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ABSTRACT 
Title of Thesis: The American Press and the Sinking of the 
Lusitania 
Timothy Joseph McDonough, Master of Arts, 1986 
Thesis directed by: Maurine Beasley, Associate Professor, 
College of Journalism 
Purpose of Study: The purpose of the study was to analyze to 
what degree the sinking of the R.M.S. Lusitania swayed 
editorial opinion against Germany in seven representative 
United States newspapers. 
Procedures: Seven newspapers were chosen for this study, 
based on their geographic location and political prominence: 
the New York Times, Atlanta Constitution, Chicago Tribune, 
San Francisco Examiner, Washington Post, Kansas City Star, 
and the Milwaukee Journal. The historical record of U.S. 
foreign policy prior to World War I, and the political 
viewpoint of each newspaper was reviewed by way of 
introduction. The papers were examined for news and 
editorial content. Items studied included: the first seven 
pages of each newspaper, the unsigned editorials expressing 
the view of the editorial staff, and letters to the editor 
that dealt with the sinking. Each paper was studied six 
months prior to the sinking, during the crisis (including 
the exchange of diplomatic notes between the United States 
and Germany), and six months after the answer to Wilson's 
final Lusitania note. 
Conclusion: The study found that the sinking of the 
Lusitania did not sway editorial opinion against Germany in 
the selected newspapers . 
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CHAPTER ONE: THE LOSS OF AN ATLANTIC GREYHOUND 
The Lusitania: Queen of the Atlantic Run 
The sealanes of the North Atlantic are the most 
dangerous and heavily traveled in the world. First used by 
the Vikings, methods of navigating the routes between Europe 
and North America had changed little by the turn of the 20th 
Century. 
The maritime hazards of the North Atlantic are legend. 
The spring thaw brings icebergs broken from northern 
glaciers. One such iceberg in 1912 claimed the Titanic on 
its maiden voyage. The summer and early fall bring the 
hurricanes spawned in 
mentioned, brings seas as 
the Caribbean. The winter, as 
tall as buildings. And all year 
long the fog lays in thick blankets, especially off the 
Grand Banks. 
The North Atlantic route has been used since the days 
of the 13 British colonies in North America, but the first 
technological boost came in 1820, when the Savannah became 
the first steamship to make the crossing. Advances followed, 
but it was the industrialization of the late 19th century 
that brought on the steamship boom. The timely exchange of 
industrial raw materials between countries became vital. And 
with the growing world economy came people traveling to 
oversee their business interests abroad. The immigrants too 
1 
were a large group, always seeking safer and cheaper passage 
from the old world to the new. 
Like the race for the moon in the 1960's, the quest 
for speed in the North Atlantic became a matter of national 
pride. Germany, England, France, and to a lesser extent-
the United States all sought a share in the passenger 
trade. And like the race for the moon, the quest for larger 
and faster 
and bounds. 
passenger steamers increased technology by leaps 
Though Britannia had always ruled the waves, the 
market leader at the turn of the century was Germany. 
Germany was building ships so large and so fast that, for 
awhile, German shipping lines were competing only with 
themselves. Until the turn-of-the-century German liners such 
as the Kaiser Wilhelm II and Deutschland, it was traditional 
to have passenger accommodations as rough as the voyage 
itself. The Germans were the first to sumptuously decorate 
their ships, taking as their inspiration "castles on the 
Rhine. 111 Speed and luxury were now taken together, and it 
was the German ships that gained praise as well as the 
coveted Blue Riband award for Atlantic speed. 
But for all the technology, size, and speed, sailing 
the North Atlantic had changed little since the days of 
canvas. Compass, charts, and sextants were still the 
1 . John M Brinnin, The Sway of the Grand Saloon: A 
Social History of the North Atlantic, (New York: Delacorte 
Press, 1971), p. 338. 
2 
. I 
captain's only tools - the Marconi wireless radio was added 
during the late 1890's. In the days without radar, sonar, or 
satellite communications and tracking, captains were sailing 
these ocean behemoths by the seat of their pants. That is 
probably why the Titanic disaster is so firmly ingrained in 
the public mind. It exemplified Nature still claiming 
dominion over wealth and technology. 
The 1912 loss of the Titanic would forever change 
North Atlantic passenger service, but the circumstances 
remain incredible to this day. As if driving on a night 
highway without headlights, the White Star liner was 
traveling at 22.5 knots (a knot equals 1.15 land miles per 
hour), at night, through an area filled with icebergs. 
Though repeatedly warned by wireless of icebergs in the area 
- some of them hundreds of feet high - Captain E.J. Smith 
was determined to have an Atlantic speed record on the 
liner's maiden voyage. When lookouts spotted the fateful 
iceberg, the captain discovered too late how difficult it 
was to stop, or maneuver, a 882-foot - 46,000-ton ship. 
Though it might have withstood a head-on impact, the 
glancing blow of the iceberg sliced and buckled a 100 yard 
gash below the 
(starboard=right, 




disappeared beneath the surface some three hours later, with 
the loss of 1,513 lives. The "unsinkable" ship had become 
"the most imposing mausoleum that ever housed the bones of 
3 
---
men since the Pyramids rose from the desert s ands."2 The 
board of inquiry later exonerated the captain 
down with his ship. 
who went 
The Titanic disaster pointed up several safety flaws, 
corrected on all later passenger liners. Double hulls, 
adequate control of watertight compartments, improved 
bulkhead (wall) construction, and adequate lifeboats and 
safety equipment were all mandated after the disaster. 
But such safety features were already a part of the 
Cunard Company's entry in the North Atlantic races - the 
785-foot, 30,396-ton Lusitania.3 Completed in 1907, with her 
sister ship, the Mauretania, the Lusitania was designed to 
wrest the Blue Riband from the Germans and set new standards 
of ocean-going luxury. Though destiny would part the two 
sisters, known affectionately as "Lucy" and "Mary," the 
Mauretania remained in service until retiring in late 1934-
after holding the Atlantic speed record for 20 s traight 
years. 4 
The Lusitania was launched first, and epitomized the 
Cunard Company motto of "Speed, Comfort, and Safety . " She 
was built for Cunard by John Br own and Company of Clydebank, 
Scotland. Five years before the loss of the Titanic, the 
2. Ibid., p. 367. 
3 . See Appendix, p. 217 . 
4 . John Maxtone-Graham, The Only Way to Cross , (Ne w 
York: Macmillan, 1972), p. 43. 
4 
• 
Lusitania had a unique double-hull construction. The space 
between the hulls was made up of watertight, longitudinal 
bunkers used for coal storage an effective collision 
barrier. The ship itself was divided by eleven, transverse 
watertight bulkheads - designed not to "spill over" one into 
another should the ship take on water. 5 Extra lifeboats, 
life rafts, and safety equipment were added after the 
Titanic disaster. Despite all these safety features, 
however, Cunard never claimed the Lusitania was 
"unsinkable." 
Her speed was due to steam-powered, low-turbine 
engines - never before used on a ship of that size. Twenty-
five coal-fired boilers powered the turbines, which drove 
four propellers (or "screws") at up to 20,000 horsepower 
each. John Brinnin captured in words 
breakthrough: 
the engineering 
The Lusitania was the first of the great 
sister ships to be launched, and thus the first 
to demonstrate that the still-new turbine engine 
could make a racer out of a marine mastodon. 
With full steam up, the Lusitania's 3,000,000 
individual turbine blades generated a force of 
70,000 horsepower. On her trial runs, in spite 
of the fact that her bottom was ' heavily coated 
with the chemically-saturated, mud of the river 
Clyde' [where she was launched], she reached a 
speed of 25 knots. She was also the first great 
ship to employ electricity to operate her 
steering apparatus, to close and open her 175 
watertight compartments, to detect fire, and to 
control her lifeboat davits. 
To see that she was prepared to sail from 
5 . Colin Simpson, The Lusitania, (Boston: Little, Brown 
and Co., 1972), p. 19. 
5 
---
Liverpool, 22 trains, hauling 300 tons of coal 
each, had to chug into port and empty their 
loads into her bunkers. Her waterworks could 
have served to supply the needs of a city as big 
as London: just to cool the spent steam from her 
engines, 65,000 gallons of sea water per minute 
were driven through her stills. From stem to 
stern, her form ran in one continuous curve. Her 
fine bow, her long forecastle that extended far 
back into the superstructure, her graceful stern 
and the heavy rake of her four huge funnels made 
her the apotheosis of speed, might, and sea-
going efficiency.6 
The Lusitania was named for an ancient Roman province 
that is now Spain and Portugal, and her size rivaled any 
monument in Rome. Though almost 100 feet shorter than the 
Titanic, the Lusitania was taller on a more narrow beam 
(width of 88 feet) thus giving the illusion of a much 
larger ship. Still, at 785-feet long, and 216-feet high, she 
6 
was taller and longer than the Capitol Building in 
Washington. 7 The ship rose a total of nine decks - her 
bridge was as high as a six-story building. Her height, 
narrow width, and rakish tilt of the four funnels earned her 
the nickname "the Greyhound of the Seas." 
The ship's luxurious appointments matched her size and 
speed. Designed to be as tasteful as an English manor house, 
Cunard hoped the Lusitania would make her German rivals 
appear ostentatious: 
Her decorative and architectural features 
compared with those of the world's finest hotels 
- lofty domes, fashioned and painted by expert 
6 . Brinnin, Sway of the Grand Saloon, p. 342. 
7 . Simpson, The Lusitania, p. 23. 
decorators, panels prepared by skilled workers, 
handsome tapestries, curtains and carpets. The 
First Class Dining Saloon was a vision in white 
and gold. The style was Louis Seize, and the 
predominating color was vieux rose. The 
magnificent mahogany sideboard, with its gilt 
metal ornaments, was the admiration of all who 
saw it, while high above towered the wonderful 
dome with painted panels after Boucher. The 
Lounge was decorated in late Georgian period, 
and the fine inlaid mahogany panels, richly 
modeled dome ceiling and marble mantelpieces 
constituted a luxurious ensemble. Harmony and 
refinement was the motif of the Writing Room, 
Library and Smoke Room. In addition to these 
various Public Rooms, there were Regal Suites, 
comprising Dining Room, Drawing Room, two 
Bedrooms, Bath and Toilet Rooms, with adjoining 
rooms for maid or valet. The accommodation for 
Second Class passengers was also upon a 
luxurious scale, and the Public Rooms included 
Dining Room, Smoking Room Library and Lounge. 
Ample provision had also been made for those 
travelling Third Class. 8 
The Lusitania was a floating hotel with accommodation 
for 2,300 passengers and a staff of 900. 
On her second westbound voyage in 1907, the Lusitania 
captured the Blue Riband of the Atlantic with an average 
speed of 23.10 knots. This speed exceeded the prior records 
of the German liners Kronprinz Wilhelm, Kaiser Wilhelm II, 
and Kronprinzessin Cecilia. Later that same year, the 
Mauretania captured the record with an average speed of 
23.69 knots. In 1908, "Mary" broke her own record, while 
that same year, "Lucy" took it back with a record speed of 
25.01 knots an incredible average speed for the North 
Atlantic at that time. The Mauretania, slightly longer and 
B. Ibid. , p. 7. 
7 
heavier, was generally the faster of the two sisters, 
however. 9 
Yet this speed had another purpose besides convenient 
travel, for both the Lusitania and Mauretania were designed 
as British warships. This was the result of a deal between 
Cunard and the British Admiralty. The English were concerned 
about the German dominance of Atlantic passenger service-
Cunard needed faster, more luxurious ships, but lacked the 
capital to build them. The Admiralty was worried that the 
large and speedy liners of her German rivals might be 
converted into armed wartime commerce raiders (the Germans 
had such plans). 
The deal struck between the Admiralty and Cunard 
resulted in the Cunard Agreement of 1903 - which was debated 
and approved by Parliament. Under the agreement, the 
8 
government would lend Cunard 2,600,000 pounds at 2.75 
percent interest for the construction of the Lusitania and 
Mauretania (the going interest rate at that time was five 
percent). The life of the loan was 20 years, one-twentieth 
to be repaid annually, beginning with each ship's maiden 
voyage. The British government would also annually pay 
Cunard 150,000 pounds to maintain both liners in war 
readiness, and 68,000 pounds to carry British mail (hence 
9 . Thomas A. Bailey and Paul B. Ryan, The Lusitania 
Disaster: An Episode in Modern Warfare and Diplomacy, (New 
York: The Free Press, 1975), p. 9. 
the designation R.M.S - "Royal Mail Ship").10 
In return for the money, both ships could be taken 
over by the Admiralty at its discretion. All the ships' 
officers, and half their crews, were required to belong to 
the Royal Navy Reserve or Royal Naval Fleet Reserve. Under 
the agreement, Cunard would have to pay monetary penalties 
if it failed to live up to these requirements. The agreement 
also provided a formula for the Admiralty to commandeer 
other Cunard vessels during wartime. Cunard would get the 
desired oceangoing speed of 24-25 knots, but the Admiralty 
would design the ships: 
Especially significant were the published 
Admiralty specifications for arming both the 
Lusitania and Mauretania. Both were to be so 
constructed, with such arrangements for ' pillars 
and supports,' as would permit the strategic 
emplacement in wartime of twelve 6-inch quick-
firing guns, ' within the shelter of heavy shell 
plating,' that is, small gun shields. This was 
powerful armament, comparable to that of 
' armoured cruisers of the County Class,' thus 
making the two Cunarders ' effective additions to 
any fighting squadron.' 
Additionally the engine rooms and boiler 
rooms of both vessels were placed as far as 
feasible below the water line for protection 
against enemy gunfire, as were the rudder and 
steering gear. The coal bunkers were likewise 
located deep on the sides, thus serving as a 
shield for the vital parts. Clearly the two 
Cunarders were designed for conventional surface 
warfare against armed merchant ships, not for 
action against submarines. The Admiralty 
decision to provide the ships with the necessary 
' pillars and supports' for twelve 6-inch guns 
was a lingering manifestation of 19th Century 
naval strategy, which had attached considerable 
lO. Ibid., p. 5. 
9 
10 
value to the merchant-raider.ll 
Both the Lusitania and Mauretania were of dubious 
value as British warships. Though their guns would be 
armored, if installed, their hulls were not - the steel skin 
was no more than an inch thick, and in some places even 
less. Even a lightly armored ship would be more than a match 
for each liner. Six-inch guns were large and formidable if 
slugging it out with another warship, but smaller 4-inch 
guns fired faster, and were better suited for U-boats-
smaller, more elusive targets. As events of the war itself 
dictated, British commerce raiders were of little use since 
most German liners and merchant ships were blockaded in 
neutral ports by the British Navy. The Mauretania was one of 
nine British passenger liners called to duty by the 
Admiralty. The Lusitania, though initially included on the 
list, remained in commercial service. The other liners, 
including her sister, were armed for military transport soon 
after England entered World War I. However, two scholars, 
Thomas Bailey and Paul Ryan, point out: 
At the time the Lusitania met her doom in 
1915, she was in commercial service, although 
subject to the operational control of the 
Admiralty, which could arbitrarily change her 
routing at any time. Moreover, the London 
government was not only subsidizing the company 
for her maintenance and mail service but owned 
more than half the vessel. There were still 
about twelve more years to run on the twenty-
year loan. Along with other British liners of 18 
knots and over, a silhouette of the Lusitania 
ll. Ibid., pp. 5-6. 
appeared in Jane's Fighting Ships for 1914 for 
identification purposes. Brassey's The Naval 
Annual, 1914, categorized both the Lusitania and 
the Mauretania as ' Royal Naval Reserved Merchant 
Cruisers,' which meant that they were subject to 
call-up at the pleasure of the Admiralty in 
wartime, as were numerous other fast merchant 
shipsl 2 [every German U-boat carried these 
annuals on board]. 
The Lusitania: Final Voyage 
11 
May 1, 1915, dawned with gray rainy skies - the war in 
Europe was almost ten months old. The Lusitania sat quietly 
at Pier 54 while the bustle of embarkation occurred all 
around her. The light rain seemed to make her more brilliant 
against the gray sky highlighting the glistening black 
hull, gleaming white superstructure, and tall black funnels 
(the normal scarlet and black of Cunard covered over for 
wartime). Her length stretched beyond the pier, and the 
stern jutted into the Hudson River. There was more activity 
than usual on Pier 54 that morning - including the hustle of 
reporters and newsreel photographers - because a warning had 
been published in several New York papers: 
NOTICE! 
TRAVELLERS intending to embark on the 
Atlantic voyage are reminded that a state of war 
exists between Germany and her allies and Great 
Britain and her allies; that the zone of war 
includes the waters adjacent to the British 
Isles; that, in accordance with formal notice 
given by the Imperial German Government, vessels 
flying the flag of Great Britain, or any of her 
12 • Ibid., p. 6. 
allies, are liable to destruction 
waters and that travellers sailing in 
zone on ships of Great Britain or her 




IMPERIAL GERMAN EMBASSY, 
Washington, D.C., April 22, 1915. 13 
12 
The notice had been prepared by Count Johann 
Bernstorff, Germany's ambassador in Washington. It was an 
attempt to appeal to the American people over the heads of 
the Wilson Administration. The administration was allowing 
Americans to travel on British vessels, even though those 
vessels often carried ammunition, cannons and rifles, or 
Canadian reservists headed for England. Secretary of State 
William Jennings Bryan sought to persuade Wilson to warn 
Americans away from such ships, but Wilson and his other 
advisors favored the British in the war, and felt Americans 
could travel as they pleased. Bernstorff had planned to 
publish the warning in selected east coast newspapers by 
April 24, and on two subsequent Saturdays. But production 
delays caused the warning to first appear on May 1. 14 
The Lusitania was not the only passenger liner to 
depart for England that day. The American Line's New York 
was scheduled to leave at noon counting among her 
passengers actress Isadora Duncan. But the Lusitania was 
larger and faster, and would save passengers two days 
sailing time. Besides, President Woodrow Wilson had warned 
13 . Donald B. Chidsey, The Day They Sank the Lusitania, 
(New York: Award Books, 1967), pp. 10-11. 
14 . Bailey and Ryan, The Lusitania Disaster, pp. 74-76. 
Germany would be held to a 
loss of American ships 
Thus the 197 Americans 
13 
"strict accountability" for the 
and lives to the U-boat campaign. 
embarking on the Lusitania that 
morning were confident their government protected them. The 
New York was slower and dowdier, the Lusitania was for 
1915's "in" crowd. 
The German warning caused some passengers, however, to 
cancel their bookings on the Lusitania, transferring to the 
New York or waiting for a later trip. Many passengers-
especially the prominent received anonymous telegrams 
warning them not to sail on the doomed liner - some of these 
telegrams were signed "Morte," Latin for death. Still, 1,257 
passengers climbed the Lusitania's gangway. Prominent 
Americans included millionaire playboy Alfred Gwynne 
Vanderbilt, Broadway producer Charles Frohman, and the 
country philosopher and author from East Aurora, New York, 
Elbert Hubbard - author of the inspirational "A Message to 
Garcia," which sold 40 million copies. The most notable 
Britons aboard were Welsh industrialist D.A. Thomas and his 
suffragette daughter Margaret - Lady Mackworth. Cunard had 
recently dropped its trans-Atlantic fares, so more middle-
class passengers were aboard than usual. 
But the German warning, seemingly directed 
specifically at the Lusitania, brought out reporters and 
curious onlookers. One newsreel photographer joked, "We'll 
title this ' The Last Voyage of the Lusitania!" Another 
14 
photographer remarked to Charles Frohman, "Well if anything 
happens, at least we have your picture." A Cunard spokesman 
on the pier told reporters, "There's no risk to anyone, I 
can assure you, gentlemen. Everybody's safe on this 
crossing." Junior Third Officer Albert Bestic told a worried 
passenger, "I believe it's bluff. There's no submarine that 
can catch the Lusitania. 11 15 
But what many passengers did not know was that the 
"Greyhound of the Seas" would be sailing at reduced speed. 
As an economy measure, Cunard shut down six of the 
Lusitania's 25 boilers (or Boiler Room Number 4). 16 This 
reduced the ship's maximum speed from 25 to 21 knots. Since 
surfaced U-boats traveled at a maximum of 15 knots, and 
submerged at 9 knots, Cunard felt the margin of safety more 
than enough. 
Captain William Turner accepted this loss of speed, 
but he was not particularly pleased about it. He was also 
annoyed by the German warning and the nosy reporters that 
accompanied it. Turner was a gruff and crusty veteran of the 
days of sail, and was usually annoyed with everything unless 
he was on his bridge - in command, and at sea. He received 
no special sailing orders from Cunard on the day of the 
ship's departure. 
15 . Des Hickey and Gus Smith, Seven Days to Disaster: 
The Sinking of the Lusitania, (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 
1982), p. 16. 
16 . Ibid., p. 57. 
15 
Turner was especially angry at the two and half hour 
delay of his ship's launching time. At the last minute, some 
forty passengers were transferred to the Lusitania from the 
British Anchor Line steamer Cameronia. That morning, the 
Cameronia had been commandeered by the Admiralty for wartime 
service. Historians like to point out that had it not been 
for this two-hour delay, the Lusitania would have missed its 
fateful rendezvous with the u-20.17 
At 12:30 P.M., May 1, 1915, the Lusitania cast off her 
mooring lines in New York for the last time. Tugboats gently 
nosed the liner's bow into the midstream of the Hudson, 
beginning what was to be the ship's 202nd Atlantic crossing. 
Carrying the largest passenger list since the war's outbreak 
- 1,257 passengers (including those from the Cameronia), and 
702 crew members - it was still almost 1,000 spaces short of 
capacity. 
The day before the Lusitania's New York departure, the 
U-20, commanded by Kapitanleutnant Walther Schwieger, sailed 
from the German naval base of Emden - on the North Sea. The 
U-20 was ordered to travel around northern Scotland and 
western Ireland into the Irish Sea. The U-boat's destination 
was the busy waters off the Mersey River bar leading to 
Liverpool - a total round trip of some 3,000 miles.18 
The 30 year old Schwieger came from an old Berlin 
17 . Bailey and Ryan, The Lusitania Disaster, p. 91. 
18. See Appendix, p. 218. 
16 
family, and was well liked by his crew. He kept three pet 
dachshunds on board the U-20 as mascots. Schwieger was a 
veteran of several patrols, and carried out his orders to 
the letter. Though not the most humane U-boat commander, 
Schwieger was not the most ruthless either. He was never 
accused of such atrocities as machine-gunning lifeboats. In 
February, 1915, however, Schwieger and the U-20 attacked a 
British hospital ship - thinking it a British merchant ship. 
The mistake was realized, and luckily the torpedo missed its 
mark. On this May 1915 cruise, Schwieger was ordered to 
sink, with or without warning, all enemy ships and those 
disguised as neutral vessels. Schwieger was inclined to 
shoot first and ask questions later. 
A successful U-boat attack often involved as much luck 
as skill. Due to mechanical problems, the failure rate for 
1915 German torpedoes was 60 percent. 19 Launching torpedoes 
in rough weather was impossible, and the periscopes used to 
aim them would often jam, fog up, or allow only obscured 
vision due to passing surface waves. U-boats were extremely 
slow under water, and on the surface they risked attack (the 
British government had ordered its merchant ships to resist 
by gunfire or ramming). Since a U-boat commander had to 
"lead" his target to fire a torpedo (aim ahead of it), a 
zigzagging merchant ship greatly reduced the chance for a 
successful attack the slow-moving U-boat could not 
19 . Bailey and Ryan, The Lusitania Disaster, p. 115. 
17 
maneuver fast enough for a moving target. Despite such odds, 
Schwieger was considered a successful U-boat "ace," and when 
he was killed in his submarine in 1917, ranked seventh on a 
list of U-boat commanders who had sunk tons of Allied 
shipping. He personally was credited with sinking over 
100,000 tons. 20 
As Schwieger and the U-20 began the hazardous journey 
through the British Navy toward the south coast of Ireland, 
the Lusitania was making good time in fine weather. A 
lifeboat muster was held daily at either Number 13 on the 
starboard side, or lifeboat Number 14 on the port side-
depending on the wind. In either case, the ship's whistle 
would blow and eight crewmen and an officer would appear on 
deck. To the amusement of watching passengers, the eight men 
would get into the lifeboat, tie on life jackets, pick up 
their oars, and then get out again. The boats were never 
swung out over the rail, nor were they lowered to the water. 
There is evidence that though required to lower the boats 
the day before departure in New York harbor, this was not 
done because coal ships were along side. 21 Many passengers 
felt these daily drills were not enough, and that the crew 
that took part looked unprofessional. 
The passengers were not the only ones who noticed the 
20. Edwyn Gray, The Killing Time: The U- Boat War, 1914 -
18, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1972), p. 268. 
21. Simpson, The Lusitania, pp. 102-103. 
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crew of the Lusitania. Captain Turner too did not like what 
he saw. But a war was raging in Europe, and Britain needed 
almost every able-bodied seaman it could get. Turner had to 
be satisfied with a few regulars and many with little 
sailing experience. Some of the coal stokers and stewards 
had never been on a ship before. They had signed up in New 
York to work their way across the Atlantic. The Lusitania 
was almost 200 crew members short of her peacetime 
complement of 900, but her passenger list on this trip was 
smaller than usual. 
Turner also resented the group of wealthy gentlemen 
from first class who requested he improve the boat drills. 
If Cunard found it satisfactory, so did he. Neither Cunard, 
nor the set-in-his-old-salt ways Turner were prepared for 
wartime passenger travel. Turner told the men he would speak 
to the First Officer about their requests, but the drill 
remained the same. Crew members had lifeboat assignments, 
but passengers did not. There were no public demonstrations 
on how to put on a life jacket, and there were no smaller 
life vests for the children. Turner, with no stomach for the 
public relations aspects of his job, considered his wealthy 
passengers "bloody monkeys. 11 22 
Turner did order all 22 lifeboats uncovered and swung 
out over the rails during the early morning hours of May 6, 
as the ship approached the Irish coast. At night, passengers 
22 . Hickey and Smith, Seven Days to Disaster, p. 47. 
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on board were ordered to extinguish all unnecessary lights, 
and a partial blackout was observed. 
All British merchant captains were issued wartime 
sailing instructions on February 10, 1915, and again on 
April 16. They included: 
1. Preserve wireless silence within 100 miles of 
land, except in grave emergencies. 
2. Keep extra sharp lookouts. 
3. Maintain boats ready and provisioned. 
4. Keep on move outside ports like Liverpool. 
5. Avoid headlands [prominent landmarks], near 
which submarines routinely lurked and found 
their best hunting. 
6. Steer a midchannel course [in the Irish 
Channel]. 
7. Operate at 'full speed' off harbors, such as 
Queenstown. 
8. Steer a zigzag course.2 3 
The way Captain Turner would interpret these 
instructions would play a critical role in the events of May 
7. Though instructed, Turner was an old dog who refused to 
learn new tricks. He had been at sea all his life, and the 
Admiralty bureaucrats in London were not going to question 
his knowledge or his sense of safety. 
Meanwhile, Captain Schwieger was disappointed with his 
hunting off the Irish coast. After maneuvering through the 
minefields north of Scotland, and eluding destroyers off the 
north coast of Ireland, he had rounded the southern tip of 
the Emerald Isle with an air of expectation. But the U-20 
failed in its attacks on three steamers, bearing neutral 
markings, but suspected to be disguised British merchantmen. 
23. Bailey and Ryan, The Lusitania Disaster, pp. 141-142. 
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In all three cases Schwieger fired his torpedoes without 
warning, or without a close inspection to determine 
nationality. Six days out of Emden, the only kill he logged 
was the 132-ton British schooner Earl of Lathem. Schwieger 
had surfaced, ordered the five-man crew of the small sailing 
ship to evacuate, and sank her with twelve shots from the u-
20's deck gun. Schwieger sank the Earl of Latham ten miles 
south of the Old Head of Kinsale, a large hill topped with a 
200-foot black and white striped lighthouse - a prominent 
landmark for navigation. 
The hunting picked up on May 6, when Schwieger sank 
two sister ships from the same British shipping line. Some 
13 miles south of the Coningbeg Lightship, an area east of 
the Old Head of Kinsale, the U-20 encountered the 5,858-ton 
Candidate in the fog. Schwieger approached on the surface, 
firing his deck gun without warning. once the crew made for 
the lifeboats, a torpedo caused the ship to sink by the 
stern. Later that afternoon Schwieger sunk the 5,945-ton 
Centurion, the Candidate's sister ship in the British 
Harrison Line. Seventeen miles south of the lightship, 
Schwieger again attacked without warning sinking the 
Centurion with two torpedoes while the crew escaped in 
lifeboats. The U-20 was operating in an area just ahead of 
the east-bound Lusitania. 
The British Admiralty was aware of this submarine 
activity off the south coast of Ireland. Wireless warnings 
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were sent, addressed to "all British ships," though much of 
the information applied only to ships heading for Ireland's 
south coast particularly the Lusitania. Between the 
evening of May 6, and the morning of May 7, the Lusitania 
received and acknowledged a total of ten wireless submarine 
warnings from the Admiralty. Though phrased in general terms 
to avoid aiding the Germans, the Admiralty warnings were 
clearly directed at the course the Lusitania would take 
around Ireland to 
"Submarines , active 
Liverpoo1. 24 The first 
off the south coast 
message read 
of Ireland. 1125 
Another warned of U-boats operating off Fastnet Rock, the 
first landmark the Lusitania would encounter. Another 
message warned of submarine activity off Coningbeg 
Lightship, though it did not mention that the Candidate and 
Centurion had been sunk. Of the ten messages, one was 
repeated six times. It included: "Take Liverpool pilot at 
bar. Avoid headlands; pass harbours at full speed; steer 
mid-channel course. 11 26 
Many historians have argued that the warnings that 
Turner received were ambiguous and confusing, but is seems 
clear that repeated warnings should dictate extra vigilance 
on the part of any sea captain - unfortunately for his ship, 
24 A d' . See ppen ix, p. 219. 
25 . Simpson, The Lusitania, p. 144. 
26 . Bailey and Ryan, The Lusitania Disaster, p. 135. 
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Turner did not heed them. A veteran peacetime merchant 
captain, Turner was skeptical of Admiralty instructions for 
wartime after all, the German U-boat blockade had only 
been announced three months earlier - on February 4, 1915. 
Though skeptical, Turner did follow the first four 
instructions mentioned earlier. 
The Lusitania did maintain wireless silence. No 
messages were broadcast, and the Admiralty warnings were 
acknowledged in code. Turner doubled his lookouts from four 
to eight - particularly in the area of the bow. Though there 
was some later questions about the provisioning of the 
lifeboats, Turner had ordered them uncovered and swung out 
on their davits as he neared Ireland. Finally, Turner had no 
plans to dawdle outside Liverpool. The shallows - "bar" - at 
the entrance to the Mersey River could only be crossed at 
high tide -around dawn on May 8. To miss the tide meant 
circling until the next tide - making the ship a perfect 
target. Turner was planning to enter the Mersey at dawn, 
without stopping for a harbor pilot, and thus save time. 
But these first four instructions did not challenge 
Turner's seafaring experience the way North Atlantic 
passenger liners had always traveled before. The others did; 
Turner ignored them, and it cost him his ship. As ships had 
done since the days of sail, the Lusitania was cruising 
within sight of the major headlands on the southern Irish 
coast - Brow Head, Galley Head, and the Old Head of Kinsale. 
Mariners had 
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always hugged the coast to guide their 
navigation; when torpedoed, the Lusitania had just completed 
a four-point bearing on the Old Head of Kinsale - requiring 
it to cruise a straight course toward the landmark for about 
forty minutes. Neglecting the headland instruction, Turner 
also failed to keep a midchannel course. Though authors have 
argued there is no "channel" off that part of Ireland, maps 
and most naval historians say that there is - at that point 
140-miles separate Kinsale and the southern tip of England. 
Traditionally, ships had sailed only two miles from the Old 
Head of Kinsale. At the inquiry following the sinking, 
Turner said he thought his distance of twelve miles was 
sufficient, whereas midchannel actually meant some 60 miles 
off the Irish coast. Turner also did not pass Queenstown 
harbor at full-speed. Instead he slowed his ocean greyhound 
to 18 knots - in U-boat active waters - to make the high 
tide on the Mersey exactly at dawn. Finally, Turner failed 
to zigzag - the Lusitania sailed a straight course when she 
was torpedoed. Turner said at the inquiry he thought he was 
supposed to zigzag only after a U-boat was sighted. 
The passengers on board the Lusitania were not aware 
of their captain's neglect. May 7, was bright, warm, and 
sunny after an early morning fog. Passengers strolled the 
promenade deck and opened 
in all the dining saloons. 
their portholes. Lunch was ready 
The portholes, though ordered 
closed by Turner, were opened by passengers and stewards to 
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allow in the fresh spring breeze. There were some 500 of 
these 18-inch portholes on each side of the ship - most were 
open. It has been estimated that in four minutes, 24 such 
open ports would allow 360 tons of water to enter a sinking 
ship. 27 
Schwieger and the U-20 had meanwhile decided to call 
it quits. With only three torpedoes, and two-fifths of his 
diesel fuel left, he decided to start the long voyage back 
around the west coast of Ireland to Germany. May 7 was a 
fine day, so he decided to cruise on the surface. 
Schwieger's log is as graphic as it is succinct (the German 
time of the log is one hour later than the British time in 
the area): 
2:20 P.M. Directly in front 
funnels and the masts of 
at right angles to our 
the SW and going towards 
[the U-20 submerges]. 
of us I sighted four 
a passenger steamer 
course coming from 
Galley Head 
2:25 P.M. Have advanced eleven meters towards 
the steamer in hope it will change its course 
along the Irish coast. 
2:35 P.M. Steamer turns [starboard, after 
completing the four point bearing off the 
Old Head], takes direction to Queenstown, and 
thereby makes it possible for us to approach 
for a shot. We proceed at high speed in order 
to reach correct firing position. 
3:10 P.M. Torpedo shot at distance of 700 
meters, going three meters below the surface. 28 
At lookout on the Lusitania's starboard bow was 18-
year-old Leslie Morton, who signed on in New York with his 
27 . Bailey and Ryan, The Lusitania Disaster, p. 302. 
28 . Edwyn Gray, The Killing Time, pp. 13-17. 
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brother for their first Atlantic crossing on the Lusitania. 
Morton spotted the torpedo, yelled to the bridge, and ran 
below to wake up his sleeping brother. He was not heard on 
the bridge, however. If he had been, the Lusitania - agile 
for her size - could have turned hard to starboard and 
averted disaster. The second shouted warning from a lookout 
- "Here's a torpedo!" came too late. 29 American 
businessman James Brooks saw the approaching torpedo from 
the promenade deck: 
I had just finished a run on deck, when I 
glanced out over the water. It was perfectly 
smooth. My eyes alighted on a white streak 
making its way with lightning-like rapidity 
towards the ship. I was so high in that position 
above the surface of the water that I could make 
out the outline of a torpedo. It appeared to be 
about twelve feet long, and came along possibly 
three feet below the surface, its sides white 
with bubbles of foam. I watched its passage, 
fascinated, until it passed out of sight behind 
the bridge, and in another moment came the 
explosion. The ship, recoiling under the force 
of the blow, was jarred and lifted, as if it had 
struck an immovable object. A column of water 
shot up to the bridge deck, carrying with it a 
lot of debris, and, despite the fact that I must 
have been twenty yards from the spot at which 
the torpedo struck, I was knocked off my feet. 
Before I could recover myself, the iron forepart 
of the ship was enveloped in a blinding cloud of 
steam, due, not, I think, to the explosion of a 
d d 30 secon torpe o ... 
Looking through his periscope, Schwieger saw his 
normally unreliable torpedo strike home just below the 
Lusitania's bridge: 
29 . Bailey and Ryan, The Lusitania Disaster, pp. 148-149. 
30 . Brinnin, Sway of the Grand Saloon, p. 416. 
An unusually heavy explosion takes place 
with a very strong explosion cloud (cloud 
reaches far beyond front funnel). The explosion 
of the torpedo must have been followed by a 
second one (boiler or coal or powder?). The 
superstructure right above the point of impact 
and the bridge are torn asunder, fire breaks 
out, and smoke envelops the high bridge. The 
ship stops immediately and heels over to 
starboard very quickly, immersing simultaneously 
at the bow. It appears as if the ship were going 
to capsize very shortly. Great confusion ensues 
on board; the boats are made clear and some of 
them are lowered to the water. In doing so great 
confusion must have reigned; some boats, full to 
capacity, are lowered, rushed from above, touch 
the water with either stem or stern first and 
founder immediately. On the port side fewer 
boats are made clear than on the starboard side 
on account of the ship's list. The ship blows 
off [steam]; on the bow the name ' Lusitania' 
becomes visible in golden letters. The funnels 
were painted black, no flag was set astern. Ship 
was running twenty knots [actually 18]. Since it 
seems as if the steamer will keep above water 
only a short time, we dived to a depth of 
twenty-four meters and ran out to sea. It would 
have been impossible for me, anyhow, to fire a 
second torpedo inhto. th
1
~s ~1owd of people 
struggling to save t eir 1ves. 
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"COME AT ONCE. STRONG LIST. POSITION 10 MILES SOUTH 
KINSALE," was the frantic SOS sent over and over from the 
Lusitania's radio shack. In less than ten minutes, Turner 
knew his ship was doomed. The electricity was knocked out 
with the first explosion - the ship's steering, watertight 
doors, and fire detection equipment were unusable. water was 
streaming through the open portholes. Turner had immediately 
ordered "Hard-a-port!" when the torpedo was spotted, but now 
the Lusitania was locked into that steering position. Like a 
31 Bailey and Ryan, The Lusitania Disaster, p. lSO. 
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wounded animal, the Lusitania traced a helpless arc to por t 
- at first facing the Irish coast, then slowly turning away 
from it. All the while the bow disappeared before her 
captain's eyes. The ship was still moving at 18 knots 
initially, slowing in her semicircle to eventually allow the 
boats to be launched without being swept under by the wake. 
The ship was sinking so fast, panic erupted on deck - it 
became "every man for himself." Many were killed in the mad 
rush for the few lifeboats that could be launched from the 
starboard side. 
The water ten miles off the Old Head of Kinsale is 315 
feet deep, the sinking Lusitania 785 feet long - soon 
struck the bottom. As her bow hit the ocean floor her stern 
section rose almost vertically in the sky. Those in the 
water could see the propellers still spinning in the 
afternoon sun. With "a long, low moan," the Lusitania 
disappeared from sight - eighteen minutes after being hit by 
one torpedo. Of the 1,959 passengers and crew 
died. Of the 197 Americans on board, 
aboard, 1,198 
128 died. One 
horrifying statistic points out that 35 of the 39 infants on 
board were killed.32 
32. Ibid., p. 193. 
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CHAPTER TWO: STATEMENT OF PURPOSE AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
Purpose and Method 
Scholars whose research has focused on the Lusitania 
and American public opinion have said that though the 
sinking caused a wave of indignation in the United States, 
it did not result in a clamor for war against Germany. It 
was only one link in a chain of events leading to U.S. 
belligerency in World War I. This study will test this view 
in a way never done before, with an examination of seven 
representative newspapers of 1915. Specifically, this study 
will analyze to what degree the sinking of the Lusitania 
swayed editorial opinion against Germany in seven 
representative U.S. newspapers. The study uses newspapers as 
a gauge, since they are the best sources of public opinion 
existing from 1915. 
Seven newspapers were chosen for this study based on 
their geographic location and political prominence: the New 
York Times, Atlanta Constitution, Chicago Tribune, San 
Francisco Examiner, Washington Post, Kansas City Star, and 
Milwaukee Journal. The Times was chosen for its reputation 
as a paper of record, and because New York marked the 
Lusitania's last point of departure. The Constitution was 
chosen as one of the most prominent and respected dailies of 
the south. The Tribune was selected not only as a prominent 
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mid-western paper, but as one of the most notorious American 
dailies favoring the Republican Party - a paper opposing the 
policies of Woodrow Wilson. The Examiner was used as a 
representative from the west coast, and as a paper owned by 
William Randolph Hearst - a man with an enormous affect on 
the journalism of this period. The Post was selected because 
of the importance of Washington in the foreign policy 
process. The Star was selected because of its prominence in 
the western farm states - "America's Heartland." The Journal 
was chosen because the majority of its city's population was 
made up of German immigrants. The author felt that these 
papers represented most political shades of opinion in the 
United States of 1915. Thus a firm foundation for a study of 
this type. 
Each paper was studied before, during, and after the 
crisis, in order to determine any change in editorial policy 
or outlook. The papers were examined six months prior to the 
sinking of the Lusitania, that is, the first week in 
November, 1914 (Nov.1 - 7). The papers were examined during 
the crisis itself, from the sinking on May 7, 1915, through 
the exchange of three diplomatic notes ending February 4, 
1916. To cover this crisis period, every issue in May, June, 
July, and the first two weeks in August were examined. The 
final U.S. protest note was sent on July 21, 1915, and was 
not answered until February 4, 1916. Therefore, to cover the 
final German response, the first two weeks of February, 1916 
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(Feb. 1 - 14), were also examined. The papers were studied 
six months after this final exchange of notes, August 1 - 7, 
1916. A total of 134 issues per paper were examined. 
This review of each newspaper included an examination 
of: the first seven pages of each paper, the unsigned 
editorials expressing the view of the editorial staff, and 
any letters to the editor, when published, that dealt with 
the sinking. This study used descriptive analysis to 
determine the degrees of difference, or biases, in the news 
coverage of each paper. 
Qualitative analysis was used in this study, since the 
purpose and the data were well suited for non-statistical 
description and interpretation. The main reason for this is 
that the facts known today about the loss of the Lusitania 
are an accurate bench mark for comparison. 
As outlined in Chapter One, and discussed later in 
this chapter, the facts of the last voyage and sinking of 
the Lusitania are well known and documented. The facts of 
the May, 1915, cruise of the U-20, and the actions of 
Captain Schwieger, are also well documented in the historic 
record. The major questions surrounding the sinking 
(discussed later in this chapter), though controversial, 
have not changed significantly since 1915: Was the Lusitania 
armed? Did it carry munitions? What sank the ship-
exploding ammunition or bursting boilers? Why were no 
escorts provided? Was there a conspiracy to sink the 
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Lusitania? 
The fact that this case is established with such firm 
historical documentation, it is possible to make comparisons 
and judgments on the news coverage of this event by the 
newspapers of 1915. Did the papers accurately depict these 
facts? Were there variances? Did the variances favor one 
side or another - Allied or German? 
Using the facts of the sinking known today as a bench 
mark, the researcher read pages one through seven of the 
selected issues. Notes were taken on the headlines and 
contents of Lusitania stories on these pages according to 
the following criteria: Did the stories vary from the facts 
known today? If so how? Did any such variance from today's 
facts emphasize the German side in the crisis (that the 
Lusitania was an armed, munitions transport), or the British 
side (the ship was an innocent liner, and its sinking was a 
wanton act of cruelty)? The stories were also noted for 
their prominence in each newspaper. Were they relatively 
large stories or small? Did they appear on the front page, 
or inner pages? Did they appear on the top or bottom of each 
page? 
The unsigned editorials of each newspaper were also 
read, and noted, in view of the accepted facts of the 
sinking. The opinions and judgments of each editorial were 
noted accordingly: What questions were raised by the paper 
over the sinking? Was there a change in tone or opinion 
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against Germany from six months before the crisis? Published 
letters to the editor were noted in the same manner: What 
was the reaction to the sinking? Had the tone or opinion 
regarding Germany changed? As there was much comment on the 
many aspects of the war in Europe, only unsigned editorials 
and letters to the editor specifically mentioning the 
Lusitania were reviewed during the crisis period of May, 
1915, through February, 1916. 
Six months before, and six months after the sinking, 
the papers were read and noted in the same manner as during 
the Lusitania crisis period. Keeping in mind what is known 
today about the U.S. neutrality period during World War I 
(as discussed in Chapters Three and Four), pages one through 
seven of each paper were reviewed. Headline and content of 
war stories were noted according to the following criteria: 
What was the subject of the story - Central Powers or Allied 
forces? Was it a feature or news story? What was the 
editorial slant of the story - did it criticize or promote 
either side? The prominence of each war story was also 
reviewed in the same manner as during the Lusitania crisis 
period: the relative size, page location, and placement on 
each page was noted. 
Unsigned editorials 
after the Lusitania crisis 
six months before, and six months 
were reviewed and noted in the 
same manner as at the time of the sinking. Notes were taken 
on the editorials' opinions of the war policies of both the 
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Allied and Central Powers. Were the editorials supportive or 
critical of either side in their conduct of the war? The 
same review was conducted for letters to the editor. 
A review of the notes taken during this process (134 
issues per paper) allowed comparisons between the papers 
news coverage, and judgments to be made based on these 
comparisons. The language of these judgments, using such 
phrases as "majority of" and "most of the time," may seem 
out of place without statistics. But without such judgmental 
words the historian is crippled, and the analysis becomes 
strictly a narrative. 
The goal of this study is to analyze whether the 
sinking of the Lusitania swayed editorial opinion against 
Germany in seven selected newspapers. The method-
qualitative description and interpretation - is the best 
means for achieving that goal because it is sensitive enough 
to pick up subtle changes in editorial opinion or policy. 
such a study does not lend itself to statistical analysis, a 
tool better suited for larger studies, comparing a series of 
events, over a longer period of time. 
Review of the Literature 
Reviewing the literature, one finds 
twenty books deal strictly with the 
Lusitania. However, many other books of 
that fewer than 
sinking of the 
general history, 
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foreign policy, and military and maritime history continue 
to devote at least a chapter to the disaster. The Lusitania 
books published before 1920 are of little practical use 
today. These books, often relying on Allied propaganda for 
facts, attempt to justify the sinking as a casus belli for 
American belligerency. 
Since 1920, the majority of books concerning the 
of her final Lusitania have 
voyage. Donald 
and A.A. and 
been historical narratives 
Chidsey's The Day They Sank the Lusitania, 
Mary Hoehling's The Last Voyage of the 
Lusitania, are good examples of such narratives . Both books 
are good sources of background information, but written 
during the 1950's and 1960's - before the bulk of government 
documents were declassified - and their scope is limited. 
The most in-depth books have appeared since 1970. In 
1972, British journalist Colin Simpson published The 
Lusitania, a rather sensational book outlining a conspiracy 
by the British government to expose the liner to German 
submarines, hoping its sinking would embroil America in the 
war. A bestseller, the book spawned a B.B.C. television 
documentary. Almost in answer to Simpson's book, Thomas A. 
Bailey and Paul B. Ryan published The Lusitania Disaster in 
1975. Bailey, a Stanford University fo r eign policy 
historian, and Ryan, a Stanford naval historian, claimed the 
sinking was the result of a series of blunders. The latest 
books on the Lusitania were published in 1982. They are Des 
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Hickey and Gus Smith's Seven Days to Disaster, and David 
Butler's Lusitania. The latter is a novel. Both works take 
advantage of declassified records to provide thrilling 
accounts, but they fail to address the major questions 
surrounding the sinking. 
To this day dozens of questions remain unanswered 
about the loss of the Lusitania - now but a rusting hulk at 
the bottom of the Irish Sea. Scholars - those writing 
strictly of the Lusitania or those mentioning it as part of 
other works - are divided into two camps. Bailey and Ryan 
represent one group: they claim the sinking was the result 
of government policy gone awry and costly human errors - a 
terrible mistake. Simpson leads the second group: they claim 
the sinking was a deliberate trap set by Winston Churchill 
and the British Admiralty to trigger the entry of an alr eady 
eager United States into World War I a deliberat e 
massacre. These two groups disagree on almost everything but 
outline four major questions. 
What sank the Lusitania: bursting boilers or exploding 
cargo? 
The Lusitania was primarily a passenger liner and not 
a cargo ship. There was cargo space available - for baggage 
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and other items - located in the bow section. 1 When the 
Lusitania left Pier 54 in New York she carried 4,200 cases 
of Remington rifle cartridges - 1,000 to a box, for a total 
of 4,200,000. Also carried were 1,250 cases of empty 
artillery shells, and 18 cases of non-explosive shell fuses. 
Such cargo was absolute contraband, according to 
international law (discussed in the next chapter), but was 
not explosive, according to Bailey and Ryan. Empty shells 
and fuses without gunpowder could not explode. They point to 
extensive tests on rifle cartridges by the U.S. Department 
of Commerce and Labor in 1911. In those tests, cases of 
rifle shells were thrown into open fires - some cases popped 
like firecrackers but did not violently explode. Labeled 
"not explosive in bulk," federal law allowed such rifle 
cartridges to be shipped on passenger liners. The load of 
rifle ammunition was small, according to Atlantic trade 
standards, say Bailey and Ryan, and was not enough to 
explode with enough force to tear bulkheads and sink the 
ship. 
Colin Simpson does not believe the sworn ship's 
manifest. He believes other high explosives were smuggled on 
board labeled as meat, cheese, and furs. Of particular 
1 . See Appendix, p. 220 . Note: This diagram comes from 
The Lusitania Disaster by Bailey and Ryan. They place the 
torpedo's point of impact between the first and second 
funnels. Other authors, most notably Simpson, have placed 
the impact closer to the bow. 
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concern to Simpson is gun cotton, an easily concealed yet 
highly explosive and unstable material used in mines and 
artillery shells. The gun cotton was manufactured by E.I. 
DuPont de Nemours, according to Simpson, and sent to New 
York for shipment on the Lusitania and other British ships. 
Sewn into burlap bags and disguised, the gun cotton was 
placed in the forward area of the ship - in new storage 
facilities installed at the war's outbreak. The gun cotton-
or pyroxylin - would explode with great force if exposed to 
flame, or even if chemically reacting with sea water. 
Simpson says the torpedo hit forward of the bridge, and the 
second explosion of the gun cotton ripped out the bow below 
the water line. 
British military historian Patrick Beesly in his book, 
Room 40: British Naval Intelligence 1914-18, says that 
official Cunard files show that the 1,250 cases of empty 
shells were actually filled with gunpowder "live" 
ammunition and that the so-called non-explosive fuses were 
actually made of highly explosive fulminate of mercury. 
Beesly says the Lusitania carried 18 cases of fuses and 
1,466 cases of live artillery shells on her previous 
crossing. Thus, Beesly reaches the same conclusion as 
Simpson - the second explosion was ammunition. Both contend 
the British government covered this up because it would 
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verify Germany accusations after the sinking. 2 
Bailey and Ryan discount the ammunition theories, and 
say bursting boilers were behind the second and fatal 
explosion. The authors cite other rapid sinkings caused by 
ruptured boilers. Though six of the Lusitania's boilers were 
shut down in Boiler Room Number 4, located in the stern, the 
remaining boilers were red hot and operating at 195 pounds 
per square inch. An onrush of cold sea water could have 
caused an explosion as violent as any ammunition. According 
to Bailey and Ryan, the torpedo struck the starboard side of 
the ship between Boiler Room Number 1 and Number 2. The 
resulting explosion doomed the ship, they argue. 
Dives on the wreck in 1962 and 1982 revealed that the 
bow section was badly mangled with steel plating blown 
outward. This tends to lend support to those who say 
ammunition exploded in the bow. Yet this may also be because 
as the ship hit the bottom bow first the remaining 
boilers and heavy engine equipment slid forward down the 
hull - tearing open the bow area . Still, in 1982 the 
Admiralty sent the following warning to members of a diving 
expedition investigating the wreck: "It would be imprudent 
not to point out the obvious but real danger inherent if 
explosives did happen to be present. In that unlikely event 
2 . Patrick Beesly, Room 40: British Naval Intelligence 
1914-18, (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1982). 
you are strongly advised to stop operations. 3 
The evidence provided by Bailey and 
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Ryan, more 
comprehensive than much of Simpson's, makes the boiler 
theory the more credible of the two. Ryan, a naval 
historian, provides several examples of torpedoed ships-
definitely not carrying explosives - sinking in less than 
ten minutes from ruptured boilers. The cargo hold of the 
Lusitania was small, and there were plenty of large British 
freighters, armed to resist U-boats, that could carry much 
more ammunition. In 1915 Britain was desperately in need of 
military supplies and ammunition. Escorts were provided to 
ships carrying valuable military cargoes, even horses. Gun 
cotton and live artillery shells were quite valuable to the 
British military at the time. Had the Lusitania carried 
them, it is likely she would have been escorted by 
destroyers according to Admiralty orders. 
Was the Lusitania an armed warship? 
As discussed in the next chapter, all British merchant 
captains were ordered to flee from, or to resist, any 
hostile U-boats by means that included ramming. Thus, from a 
legal perspective, the Lusitania was armed with a prow that 
could cut a U-boat in two. 
3 Dan Knowlton, "Exploring the 
Lusitania," Sea Classics, June 1985, p. 34. 
Wreck of the 
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But was the Lusitania called into service by the 
British Admiralty and given her complement of twelve 6- inch 
guns? Colin Simpson says yes. According to Simpson, the 
Lusitania entered dry-dock on May 12, 1913, not for what 
Cunard called routine maintenance, but for the installation 
of her guns and their supporting equipment. Gun rings were 
installed along the boat deck, then covered with wooden deck 
panels. Areas in both the bow and stern were converted into 
magazine areas, and the guns themselves were stored in the 
bow to be wheeled out and bolted down when needed. Simpson 
cites as evidence an article in a June 19, 1913, edition of 
the New .York Tribune that discussed this conversion. 
In 1962, diver John Light saw what he thought was a 
gun barrel while inspecting the wreck of the Lusitania. 
Light also found sections of the hull cut out by earlier 
salvagers. Light's dives were restricted to 10-minute 
intervals because he was using a standard wetsuit and oxygen 
tanks at 315 feet. Simpson says Light did see a gun, and 
that the British Navy had moored over the wreck in the years 
after the sinking sending divers down to remove the 
evidence. Dives made in 1982 revealed that the wreck had 
deteriorated in the twenty years past 
superstructure has collapsed on the sea bed. No 
found. 
much of the 
cannon were 
Bailey and Ryan say Simpson relies heavily on 
blueprints for gun placement and one newspaper article for 
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his entire thesis. They claim the blueprints were plans, now 
declassified, that were never implemented. The two authors 
say the Lusitania was never in dry-dock long enough for such 
a refit, and that Admiralty files show the Lusitania was not 
called to the reserves. In addition, the 6-inch guns of 
1913-1915 were large, crew-served cannon weighing several 
tons. They would have to be installed by crane, and could 
not be trundled along the deck on the high seas. Bailey and 
Ryan also say the Cunard piers in New York were crawling 
with German spies (something Simpson agrees with) that would 
have been only too anxious to alert American newspapers to 
the Lusitania's guns. No such reports ever surfaced before 
she sailed, and newsreels of the ship's final departure show 
no such guns, or concealed guns. Passengers on previous 
voyages never saw anything resembling cannons or their 
support equipment. John Light, who helped Bailey and Ryan in 
their research effort, admits he might have seen an exposed 
spar or pipe in the wreckage. Again, the evidence cited by 
Bailey and Ryan appears more credible: that the Lusitania 
never became the commerce raider her designers envisioned. 
Why were no escorts provided for the Lusitania? 
British corvettes and destroyers were the terror of 
the German U-boat, capable of speeds of up to 35 knots. Why 
were none provided for the Lusitania? 
42 
For Simpson, Beesly, and others, the reason is simple 
there was a conspiracy to sink the Lusitania and armed 
escorts would have thwarted that plan. An author of 
particular note in this conspiracy-minded group is Samuel F. 
Bemis, who wrote, A Diplomatic History of the United States. 
Bemis himself was a Lusitania survivor. 
According to Beesly, the British had broken the German 
naval codes, and by intercepting German wireless 
communication had a general idea of where every U-boat was 
patrolling. The British Admiralty, most notably First Sea 
Lord Winston Churchill (the villain in all the conspiracy 
theories), was hoping for at least an abortive attack by the 
U-20 on the famous liner carrying American citizens. 
Churchill and the Admiralty were hoping that such an attack 
would enrage America, which would then enter the war to aid 
the Allies. British destroyers remained idle at the nearby 
port of Milford Haven to allow the attack to take place. 
Bailey and Ryan point out that destroyers were a rare 
commodity in 1915 for the British Admiralty. Most were 
involved in the disastrous naval campaign in the Dardanelles 
- an attack plan authored by Churchill himself. Others were 
occupied convoying troop transports and freighters across 
the English Channel into France. The few that remained were 
used as escorts for the slow freighters carrying important 
military cargo from America. But the Lusitania was not slow. 
She was capable of 21 knots without six of her boilers, and 
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had they been fired could have been capable of 25 knots. 
The ship's speed was her saving grace. Had she been 
zigzagging in midchannel as ordered, she would have been 
almost impossible to catch. The Admiralty had no way of 
knowing that Turner would be hugging the coast on a straight 
course at only 18 knots. In addition, a merchant ship 
accepting armed escort or convoy was considered a 
military target according to international law and subject 
to attack without warning. Why burden, and possibly 
endanger, the speedy liner with military escorts? Besides, 
say Bailey and Ryan, the Lusitania carried no vital military 
cargo to warrant the escort of the destroyers - some 100 
miles and five hours steaming time away in Milford Haven. 
Was there a conspiracy to sink the Lusitania? 
Simpson and Beesly say emphatically yes. Bemis seems 
resigned to it given the evidence. Bailey and Ryan claim 
horrible mistakes in judgement were made, but there was no 
conspiracy behind them. 
Conspiracy stories surfaced about the Lusitania almost 
immediately after the ship went down. As stated earlier, 
conspiracy advocates say Churchill, the British Admiralty, 
and the London government in general, sought U.S. 
participation in the war and needed a trigger for the 
already pro-Allied Wilson. Conspiracy backers always point 
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to a damning comment by King George to Colonel Edward M. 
House, Wilson's advisor and confidant, the day before the 
tragedy: "Suppose they should sink the Lusitania with 
American passengers on board?" 
Bailey and Ryan dismiss this comment as an idle piece 
of speculation, arguing that the British Royalty would be 
the last to know of a plan requiring such secrecy. The 
authors point out that in 1915, on the whole, the Allies 
were doing quite well against Germany in the fields of 
France. The Allies desired America's good will and 
ammunition, but the last thing they wanted was the 
idealistic Wilson to ruin their acquisitive postwar plans . 
It was not until 1917, when America finally did enter the 
war, that the Allies were in danger of collapse. 
When one reviews these conspiracy theories regarding 
the sinking of the Lusitania, one can't help but use the 
paraphrase "lies, damn lies, and the historical record." It 
seems every author has files and new evidence to draw on. It 
often comes down to whether or not the reader believes 
governments always lie or tell the truth sometimes. It is 
only now, 71 years later, that all the material had been 
declassified. The Lusitania, now lying on her starboard side 
in a chilly grave of 315 feet of water, will always be a 
restless wreck. 
The only point where these scholars agree is how many 
torpedoes were fired at the Lusitania - one. This was not 
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always the case, however, for accounts have said that as 
many as four torpedoes were fired at the ship. The multiple 
torpedo theory began with the survivors who endured 18 
minutes of life-threatening horror, not to mention hours 
floating in the chilly water. conflicting reports from these 
confused, and angry, survivors included accounts of as many 
as four torpedoes and three submarines. Several claimed they 
saw the submarines surface - though Schwieger never did. The 
British government knew - by intercepting German naval codes 
- that only one, and possibly two, U-boats were in the area 
though it had no clear idea how many torpedoes were fired. 
But it was important for Britain to hold fast to the 
multiple torpedo theory, lest a story of one torpedo, 
followed by a second explosion, appear to vindicate the 
German claims of exploding ammunition. The Germans always 
maintained that only one torpedo was fired by the U-20. 
Since the British never admitted the possibility that only 
one torpedo was fired, they encouraged speculation of the 
multiple theory in the press. The official government 
inquest said two torpedoes sank the Lusitania, and placed 
their impact point well behind the bow area - amidships. 
Other scholars mention the Lusitania as part of 
general histories, or histories addressing some other aspect 
of World War I. The Lusitania is mentioned by foreign policy 
historians in terms of an international crisis during the 
U.S. neutrality period. The facts of the sinking are usually 
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reviewed in a narrative describing the events of the 
neutrality period of 1914-1917. Thomas A. Bailey, in the 
tenth edition of A Diplomatic History of the American 
People, said of the sinking: "For perhaps the first time the 
war was really brought home to the American people. 114 Julius 
W. Pratt, in the second edition of his book, A History of 
United States Foreign Policy, refers to earlier works by 
Bailey on the Lusitania: "According to the best available 
evidence, the Lusitania was not armed and did not, as the 
Germans claimed, carry Canadian troops. She did, however, 
carry munitions .... 115 One of the latest foreign policy 
histories is Howard Jones' The Course of American Diplomacy, 
published in 1985. The University of Alabama historian says: 
"Reaction in the United States to the sinking of the 
Lusitania was a mixture of stunned disbelief and revulsion. 
Many Americans considered it an atrocity. 116 Jones sums up 
the events of the crisis by saying: 
On February 4, 
after the sinking of 
government expressed 
reparations, which 
1920's. Thus Germany 
1916, almost nine months 
the Lusitania, the German 
regret and agreed to make 
it did during the early 
never admitted wrongdoing, 
4 Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the 
American People, 10th ed., (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice 
Hall, 1980), p. 578. 
5 . Julius W. Pratt, A History of United States Foreign 
Policy, 2nd ed., (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 
1965), p. 271. 
6 . Howard Jones, The Course of American Diplomacy: From 
the Revolution to the Present, (New York: Franklin Watts, 
Inc., 1985), p. 282. 
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did not offer an apology, and continued its 
calls for arbitration. Yet there was no popular 
clamor in the United States for war, and the 
drawn out exchanges of notes allowed emotions to 
calm while leaving the impression that Wilsonian 
diplomacy had achieved a victory. The 
administration in Washington chose to regard the 
promise of indemnification as satisfactory, and 
dropped the matter.7 
Samuel F. Bemis in the fifth edition of, A Diplomatic 
History of the United States, is critical of the British 
government, regarding the Lusitania, in a long note ending 
Chapter 32: "One might well wonder whether the British 
Government purposely exposed to attack the Lusitania and 
other British passenger vessels carrying American citizens, 
in order to lead the Germans on to a rash act which might 
bring the United States into the war. 11 8 Bemis' chapter deals 
particularly with the international maritime law questions 
of the period. 
Wilson scholars view the crisis in terms of an example 
of presidential decision-making. Some of these historians, 
most notably Arthur S. Link, view Wilson as a kind of martyr 
for the cause of peace: 
For the President of the United States this 
was by far the severest testing that he had ever 
known. We cannot live all these troubled hours 
over again with him, but we know enough about 
what he thought and did to say that now as never 
before did his true character manifest itself in 
word and deed. 
7 . Ibid., p. 284. 
8 . Samuel F. Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United 
States, 5th ed., (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 
Inc., 1965), p. 616. 
To begin with, he sought deliberately to 
set an example of calmness and detachment for 
his people in this time of stress. One can 
almost see him reading the line of Kipling of 
which he was so fond: 
If you can keep your head when 
all about you Are losing theirs and 
blaming it on you ... 9 
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Thankfully, recent scholars, such as Patrick Devlin, 
have viewed Wilson's decision-making with a more critical 
eye. In Too Proud to Fight, Devlin looks - through Wilson's 
eyes - at the crisis facing the United States and Germany 
over the Lusitania: 
Wilson's attitude was that of the majority, 
though for him it was based on something more 
than the desire for action without its 
consequences. His thinking put him in the 
company of those who knew that the challenge 
could not be evaded, but his feeling and his 
whole nature put him against the resort to war. 
Reconciliation between thought and feeling was 
achieved by his belief, or at least his strong 
hope, that an appeal to conscience would prove 
as powerful a weapon as the threat of force. 
Thus once again Wilson's convictions led him 
towards the policy which was politically 
expedient, a policy which sacrificed neither 
peace nor irretrievably prestige and gained time 
for a country which was mentally and physically 
unprepared to fight. But it was a policy which 
might lead to war. If the appeal to conscience 
failed, America would, unless she could find 
some honourable way of escape, be confronted 
with a choice between a loss of prestige 
immeasurably greater than if she had adopted 
forthwith the Bryanist policy of non-
involvement, a loss so great as to be tantamount 
to humiliation, and the threat of intervention 
9 . Arthurs. Link, Wilson: The Struggle for Neutrality 
1914-1915, Vol. 3, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 1960), pp. 379-380. 
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which might have to be made good.10 
Scholars of military history, like their colleagues in 
foreign policy, tend to mention the Lusitania sinking as an 
aspect of the submarine warfare of World War I. They all 
usually review only the facts of the sinking, offering one 
or two comments about its legacy. Edwyn A. Gray said in the 
opening chapter of his book, The Killing Time: "The cold-
blooded sinking of the Lusitania was the most publicized 
tragedy of the First World War and, in the skilled hands of 
the British propaganda machine, it did much to inflame 
public opinion in the United States against Germany. 1111 It 
seems British historians will never forget, or forgive, the 
sinking. Historian Richard Hough in his 1983 book, The Great 
War at Sea, says that: "The one ship whose name signified 
the barbarity and revulsion felt for this new form of 
[submarine] warfare was the Lusitania. 111 2 Not surprisingly, 
Winston Churchill, in the World Crisis, also blames the 
Germans for piracy: 
The United States, whose citizens had 
perished in large numbers, was convulsed with 
indignation, and in all parts of the great 
Republic the signal for armed intervention was 
awaited by the strongest elements of the 
10 Patrick Devlin, 
Wilson's Neutrality, (New 
1975), pp. 284-285. 
Too 
York: 
Proud to Fight: Woodrow 
Oxford University Press, 
11 . Edwyn Gray, The Killing Time: The U-Boat War 1914-
18, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1972), pp. 18-19. 
12 . Richard Hough, The Great War at Sea: 1914-1918, 
(London: The Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 174. 
American people. It was not given, and the war 
continued in its destructive equipoise. But 
henceforward the friends of the Allies in the 
United States were armed with a weapon against 
which German influence was powerless, and before 
which after a lamentable interval cold-hearted 
policy was destined to succumb. 13 
None of these works of history, however, provide a 
systematic look at public opinion during the Lusitania 
crisis. Public opinion research was in its infancy in 1915, 
so historians have used the newspaper as the only reliable 
mirror of regional opinion. Authors that address the 
reaction of Americans to the sinking usually cite regional 
newspaper headlines, or excerpt editorials, to show U.S. 
outrage during, and after, the crisis. All these authors 
assume, without systematic public opinion research, that the 
sinking was one of 
belligerency. 
several factors leading to U.S. 
Journalism historians also succumb to this type of 
reasoning. Frank Luther Mott, in the third edition of his 
book, American Journalism, says that the sinking of the 
Lusitania "afforded American papers the biggest story of the 
years 1914-16. 1114 Then he devotes one sentence to the press 
reaction: "Six months later, after the sinking the 
Lusitania, few papers remained neutral; and certainly the 
13 . Winston Churchill, The World Crisis: 1915, (New 
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1929), p. 348. 
14 . Frank Luther Mott, American Journalism: A History 
1690-1960, 3rd ed., (New York: Macmillan, 1962), p. 696. 
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pro-German proportion had not increased. 1115 Edwin and 
Michael Emery also add little to the subject of the American 
press and the Lusitania. In the forth edition of their book, 
The Press and America, the authors call the sinking one of 
several "important factors" leading to American 
belligerency. Then, like Mott, the Emerys sum up the press 
reaction in one sentence: 
But resentment ran high in the United 
States, particularly when it was remembered that 
an Imperial German Embassy advertisement warning 
travelers on Allied ships that they did so ' at 
their own risk' had appeared in New York 
newspa2ers the morning the Lusitania left 
port. 10 
Sidney Kobre, in his book, The Development of American 
Journalism, provides more newspaper quotes, but studies the 
origins of World War I only by citing New York newspapers. 
After using quotes from the New York World, Kobre says that 
the "sinking of this British liner, on which were traveling 
many Americans, proved to be one of the most sensational war 
stories in the period 1914 to 1917. The event contributed a 
great deal to the shaping of public opinion in this country 
against Germany. 11 17 
A second group of books of journalism history are 
15. Ibid., p. 616. 
16 . Edwin and Michael Emery, The Press and America: An 
Interpretative History of the Mass Media, 4th ed.,(Englewood 
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1978), p. 329. 
17 . Sidney Kobre, Development of American Journalism, 
(Dubuque, Iowa: Wm. C. Brown Co., 1969), p. 574. 
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strictly narrative tales of the adventures of war 
correspondents in Wold War I. A good example of this type of 
journalism history is M.L. Stein's, Under Fire: The Story of 
American War Correspondents. Another book is Behind the 
Front Page, by former United Press correspondent Wilbur 
Forrest. Both provide factual narratives telling how the 
news of the Lusitania was broken. Forrest, then a cub 
reporter for United Press, was the first journalist to reach 
Queenstown, Ireland, on the day of the sinking, beating 
rivals by several hours and 1,500 words. 
But again, none of these works provide a systematic 
look at America's front pages. Only two research efforts 
have come close. The first was published in 1916, one year 
after the loss of the Lusitania. This is The Lusitania Case, 
by C.L. Droste and W.H. Tantum. Though reprinted in 1972, 
copies of this book are extremely hard to come by. The 
Lusitania Case is a bound collection of selected documents, 
speeches, letters, pictures, cartoons, newspaper and 
magazine stories, and editorials - from Britain, America, 
and Germany. The collection attempts to address each aspect 
of the sinking. Under chapter titles such as "The German 
Warning," "The Manifest of the Lusitania," and "America 
Comments," are collected material dealing specifically with 
that subject. This book, discussing some thirty aspects of 
the sinking, is an invaluable source of Lusitania 
information - and yet, it is limited. Written a year before 
----- --- - -
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U.S. belligerency, the documents, speeches, and letters must 
be observed with a jaundiced eye - for wartime propaganda 
machines were in high gear. The collection of U.S. news 
stories and editorials is solid coming from all over 
America - but suffers from a narrow time frame, largely from 
May through August 1915. It is, however, an excellent 
"snapshot" of world opinion during the summer of 1915. 
Another drawback is that it is a collection - and simply 
that. There is no analysis of any kind, save that from the 
items in the collection itself - news stories, columnists, 
and editorials. 
Bailey and Ryan in, The Lusitania Disaster, make the 
second attempt at comprehensive research of the American 
press reaction. In Chapter 15, "The Worldwide Uproar," they 
cite headlines, stories, and editorials from across the 
country. They survey different newspapers - including those 
in countries besides the United States - but this too is a 
snapshot. The authors say there was no clamor for war over 
the sinking of the Lusitania, but like Droste and Tantum, 
they concentrate only on the spring and summer of 1915. Did 
American public opinion about the loss of the Lusitania 
change after the summer of 1915? What was the opinion of the 
war before the sinking? These are questions beyond the scope 
of Bailey and Ryan's book. 
It is clear, then, from this review of the literature 
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that scholars have made assumptions about American public 
opinion regarding the sinking of the Lusitania. This study 
will contribute to the Lusitania literature by examining 
these assumptions through a study of seven newspapers. Did 
America clamor for war? Were the government policies of 
Britain, Germany, and the United States questioned? Did 
America demand answers to the questions stemming from the 
controversial circumstances of the sinking itself? This 
study will show how these seven newspapers dealt with the 
aforementioned questions. 
Any comprehensive study of this time period must 
review the origins of World War I including the events, 
policies and personalities involved. This will be discussed 
in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER THREE: THE SEEDS OF WAR 
The Lusitania left a wake of controversy off the Old 
Head of Kinsale in May 1915. But this should come as no 
surprise to anyone, since the circumstances of her sinking 
have roots in one of the most controversial wars in history. 
Historians still debate the origins and aftershocks of 
World War I - the Great War. Indeed it is a fruitful plain 
of harvest for any researcher. It was the first modern war 
of the 20th Century, born out of the economic imperialism 
and military chivalry of the 19th Century. The many aspects 
of the conflict fill volumes - the number of works on Wilson 
alone is staggering. 
What follows here is a review of the foreign policy 
decisions that led up to that tragic encounter between the 
U-20 and the Lusitania off the Irish coast. The Entente 
Powers, the Central Powers, and the United States all made 
critical choices during this period particularly the 
choice of maritime strategies. 
War Clouds 
World War 
of the late 19th 
I had its seeds in the economic imperialism 
Century. Rapid industrialization brought 
the need for new markets and sources of raw materials. The 
easiest outlet for such growing pains was colonial 
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expansion. Africa, the Middle East, southeast Asia and the 
Pacific, South America, and China were all areas ripe for 
exploitation by the imperial powers of Europe (not to 
mention the United States). Like the conquistadors of old, 
they sought new markets for their manufactured goods, while 
they reaped the benefits of new sources of oil, rubber, iron 
ore, and other raw materials. But there was only so much of 
a good thing to go around, and friction was bound to 
develop. Some of this friction was alleviated by treaties or 
minor military skirmishes - but the pressure was building. 
Great Britain was the leading imperial power at the 
turn of the century. By 1900 she had the strongest navy in 
the world, the empire (on which the sun never set), and some 
$20 billion in assets - an enormous sum in those days. The 
empire comprised 309 million people in 9.3 million square 
miles around the world. With the most to lose in any 
conflict, Britain sought to maintain the delicate balance of 
power through treaty keeping other great powers from 
forming a solid block against her. 1 
France ranked second of the major European powers. Her 
empire consisted of 56 million people in 3.7 million square 
miles, primarily in Africa and Asia. 
But it was Germany that was the rising power on the 
European scene. By 1900 it had transformed itself from an 
1 . Sidney Lens, The Forging of the American Empire, 
(New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1971), p. 236. 
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agricultural nation into one of the world's leading 
industrialized states. Its empire ranked third with 15 
million people in one million square miles - most of it in 
Africa. The spark for this growth had been the defeat of 
France in the 1870-1871 war, during which it had acquired 
Alsace-Lorraine, an area of France rich in coal, iron ore, 
and phosphorus. From the end of the war in 1871, until the 
period just prior to World War 
grown from 41 million people 
I, Germany's population had 
to 65 million people. Its 
output of pig iron, from 529,000 tons to 15 million, served 
to show its industrial might. Germany was a growing economic 
machine, pre-eminent in chemicals, machine building, 
precision instruments, and electrical equipment. 2 
As mentioned before, these three major powers sought 
new markets and sources of raw materials through expansion-
peacefully, if possible. In the days of secret treaties, 
they formed alliances they thought would help them carve up 
the pieces of the economic pie. 
Linked to Germany was Austria-Hungary, a monarchy of 
uneasy minorities and dynasties centralized in Austria. 
Austria-Hungary was seriously at odds with Czarist Russia 
over the fate of the states in the Balkan Peninsula. Italy, 
a more minor power, was also aligned with Germany (though it 
would later desert her). Together, these three nations made 
up the bulk of the Central Powers of Europe. The opposing 
2 . Ibid., pp. 236-237 . 
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Entente (French word for alliance) Powers included Great 
Britain, France, and Russia. 
Germany's expansion plans for 
directly challenged those of England. 
help Austria-Hungary consolidate an 
dominance of Europe 
Germany planned to 
economic base in the 
Balkans. On her own she would move into Turkey, the Near 
East, and the Persian Gulf. A key part of this plan was the 
building of a Berlin-to-Baghdad railway, connecting Europe, 
as far west as Antwerp, with Persia. Such a railroad would 
divert large amounts of freight from British shipping 
companies using the Suez Canal. Germany could then dominate 
the Middle East region, and by running a rail line south, 
open the door to Africa. Such a plan would not only threaten 
British expansion and trade, but deny easy access to her 
colonies. 3 
These plans of the Central Powers ran headlong into 
those of the Entente. France desired the return of Alsace-
Lorraine and a dominant position in the industrial heartland 
of the German Rhine. Russia sought dominance in the Balkans 
and Constantinople in Turkey. Great Britain sought the rich 
oil fields of Persia. Italy changed sides at the war's 
outbreak, and joined with the Entente Powers in plans to 
divide Asiatic Turkey amongst themselves. Italy also sought 
Trieste and part of the Tyrol. 4 
3 • Ibid., p. 237. 
4 . Ibid., p. 238. 
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Yet even as these political and economic blueprints 
opposed one another, the Entente and the Central Powers 
tried their best to achieve them without conflict. 
Britain in particular, the country with the most to 
lose should war break out, sought to placate her friends and 
rivals. In August, 1907, she courted Russia by dividing 
Persia into three zones: the northern, a Russian sphere; the 
southern, British; 
was soothed with 
and the zone in between - neutral. Japan 
an alliance in 1902 that allowed that 
nation further markets in China. The United States was 
satisfied by Britain's inaction over the Roosevelt Corollary 
of the Monroe Doctrine that allowed U.S. interventions in 
Haiti, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, and Mexico. 
Britain worked with France for a settlement in North Africa: 
British support of France in Morocco for British control of 
Egypt. 
Britain even sought accommodation with Germany. In 
1913 the two countries agreed that the Berlin-to-Baghdad 
railway would terminate in the southern tip of Mesopotamia 
(Iraq), with two British administrators appointed to the 
board of directors. In return, a petroleum company in 
Mesopotamia would be established in which Britain held 75 
percent of the shares, Germany 25 percent. 5 
Built on 
arms race. Each 
this foundation 
country sought 
5 . Ibid., p. 238. 
of economic rivalry was an 
an army and navy strong 
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enough to ensure its economic strategies could be fulf i lled. 
This collection of big sticks did nothing to alleviate the 
tensions building toward war. 
Occasional power struggles and armed conflicts helped 
to shake the military and diplomatic status quo. Germany and 
France vied for influence in Morocco in 1905 - 1906 and again 
in 1911. In the same year, Italy declared war on Turkey to 
wrest the latter's control over the African territory of 
Tripoli. In 1912, war in the Balkans broke out between 
Turkey and Bulgaria, Montenegro, Serbia and Greece. When 




Though western Europe was 
Serbia, Greece, and 
largely spared such 
conflict, it seemed only a matter of time until it would be 
drawn in. "Some damned foolish thing in the Balkans," Prince 
Otto van Bismark predicted, would ignite the next war. 6 
The long fuse, ignited during the 19th Century, 
reached the powder keg in Europe much the way Bismark 
predicted. On June 28, 1914, a fanatical Bosnian 
revolutionary named Gavrilo Princip assassinated the heir to 
the Austro-Hungarian throne. Archduke Francis Ferdinand and 
his wife were riding through the streets of Bosnia's capital 
city of Sarajevo in a motorcade when Princip shot them to 
6 . Barbara W. Tuchman, The Guns of August, 




Like a trip-wire, the killings in Sarajevo put into 
motion the complex system of European alliances. On July 28, 
the Austro-Hungarian government, suspecting the complicity 
of the Serbian government in the assassinations, declared 
war on Serbia. Two days later, Russia mobilized, determined 
to defend her small protege. On August 1, Germany declared 
war on Russia; on August 3, against Russia's ally France 
(which had refused assurances of remaining neutral). On 
August 4, Germany declared war on Belgium, which had denied 
passage to German armies en route to France. On the same 
day, Great Britain declared war on Germany for violating 
Belgian neutrality. Later, Turkey and Bulgaria entered the 
war with Germany and the Central Powers. Italy and Rumania 
eventually joined the Entente Powers. Japan declared war on 
Germany on August 23, largely to seize German holdings in 
China and the Pacific. In less than a month, Europe exploded 
like a string of firecrackers. 
America Wages Neutrality 
The killings in Sarajevo and the outbreak of the Great 
War caught the United States completely by surprise. The 
State Department was unprepared for the crisis, having 
received no warning from its diplomats across the Atlantic. 
Many of these diplomats, political appointees, were ignorant 
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of both European history and geography. "I had never heard 
of Sarajevo," wrote Brand Whitlock, U.S. minister to 
Belgium. "I had not the least idea where it was in this 
world, if it was in this world." During the crisis of July 
and August, Whitlock was at his country home outside 
Brussels, writing a novel about rural life in Ohio. Frank E. 
Mallett, the American vice-consul in Budapest, did send a 
warning to Washington almost two weeks after the 
assassination of the archduke on June 28. Being only a vice-
consul, however, Mallett sent his war warning via mail 
rather than expensive cables 
Department on July 27. 7 
it arrived at the State 
President Wilson issued a formal proclamation of U.S. 
neutrality on August 4, 1914. He followed the formal 
proclamation with an appeal to Americans on August 20: 
The United States must be neutral in fact 
as well as in name ... We must be impartial in 
thought as well as in action, must put a curb 
upon our sentiments as well as upon every 
transaction that might be construed as a 
preference of one party to the struggle before 
another. 8 
Impartiality in thought and action was easier said 
than done for America in 1914. Americans, whether watching 
the World Series or a ping-pong match, love to choose sides 
7 . Robert H. Ferrell, American Diplomacy: A History, 
(New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1975), p. 457. 
8 . Julius w. Pratt, A History of United States Foreign 
Policy, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), 
p.265. 
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- and usually root for the side they perceive as the 
underdog. Choosing sides in the Great War was no different. 
By 1914, there were over 8 million German-Americans in 
the United States. Living mostly in the midwest, these 
citizens were squarely behind "the Fatherland," seeing 
Britain as the aggressor. In the same camp were the 4.5 
million Irish-Americans. They had no love for Britain, long 
the oppressor of their homeland (the ruthless suppression of 
the Irish Rebellion of 1916 made even the Wilson 
Administration wince). America also contained over 4 million 
Jews, strongly opposed to Czarist Russia's anti-Semitism. 
Swedish-Americans, some 2 million, also despised Russia and 
favored Germany.9 
On the other side of the coin were Americans backing 
the Entente Powers - or "Allies," as they were known on this 
side of the Atlantic. Despite the Anglo-American rivalry of 
the past century, the Revolution and the War of 1812, many 
Americans could not forget their bloodlines and cultural 
heritage. Relations between the U.S. and Great Britain had 
been largely friendly of late, and German militarism seemed 
the great evil. Other Americans had long memories when it 
came to Britain, but they believed they owed a debt to 
France. They took to heart the lines from Robert Underwood 
Johnson: 
9 . Patrick Devlin, Too Proud to Fight: Woodrow Wi lson' s 
Neutrality, (New York: Oxford University Pres s , 1975), p. 141. 
Forget us, God, if we forget 
The sacred sword of 
Lafayette!lO 
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The Allies were seen by many Americans as the 
underdogs in this fight. Britain had gone to war over the 
invasion of Belgium, a country whose King Albert had told 
the Germans: "Belgium is a nation, not a thoroughfare." The 
German chancellor, Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, had called 
the Belgian neutrality treaty his nation signed in 1839 "a 
scrap of paper." This did not seem fair to most Americans. 
Lurid Allied propaganda accounts of German atrocities in 
Belgium did not help their cause in America. 
Though propaganda and the homefront will be addressed 
in a later chapter, it is important at this stage to outline 
the viewpoint of Americans. According to foreign policy 
historians, citizens had chosen sides, refusing to be ''moral 
eunuchs," as one newspaper editor put it. But both sides, 
though pro or anti Allied or Central Powers, were firmly 
against U.S. intervention. It was Europe's war. Americans 
believed the senile monarchies of Europe were in one last 
death struggle, and that the United States should remember 
the words of George Washington and keep out of foreign 
entanglements. Americans thought the Atlantic Ocean safely 
protected them from the horror of war overseas. 
The man America looked to at this critical hour was 
10. Thomas A Bai'ley , , 
American People, (Englewood 
Inc . , 19 8 0 ) , p. 5 6 5 . 
A Diplomatic History of the 
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 
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Thomas Woodrow Wilson, 28th President of the United States. 
Wilson has been studied by countless scholars since his 
election over Taft, Roosevelt, and a divided Republican 
party in 1912. Wilson was a progressive reformer at home. In 
foreign policy he was more devious: he called for neutrality 
in 1914, but used the powers at his disposal to undermine 
it. Richard Hofstadter pointed out this inconsistency: 
Wilson's Allied sympathies were as vital as 
his love for peace. He was a thorough 
Anglophile. He had learned his greatest lessons 
from English thinkers; he had taken English 
statesmen as his models of aspiration and the 
British Constitution as his model of government; 
his work as president of Princeton had been, in 
large measure, an effort to introduce the 
English idea of a university; even his favorite 
recreation was to bicycle about the villages of 
the Lake Country with the -Oxford Book of 
English Verse' in his pocket.11 
Born in Staunton, Virginia, during the ravages and 
hardship of the Civil War and Reconstruction, Wilson grew up 
with an impassioned love for peace. Though a sincere 
pacifist, Wilson felt a German victory would be a blow to 
western 
autocracy. 
civilization a triumph of militarism and 
Many historians, including the writers of most high 
school American history texts, depict Wilson holding fast to 
strict neutrality to the bitter end; accepting war only as a 
last resort to German barbarity. Wilson's official 
11 Richard Hofstadter, The American Political 
Tradition And the Men Who Made It, (New York: Vintage Books, 
1974), p. 393. 
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biographer, Arthur S. Link, is the most prominent defender 
of this view. Yet even in Link's own five-volume biography 
of Wilson can be found discrepancies. Colonel Edward M. 
House, Wilson's advisor and confidant, is quoted by Link 
after an August 30, 1914, meeting with Wilson: 
The President spoke with deep feeling of 
the war. He said it made him heartsick to think 
of how near we had come to averting this great 
disaster I was interested to hear him 
express as his opinion what I had written him 
some time ago in one of my letters, to the 
effect that if Germany won it would change the 
course of our civilization and make the United 
States a military nation ... He felt deeply the 
destruction of Louvain [the university library 
in Belgium], and I found him as unsympathetic 
with the German attitude as is the balance of 
America. He goes even further than I in his 
condemnation of Germany's part in this war, and 
almost allows his feeling to include the German 
people as a whole rather than the leaders alone. 
He said German philosophy was essentially 
selfish and lacking in spirituality He 
thought the war would throw the world back three 
or four centuries. 12 
Yet, in December, 1914, Wilson would write to a 
correspondent who had complained of anti-German bias in the 
American media: 
I deplore as sincerely as you do 
expressions of violent condemnation or violent 
partisanship with regard to either side in the 
present dreadful conflict in Europe and have 
taken every public occasion that opened itself 
to me to urge upon my fellow-citizens a genuine 
neutrality of thought as well as of action. But, 
unhappily, the only thing that the Government 
can do is to enforce neutrality of action. This 
it has studiously and at every point been 
12 . Arthurs. Link, Wilson: The Struggle for Neutrality 
1914-1915, Vol. 3, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 1960), p. 51. 
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careful to do and will continue to do with the 
utmost vigilance.13 
Hofstadter sums up Wilson's uncertain course during 
the neutrality period as the clash of two inconsistent 
strategic ideas: 
The first was that the United States must 
remain the Great Neutral, the conservator of 
sane and just peacetime values, the exponent of 
peace ' without victory.' The second was that the 
Allies must not be allowed to lose the war, that 
the ' military masters of Germany' must be 
crushed. 14 
Wilson delegated very little foreign policy authority, 
even to the point of "banging out" press releases and 
diplomatic notes on his own Underwood typewriter. The few 
advisors Wilson did use for advice were, for the most part, 
thoroughly pro-Ally. 
Colonel Edward M. House was Wilson's political 
kingmaker from Texas. Wilson had been close to House since 
his days as Governor of New Jersey, and it was the wheeling 
and dealing of House that obtained for Wilson the Democratic 
presidential nomination in 1912. Wilson called him "my 
second personality my independent self," and he trusted 
House with his deepest thoughts. House fancied himself an 
urbane Texan, political strategist, and international 
trouble-shooter. He enjoyed being the power behind the 
throne. A thorough Anglophile, and inexperienced in 
13. Ibid., p. 67. 
14 . Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition, p. 353. 
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diplomacy, House was putty in the hands of British Foreign 
Secretary Sir Edward Grey and Sir Cecil Spring Rice, 
Britain's ambassador to Washington. Both flattered his ego 
and kept him at arms length. Convinced the defeat of Germany 
was vital to U.S. national security, House greatly affected 
Wilson's views toward the Allies. 
Wilson's second most important advisor during the 
period of neutrality was Robert Lansing, Counselor of the 
State Department (and later Secretary of State when William 
Jennings Bryan resigned during the Lusitania crisis). An 
able international lawyer, and strongly pro-Ally, Lansing 
drafted much of the correspondence sent to Berlin and 
London. He strongly influenced Wilson on points of 
international law. Colin Simpson in his book, The Lusitania, 
portrays Lansing as the major villain during the neutrality 
period; setting up Wilson and conspiring with the British. 
This may be too simplistic. Nevertheless, Daniel Smith, in 
one of the few works devoted solely to Lansing, says that he 
"bore a large share of the responsibility for American 
intervention in the war. 1115 Smith says Lansing saw a real 
opportunity for the future economic and political dominance 
of the United States; that would be dependent on the status 
quo prior to 1914. A German victory, and the dominance of 
Europe that would follow, would force America toward 
15 Daniel M. Smith, Robert Lansing and American 
Neutrality 1914-1917, (New York: DaCapo Press, 1972), p.168. 
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militarism - leading to another future war. 
Thus, future 
U.S. growth was ti'ed f' ht' to the Allies, Britain was" 1g 1.ng 
our fight." Specifically: 
h ' :·· Lansing's primary concern was to use 
is influence to ensure that all possible 
measures for an Allied victory were taken. This 
m~ant that nothing should be done to interfere 
w7th the Allied prosecution of the war and that 
~iplomatic protest should be long and 
inconclusive, designed to satisfy public opinion 
a nd to maintain legal reservations of right for 
postwar settlement on the one hand, and, on the 
other, to prevent any of the controversies from 
degenerating into positive action of a coercive 
or retaliatory nature.16 
America's ambassador in London was author-editor 
Walter Hines Page. Lacking diplomatic experience, but long-
enamored of British literature, Page soon "went native" and 
saw himself as one with the British people. He had nothing 
but contempt for the bureaucrats in the State Department, 
often changing his instructions to make them more tolerable 
to the British. Sir Edward Grey, who found Page a willing 
spokesman for the Allied cause, spoke of one meeting: 
Page came to see me at the Foreign Office 
one day and produced a long despatch from 
Washington contesting our claim to act as we 
were doing in stopping contraband going _to 
neutral ports. I am instructed,' he said, to 
read this despatch to you.' He read, and I 
listened. He then said: I have now read the 
despatch, but I do not agree with it; let us 
consider how it should be answered1
17 
16. Ibid., pp. 169-170. 
17 Bailey, Diplomatic History of the American People, 
p. 572. 
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Thomas A. Bailey said that instead of faithfully 
representing the United States in England, Page represented 
the British cause to Washington.1 8 
The president's only truly neutral advisor during the 
period was Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan. Though 
often portrayed as an idealistic buffoon in many works 
concerning this period, Bryan was the only one who took no 
sides, who faithfully carried out to the letter what his 
chief espoused in public. Bryan, the Democratic party's 
standard bearer for so many years, was appointed secretary 
of state largely for that very reason. He believed in 
Wilson's political agenda, and did much to solidify the 
agrarians in the West and deliver that region into the 
Democratic column in 1912. 
Kendrick Clements, in his book, William Jennings 
Bryan: Missionary Isolationist, says that Bryan is important 
because he mirrored the views of many Americans during this 
period: 
Balanced somewhat precariously between 
traditional isolationism and a deep conviction 
that Christianity required service to others, 
Bryan's attitudes mirrored those of millions of 
Americans who found themselves torn between a 
fearful desire to escape and an idealistic wish 
to help, as they faced an increasingly unstable 
and dangerous world. Indeed, Bryan's foreign 
policy is of interest to us precisely because it 
was not based upon careful study of the issues 
or on much practical experience. More articulate 
and outspoken than most of his followers, Bryan 
nevertheless revealed their feelings mor e 
18. Ibid., p. 572. 
faithfully than he might have if he had h 
more systematically abo t h 19 thoug t 
u t e issues. 
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Bryan, proud of his nickname "the " d 
Commoner, espouse 
what Clements terms "missionary isolationism:" that America 
had a special duty to improve and serve the world while at 
the same time remaining f 
ree from foreign entanglements. 
Robert Cherny said Bryan envisioned such improvements as 
self government, the 
resolution of conflict through 
negotiation, self-improvement for the individual, and the 
propagation of Christian values.20 
Wilson and Bryan would eventually break because the 
latter believed in neutrality at any cost; Wilson, House, 
and Lansing believed in the guarantee of neutral rights-
even if it meant conflict. With his own biases, and the 
biases of his closest advisors, Wilson set out to be neutral 
in thought and action. 
Economic Hands Across the Sea 
After the proclamation of neutrality on August 4, the 
Wilson Administration faced a skidding economy, aggravated 
by the outbreak of war in Europe. 
19. Kendrick A. Clements, William Jennings Bryan: 
Missionary Isolationist, (Knoxsville, T~nn.: The University 
of Tennessee Press, 1982), Preface, p. xi. 
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The slump in the economy was already a year old in 
1914. Steel production was down 50 percent, and trouble 
loomed for copper, cotton, meat, chemicals and machinery. To 
make matters worse, on August 20, 1914, the British cabinet 
issued an order in Council stating it would not respect the 
Declaration of London of 1909, an international agreement 
formulating rules for neutral trading with belligerents 
during wartime. Without so stating, Britain had instituted 
an economic blockade of Germany - expanding the definition 
of contraband, and seizing condemned cargos. The effect on 
the American economy was disastrous. 
With the strongest navy in the world, Britain could 
make her blockade stick. German liners and merchantmen 
remained bottled up in U.S. ports like New York, Boston, and 
Baltimore. Other neutral countries also served as safe 
harbors. American trade with the Central Powers dropped from 
$169 million in 1913-1914, to $12 million in 1915, and to a 
low of $1 million in 1916. The State Department, with 
Lansing in Washington and Page in London, "protested" the 
blockade. The British replied these were "unusual" methods 
brought on by the "exceptional" nature of this war. It was 
actually a repeat performance of Britain's strategy during 
the Napoleonic Wars. 
An important figure during these lean economic times 
was the infamous financial buccaneer - John Pierpont Morgan. 
Morgan, one of the most prominent "robber barons" of the 
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period, had developed the 
investment strategy known as 
"Morganization." Before Morgan, investment bankers acted 
primarily as middlemen - arranging investors and financial 
backing without interfering with corporate policy. Morgan's 
policy was more aggressive, requiring representation on 
corporate boards as part of financing deals. Companies that 
came to the successful Morgan for help had to pay the piper. 
In 1912, the House of Morgan held controlling interest in 12 
major banks, three insurance firms, 11 railroads, including 
Express, United States Steel 




Telephone and Telegraph, 
General 
International Harvester, and Western Union, as well as 
public utilities and two Latin American corporations.21 
Electric, 
August, 1914, 
the French government 
approached Morgan's paris office with a $100 million loan 
request. Though ready to oblige, the firm decided to check 
with the state Department, rather than run afoul of the 
neutrality proclamation. At the State Department, Morgan ran 
into opposition from Bryan. Writing to Wilson, Bryan called 
money "the worst of all contrabands because it commands 
In earlY 
loans were approved, he reasoned , 
everything else." If the 
their favorite 
citizens would take sides and begin loaning money to aide 
belligerent. 
financial interests, aligned to one side or the othe r, would 
put pressure 







21 _r_orginq of American Empire , pp. 247 -2 48 . 
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neutrality would be undermined. Wilson agreed, and the loans 
were denied. 
In the meantime, the initial bust at the war's 
outbreak turned into a boom for American business. The 
Allied powers, cut off from central Europe by the fighting, 
increasingly turned to the U.S. for its supplies. Britain, 
almost completely dependent on outside sources for food and 
other raw materials, became the biggest customer. With a 
strong British navy patrolling the sealanes, the Central 
Powers could not take advantage of purchasing from the 
United States. 
In response to orders from abroad, U.S. wheat prices 
jumped from $.85 per bushel; to $1.67 per bushel by 
February, 1915. From 1914 to 1917, steel imports rose from 
$.25 billion to $1.1 billion and the export of chemicals, 
dyes and drugs from $22 million to $181 million. The U.S. 
became the Allied source for food and raw materials such as 
copper, iron ore, zinc, cotton, lumber, wool, and oil. 
The manufacture of munitions was a key factor in the 
boom. Between 1914 and March 1917, munitions exports rose 
from $6 million to $1.7 billion. During the war, the E.I. 
duPont de Nemours Company supplied the Allies with two 
fifths of their ammunition. 22 According to Samuel Bemis, 
after some technical defaults on rifle contracts, "the 
British Government, anxious to keep up deliveries of desired 
22. Ibid., p. 241. 
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weapons, felt obliged to take over control, but not 
ownership, of some leading American arms factories. 23 
A leading figure behind this economic revival was J.P. 
Morgan, who by 1915, had become the sole purchasing agent 
for both the French and British governments in the United 
States. By 1917, Morgan had spent some $3 billion of Allied 
money for munitions and commodities at a commission of 1 
Percent - $30 million. But since Morgan, when possible, 
Placed orders for Allied purchases with his own firms, his 
total financial gain was much greater. 
The Allies initially paid for the purchases with gold 
or by selling stocks, bonds, or other assets in the United 
States. They had no other choice, since any domestically 
Produced commodities went directly to the war effort, and 
could not be used for export trade. This could not last 
long, however, and by October, 1914, the Allies were again 
Pressing for loans. 
This time Morgan & Co., along with the Rockefeller-
controlled National City Bank, approached Lansing to 
reconsider the ban on loans. Lansing was receptive, and 
pointed out to Wilson the legal precedents for such loans: 
both North and South had borrowed European money during the 
American Civil War; Japan had borrowed money from both 
23. Samuel F. Bemis, 
States, (New York: Holt 
p. 592. 
Diplomatic History of the United 
Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1965), 
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England and the U.S. during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-
1905, Russia had borrowed from France for the same war . 
Besides, it was not the government providing the loans, it 
was private citizens, he contended . The New York banking 
firms had also warned Lansing the economic surge could come 
to a grinding halt if the loans were not granted. Wilson 
agreed with Lansing, though it was decided the new loans to 
be authorized were to be called "credits," as a face-saving 
gesture for Bryan. The Wilson Administration reversed the 
neutral loan policy, but told bankers it was not to be 
approached publicly about loans again. Americans did not 
learn of this policy shift until a press release was issued 
on March 31, 1915. 
When criticized by German-Americans for trade with the 
Allies, Lansing replied: 
If one belligerent has by good fortune a 
superiority in the matter of geographic location 
or of military or naval power, the rules of 
neutral conduct cannot be varied so as to favor 
the less fortunate combatant.24 
America's trade with the Allies not only helped their 
war effort, but tipped the balance of world economic power 
toward the United States. Sidney Lens has argued that the 
economic expansion during the neutrality period had four 
major implications for the U.S.: 
266. 
(1) An enormous expansion of domestic industrial 
facilities. 
24 . Pratt, History of United States Foreign Policy, p . 
(2) The liquidation of billions of dollars of 
foreign holdings in the United States and 
conversion of the nation from a debtor to a 
creditor. (3) The emergence of New York on a par with 
London as the world's leading banking center. 
(4) The take-over of 
British, German, and other investments in South 
America, to make the United States finally the 
unchallenged monarch of the western 
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hemisphere.25 
for a foreign 
Wilson had essentially three options 
Policy strategy during the period of neutrality. First, he 
could, like Jefferson in 1807, issue an embargo on all 
exports to both belligerent alliances. secondly, he could 
have ordered the navy to convoy u.s. merchantmen through the 
British blockade - Teddy Roosevelt's "Great White Fleet" was 
still the third most powerful in the world. Finally, he 
could acquiesce to the British blockade, and trade only with 
the Allies. 
clearly, the most neutral choice "in thought as well 
would 
be to embargo goods to both 
as 
belligerents. such a course would have meant political 
in action" 
Thomas Jefferson found out in 1807. With the 
suicide 
' 1916 election looming on the horizon, Wilson was not about 
to cut his own political throat at a time when war trade 
With the Allies was bringing the country out of recession. 
Besides, Wilson accepted Lansing's dubious legal argument 
that an embargo would aid the central Powers at the cost of 
the Allies _ and therefore, place the United States in a 
as 




The second choice was clearly the most warlike, and 
Wilson wanted at all costs to avoid war. Still, if he were 
serious about asserting neutral rights, he needed to allow 
trade. Though risking war with Britain, such a policy would 
have allowed Germany and the Central Powers a share in the 
benefits the Allies were reaping. 
Wilson finally chose the path of least resistance, 
respecting the British blockade and trading only with the 
Allies. This option held no immediate risk of war. It also 
allowed the Allies access to continuous supply, something 
agreeable to all in the administration except Bryan - who 
was becoming more isolated within the State Department 
anyway. It was a peaceful choice that helped the Allies 
fight German militarism. 
Edward Parsons in his book Wilsonian Diplomacy: 
Allied-American Rivalries in War and Peace, asserts that 
Wilson and his advisors saw in the war an opportunity for 
the United States to establish its pre-eminence on the world 
economic stage. America's neutral trade with Great Britain 
weakened that country's hold on the Western Hemisphere, and 
made her more dependent on U.S. goods. By not aiding the 
Central Powers, the administration allowed German militarism 
to bleed to death by destroying that country's economic 
base. Even when the U.S. entered the war, according to 
Parsons, it did so only to ensure peace on its own terms, 
=--
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providing military supplies in small amounts to its ally, 
Britain, to ensure its cooperation. 26 
The administration's economic plans, however, were 
interrupted by a new German tactic the use of the 
submarine as a commerce raider. This new tactic was outlined 
in the German "war zone" declaration of February 4, 1915. 
This set up a U-boat blockade of Great Britain that 
challenged Wilson's right to trade with the Allies. Though 
more spectacular than the 
nonetheless as illegal 
British blockade, it was 
as a reprisal - according to 
international law. For Wilson to acquiesce to the U-boat 
blockade, as he had in the British, would be tantamount to 
establishing an embargo - forcing the economic panic and 
political fallout that would follow. Wilson chose the path 
of least resistance, aiding the Allies in spite of the U-
boat blockade, and moving the nation closer to war. 
Freedom of the Seas 
For all the pointing to international law by 
belligerents in World War I, this field was largely 
undefined when it came to modern sea warfare in 1914. Only a 
few new maritime customs were recognized and added in the 
years between 1856 and 1865. 
26 Edward B. Parsons, Wilsonian Diplomacy: Allied-
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The Declaration of Paris, following the Crimean War in 
1856, attempted to define the meaning of naval blockade. The 
declaration stated that: "Blockades, in order to be binding, 
must be effective; that is to say, maintained by a force 
sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the 
enemy." In short, it could not be a "paper blockade" only by 
declaration - there had to be real ships out there enforcing 
it. The declaration did not specify where the ships must be 
stationed, but custom dictated they would be outside harbors 
at the three-mile territorial limit. Britain's blockade of 
Germany during World War I was a type of paper blockade, 
since its warships patrolled the sealanes instead of 
stationing themselves outside harbors (where they would be 
easy targets for U-boats). 
The Declaration of Paris also called for protection of 
neutral property on enemy ships as well as enemy property on 
neutral ships - "free ships, free goods." This protection 
did not apply to contraband of war. There was no definition 
of contraband, except according to custom: absolute 
contraband, such as ammunition; conditional contraband, such 
as food or barbed wire, both of which could be used for 
peaceful or warlike purposes; and free goods or 
noncontraband, such as paper and soap, with no particular 
wartime use. 
The American Civil War added a new dictum to 
international law - the doctrine of "continuous voyage." 
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Under continuous voyage, Union forces intercepted neutral 
cargoes bound to a neutral port, on the first leg of a 
voyage enroute to the enemy by a subsequent maritime route. 
Britain would later extend this to mean a subsequent 
overland route as well. 
Thus international law often meant international 
custom or usage. Without explicit definitions, it usually 
meant the power with the biggest stick made the rules. 
Efforts at more complete definitions and actual laws 
were made at the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907, and at 
the London Naval Conference of 1909. "The Declaration of 
London" came out of the London Conference of 1909, but it 
was never fully ratified. 
The Declaration of London's most important validation 
was the practice of continuous voyage. It protected neutral 
commerce in conditional contraband bound for neutral ports. 
The United States adopted the declaration after Senate 
ratification. Germany ratified the declaration, since it 
would ensure neutral trade and allow it to obtain supplies 
through neighboring neutral countries. Britain rejected the 
treaty for the same reasons Germany accepted it: the nation 
that "ruled the waves" did not want to give up its chance 
for absolute blockade. When Britain rejected the treaty, 
both America and Germany withheld ratification. The 
Declaration of London was simply a collection of opinions. 
Samuel Bemis said an international lawyer could 
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outline seven points of maritime law for the leader of a 
neutral country in 1914: 
(1) 'Paper' blockades are illegal. A blockade to 
be binding must be effectively maintained by an 
'adequate' naval force. 
(2) Even enemy goods are safe on a neutral ship, 
if they are not contraband and if they are not 
destined for a blockaded port: 'Free ships make 
free goods.' 
(3) Neutral goods are safe even on an enemy 
ship, if they are not contraband and if they are 
not destined for a blockaded port. 
(4) A fortiori, neutral goods are safe on a 
neutral ship but only if they are not contraband 
and if they~re not destined for a blockaded 
port. 
(5) Contraband goods are divided into two 
catagories: absolute and conditional. 
(6) Absolute contraband consists of 
exclusively used for war and destined 
goods 
for an 
neutral enemy country, even if passing through a 
country enroute; the law of ·continuous voyage' 
applies. 
(7) Conditional contraband consists of goods 
which may have a peaceful use but which are also 
susceptible to use in war and are destined for 
the armed forces or a government department of a 
belligerent state; the rule of ' continuous 
voyage' does not apply. 27 
This was the international maritime law that Wilson 
had at his disposal. What little international law was 
available, was violated almost immediately when war began. 
On August 5, 1914 the second day of the war-
British warships discovered and sank a German minelayer off 
the coast of England. It was claimed the minelayer flew a 
neutral flag. Though by custom, using neutral flags as a 
ruse de guerre was an accepted practice, laying mines 




outside a country's three-mile limit was not. The Hague 
Convention of 1907 banned such minelaying outside a 
country's territorial waters. Germany denied it was laying 
mines illegally, but pointed out the 1907 Hague Convention 
was not binding since it was not completely ratified. 
Britain reached for its most potent weapon, the one it 
had successfully used against Napoleon, a complete economic 
blockade of Germany. Though never officially called a 
blockade, the action began with the August 20, 1914, Orders 
in Council. With that order, the British arbitrarily 
expanded the definition of absolute contraband to include 
items once considered conditional contraband or free goods-
such as foodstuffs. Armed with wider limits for absolute 
contraband, the 
merchant ships 
British Navy began 
(as well as those 
intercepting American 
of other neutral 
countries), taking them to British ports for inspection. 
Prior custom dictated that merchant ships were to be 
inspected on the high seas, and allowed to proceed if free 
of contraband. Citing "exceptional" measures for an 
"unusual" war, Britain pulled merchantmen into ports for 
thorough inspections including X-ray. If suspicious, 
authorities required neutral ships to remain for several 
weeks while evidence was collected against them. Mail was 
censored, and cargoes were confiscated so they could not be 
transshipped to Germany. Many confiscated cargoes were paid 
for by the British, others were not. Sometimes the British 
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government resold confiscated items for considerable profit. 
The British tightened the screws slowly, keeping items 
such as cotton, turpentine, resin, and tobacco off the 
contraband list initially, so that large sections of the 
American public would not be angered. Britain hoped the 
economic war boom in America would be the carrot that would 
make the U.S. acquiesce to later, tighter controls. Foreign 
Secretary Sir Edward Grey wrote: 
Blockade of Germany was essential to the 
victory of the Allies, but the ill-will of the 
United States meant their certain defeat ... The 
object of diplomacy, therefore, was to secure 
the maximum of blockade that could be enforced 
without a rupture with the United States. 28 
American protests were muted by actions on both sides 
of the Atlantic. On September 26, Lansing prepared a lengthy 
memo for Wilson, unusually critical of Britain's action. 
Registering "keen disappointment" over the way the 
Declaration of London was being ignored, Lansing said 
Britain's actions made "neutral trade between neutral ports 
dependent upon the pleasure of belligerents." Colonel House, 
who was dining with Wilson when the draft arrived, was: 
"shocked by the severity of the language in Lansing's draft 
note, perceived the significance of sending such a protest 
to London at this time, and urged Wilson not to permit it to 
be sent. 1129 House obtained permission to meet with 
28 . Devlin, Too Proud to Fight, p. 157. 
29. Link, Wilson, Vol. 3, p. 110. 
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Ambassador Sir Cecil Spring Rice to "get at the bottom of 
the controversy." The ambassador was shown the drafts and 
"was really astonished at the tone in one or two of the 
sentences." Patrick Devlin writes that: 
The upshot was that Wilson himself settled 
a brief, firm, and friendly telegram as a basis 
for an informal and confidential talk; and 
Lansing went round after dinner on 29 September 
to see Spring Rice and to discuss with him ways 
and means of giving Britain what she wanted 
within the framework of the Declaration.30 
What House did not scuttle on this side of the 
Atlantic, Ambassador Page took care of in England. During 
this period, Page's British sympathies "caused him to resist 
the (State Department) protests and at times suppress 
them. 1131 
Encouraged by American acquiescence, the British 
government announced on October 2, that it was mining 
"designated areas" or "zones" of the North Sea. This was in 
retaliation for Germany's alleged illegal minelaying of 
August 5 (a retaliation, according to international law, is 
itself illegal). On November 3, the British declared the 
entire North Sea a "military area," where neutrals traveled 
at risk of destruction by additional mines . 32 All neutrals 
would have to call in British ports to pick up sailing 
30. Devlin, Too Proud to Fight, p. 168. 
31. Joyce G. Williams, Colonel House and Sir Edward 
Grey: A Study in Anglo-American Diplomacy, (Lanham, Md.: 
University Press of America, 1984), p. 54. 
32. See Appendix, p. 221 • 
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instructions, or pilots, to negotiate the minefields. While 
there, of course, the ships could be inspected, delayed, and 
their cargoes seized. 
The United States sent another mild 
December 26: 
protest on 
The commerce between countries which are 
not belligerents should not be interfered with 
by those at war unless such interference is 
manifestly an imperative necessity to protect 
their national safety, and then only to the 
extent that it is a necessity. 33 
Great Britain argued that such methods were so 
necessary, and continued to expand its lists of contraband. 
Norway and other neutrals protested vigorously, but had not 
the navies to back them up. 
Freedom of the seas, the very issue of the War of 1812 
and the reason the United States would use to declare war 
against Germany in 1917, thus was being violated here with 
only mild American protest. When Germany declared her U-boat 
blockade against Britain in February, 1915, Wilson, by 
contrast, held that government to "strict accountability." 
Many historians, like Barbara Tuchman in her book, 
Practicing History, argue that the British blockade caused 
only inconvenience. Property was seized, but it was usually 
paid for. No human lives were lost, where the U-boat 
blockade involved the killing of innocent civilians. Thomas 
A. Bailey and Paul B. Ryan in their book, The Lusitania 
33 . Bemis, Diplomatic History of the United States, p. 
600. 
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Disaster, point to a fact seldom noticed by such historians: 
the British blockade did not take lives because the United 
States and other neutrals honored it by acquiescing to it 
(though under some protest). If American ships had tried to 
run the minefields on their own, the loss of life would have 
been heavy. The odds were suicidal. Neutrals protested the 
German blockade, but sailed through it because the odds were 
better that they could get through it than through the 
British minefields in the North Sea. Eight American merchant 
ships struck mines, assumed to be British, between early 
1915 and the declaration of war on Germany in 1917: five 
were sunk, three were damaged, 4 people were killed (four of 
them Americans) and 14 injured. It is interesting to point 
out that during the same period the U- boat blockade took 
three American lives on a U.S . merchant ship. That ship, the 
Gulflight, was torpedoed, but not sunk on May 1, 1915. The 
128 Americans lost on the Lusitania were on a British 
ship. 34 
The vicious circle of maritime retaliation was further 
widened with the German announcement on February 4, 1915, 
that "an area of war" existed in the waters surrounding 
Great Britain and Ireland. 35 In a war already using s uch 
modern weapons as the airplane, poison gas, and the machine 
34 . Thomas A. Bailey and Paul B. Ryan, The Lusitania 
Disaster: An Episode in Modern Warfare and Diplomacy, (New 
York: The Free Press, 1975), pp. 32-33. 
3 5. See Appendix, p. 221 . 
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submarine was about to take its infamous place in 
military history - "a damned un-English weapon." 
The German proclamation was direct. All enemy vessels 
found within the war 
zone would be destroyed, "without its 
always being possible to avoid" the loss of lives. This 
armed and unarmed merchant ships. Neutral 
included both 
, 
countries were warned against "further entrusting crews 
Passengers and wares to such ships." Neutrals were further 
warned that they should stay clear of the area. since 
itish ships were flying neutral flags it was stated the Br· · 
torpedoing of neutral ships "cannot always be avoided." 
Berlin said that neutrals had brought this war zone on 
themselves , 
because their acquiescence 
in the British 
meant supply to England while Germans starved. 
blockade had 
Neutrals were given two weeks to clear the area. Britain 
Used the German proclamation as an excuse to add more items 
to the list of absolute contraband. Almost all food items 
Were now included. 
In the earlY days of the war, the declaration of the 
submarine zone was more a German bluff than an ironclad 
barrier. By February, 1914, the Germans had approximately 
20 
U-boats _ some of them experimental, and others suited 
strictly for coastal waters. Given maintenance requirements, 
and the long, dangerous 
journey through 
the British 
blockade only a third of 
these U-boats could be on patrol. 
, 
At one-third 
would be on 
patrol, one - third 
any one time 
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heading either to or from patrol, and the final third 
undergoing overhaul in port. Though initially a bluff, the 
U-boat fleet expanded each month, and by the end of the war 
its numbers almost accomplished the objective of strangling 
England. France and England had twice as many submarines, 
but since trade to Germany was all but cut off, they were 
never used as commerce raiders. 
In 1914, only Allied ships were threatened by the 
Germans. The German government had obtained from the State 
Department the silhouettes and markings of major American 
cargo and passenger lines. Passenger carriers, such as the 
America Line, operated liners from New York to Britain 
weekly - up until the point of U.S. belligerency - without 
incident. Berlin hoped its warning would scare off neutral 
cargo trade to Britain, but had no plans to risk a breach 
with the United States by sinking an American s hip. The 
declaration of "unrestricted" U-boat war fare did not come 
until January 31, 1917. The 1917 declaration, which said all 
ships - armed, unarmed, Allied, or neutral - would be sunk 
on sight, was the last straw forcing U.S. belligere ncy. 
The official American response, penned by Lansing for 
Bryan's signature, was remarkably swift . The note to Berlin, 
issued February 9, stated: 
If the commanders of German vessels of war 
should act upon the presumption that the flag of 
the United States was not being used in good 
faith and should destroy on the high seas an 
American vessel or the lives of Ame rican 
citizens, it would be difficult for the 




Government of the United States to view the act 
in any other light than as an indefensible 
violation of neutral rights which it would be 
very hard indeed to reconcile with the friendly 
relations now so happily subsisting between the 
two Governments. 
If such a deplorable situation should 
arise, the Imperial Government can readily 
appreciate that the Government of the United 
States would be constrained to hold the Imperial 
German Government to a strict accountability for 
such acts of their naval authorities and to take 
any steps it might be necessary to take to 
safeguard American lives and property and to 
secure to American citizens the full enjoyment 
of their acknowledged rights on the high seas. 36 
This was a remarkably strong protest in light of 
British violations of U.S. maritime rights. Though Bryan 
pushed Wilson for a more even-handed approach with both 
belligerents, Britain continued to get gentle reminders, and 
Germany ultimatums. 
Though thoroughly threatening in tone, the U.S. reply 
- which was edited by Wilson - was just a ambiguous. What 
did strict accountability mean? Germany would pay if its U-
boats "should destroy on the high seas an Ame rican ves s e l or 
the lives of American citizens." What did this mean? 
Historians to this day have lamented the vague language. It 
undoubtedly eased the minds of Americans who booked passage 
on the Lusitania, even though passage on American ships was 
available. 
The language in Wilson's warning was not clear. Surely 
a U-boat sinking an American ship with the loss of American 
36 . Link, Wilson, Vol. 3, pp. 322-323. 




lives was in trouble, but what of Americans lost on a 
belligerent ship? A tradition with strong roots in 
international law was the principle "the flag covers the 
decks." In the War of 1812, Madison argued that the American 
flag turned the wooden decks into American soil. Through the 
Civil War and beyond, maritime courts had respected that 
principle - cargo and passengers were the responsibility of 
the nation flying the flag. 
When the Lusitania was lost, Wilson argued that 
"strict accountability" covered Americans wherever they 
sailed: even if on belligerents, even if the belligerents 
carried contraband (as did the Lusitania). Wilson was 
criticized - not only by the Germans - for making Americans 
"guardian angels" for belligerent ships. Today's scholars 
argue that Wilson's "strict accountability," if carried to a 
logical extreme, meant that Paris could not be shelled nor 
London bombed by Zeppelins if Americans were within the city 
limits. Wilson claimed immunity for Americans on Britis h 
ships that British citizens could not claim for 
themselves.37 
What was so upsetting about the submarine was that its 
technology was not adaptable to the old "cruiser rules" of 
international law concerning visit and search. Those rules, 
adopted during the days of sail, outlined specific 
requirements for commerce raiding. When approaching a 
37 . Bailey and Ryan, The Lusitania Di s aster, p . 39. 
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belligerent merchantman on the high seas, the raider was to 
fire a warning shot "across the bows," or somehow signal 
(ie. flags, megaphone) the ship to stop. Once stopped, the 
raider would send a boarding party in a small boat to 
inspect the merchant ship's papers and cargo. If carrying 
non- contraband, the ship could continue. If carrying 
contraband, or suspected contraband, the raider would send 
over a prize crew to take over the ship, guide it to a home 
or neutral port, and submit the ship and cargo to a prize 
court. During the Civil War, Confederate raiders, unable to 
use prize courts because of the Union blockade, began 
sinking vessels once the crew was safely evacuated. 
If the merchant ship attempted to flee, resist, or if 
it was being convoyed by warships, it lost its immunity 
under cruiser rules. Such a ship could be sunk without 
further hesitation. But an unarmed, unresisting, ship could 
not be sunk until warned, identified, and passengers and 
crew safely evacuated. 
During World War I, German surface raiders behaved 
much as the Confederate raiders of the Civil War. Cruiser 
rules were respected, merchant crews provided for, and 
vessels destroyed. But it was easy to see that Germany's U-
boats would not be able to fulfill these requirements. 
Unlike the submarine of today, the U-boats of 1914 were 
small and fragile craft - averaging 500 tons and less than 
200 feet in length. There was no heavy armor on the thin 
L 
93 
outer hulls, and their surface speed averaged only 15 knots 
(British destroyers averaged 35 knots). A U-boat crew was 
too small to provide a prize crew (about 40 men), so it 
could only destroy its intended victim. Though initially 
respecting cruiser rules when attacking, the British 
response to the U-boat forced German commanders to sink 
without warning. 
Admiral Fisher, Britain's First Sea Lord when the 
Lusitania was sunk, succinctly defined the U-boat issue: 
There is nothing else the submarine can do 
except sink her capture, and it must therefore 
be admitted that (provided it is done, and 
however barbarious and inhuman it may appear) 
this submarine menace is a truly terrible one 
for British commerce and Great Britain alike, 
for no means can be suggested at present of 
meeting it except by reprisals ... it is freely 
acknowledged to be an altogether barbarous 
method of warfare but the essence of war 
violence; moderation in war is imbecility! 38 
In March, 1916, when retired from the British 
Admiralty, Fisher wrote to German Admiral Alfred von 
Tirpitz, the chief advocate for all-out U-boat warfare 
(ignored in Germany at the time): 
Dear Old Tirps! Cheer up, old chap! 
You're the one German sailor who understands 
War! Kill your enemy without being killed 
yourself. I don't blame you for the submarine 





Well! So long! 
believe it when I 
Yours till hell 
38 . Edwyn Gray, The Killing Time: The U-Boat War 1914-




The ship with the dubious distinction of being the 
first sunk by a submarine was the 866 ton British steamer 
- itra. Bound to Norway from Scotland, she encountered the Gl · 
U-17 fourteen miles off the Norwegian coast. She was stopped 
and boarded, according to the cruiser rules, and her crew 
given ten minutes to abandon ship. once her crew was safely 
away, the Germans opened up the sea-cocks (valves) and sunk 
her. The u-boat then towed the British lifeboats 15 minutes 




merchantmen (such as the ,Q_litra) remained in accordance with 
international custom, British defense tactics soon forced a 
change. 
The British Admiralty had issued a series of secret 
orders to British merchant captains on how to deal with 
dated January 31 1915, 
The first, ' German U-boats. 
encouraged the use of neutral flags, and painting schemes 
designed to make a ship appear to be from a neutral country. 
The neutral of choice was the United States. In fact, the 
day before the orders were issued, the Lusitania had raised 
th
e American flag when nearing the Irish coaS
t 
- Colonel 
Bouse was aboard. The British claimed they raised it to warn 
U-boats that Americans were aboard . Though Bryan saw the 
opportunity for a firm protest to both belligerents, the 
39. Bailey and Ryan, The Lusitania Disaster, p. 36 . 
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Wilson Adminstration issued a mild protest - agreeing to 
"occasional" use of neutral flags to avoid destruction. 
The British Admiralty issued its second set of secret 
orders on February 10, six days after the proclamation of 
the German war zone. These orders called on merchant 
skippers to attempt escape unless absolutely cornered. This 
included ramming the U-boat, or firing on it, if armed. 
Britain had begun arming its merchant ships in 1913. 
Many such armed merchant ships, built to government 
specifications and paid for by government funds, were listed 
by the admiralty as auxiliary cruisers (the Lusitania was 
one such ship). By 1915, many, but by no means all, British 
merchantmen were armed. Guns were usually mounted on the bow 
or stern, sometimes along the sides. 
Merchant captains, when encountering a hostile U- boat, 
were to attempt to flee - keeping the U-boat astern. By 
immediately turning away from a U-boat, only a narrow target 
would be exposed to torpedo attack (German U-boats also 
mounted deck guns, but early in the war they were of light 
caliber, and notoriously inaccurate on a heaving sea). While 
fleeing, stern mounted deck guns could be used to fend off 
the U-boat. Should the U-boat surface close ahead of the 
merchant ship, captains were instructed to bear down on it-
using deck guns on the bow if possible. In this way, au-
boat would either be forced to crash dive or be rammed. 
Surfacing after such a crash dive, the U-boat would often be 
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well - a stern of the f lee ing merchant ship. 
These tactics were remarkably effective against u-
boats. Of eleven U-boats lost before May, 1915, eight were 
rammed. One British steamer, the 500-ton Thordis, rammed the 
U-6 off the south coast of England. The crew of the Thordis 
was awarded prize money from a London newspaper; the Captain 
received prize money, a lieutenant's commission in the Royal 
Navy Reserve, and the Distinguished Service Cross. The 
celebration was premature because the U-6, though damaged, 
was not sunk - and able to limp home. Germans commanders 
became more wary. 
Though the Germans were aware of the existence of 
these admiralty orders by their mounting losses, actual 
copies were not obtained from a British ship until later 
(captains were instructed to destroy the orders before 
capture). Photographic reproductions of the British orders 
were given to American Ambassador James W. Gerard in Berlin . 
They did not reach Washington until December 30, 1915 - 7 
months after the Lusitania went down. Bryan heard about 
British ramming orders from discussions with German-
Americans. He cabled Page in London on April 12, 1915, to 
look into the matter. Page replied immediately that he had 
heard of no such orders. 
In addition to the orders to ram, flee, and use false 
flags, the British made use of "Q" ships or "Mystery" ships. 
These were heavily armed warships disguised as unarmed, 
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neutral merchantmen by wooden facades and neutral paint. 
When a U-boat approached to board, or fire her deck gun, the 
screens were dropped and the Q-ship opened fire. 
One such incident involved the Baralong, 
most famous of these Q-ships. On August 19, 
one of the 
1915, three 
months after the Lusitania had sunk, the U-27 encountered 
the Nicosian off the south coast of Ireland. The 6,000 ton 
Nicosian was a British steamer carrying a load of army mules 
from New Orleans, with ten American muleteers. The U-27 
surfaced, fired a warning shot, and allowed the crew to take 
to the lifeboats. As the U-27 began to fire on the abandoned 
steamer, another ship came into view. 
small tramp steamer, with American flags 
large billboards hanging from its 
It appeared to be a 
- painted on two 
sides. The U-boat 
motored up to this new arrival for a closer look. When it 
was within 100 yards, the Baralong raised the British colors 
and began firing with 12 rapid-fire cannon. The U-boat sank 
immediately, and the Baralong fired on the Germans who 
remained in the water. Lansing, then Secretary of State, 
citing the conflicting statements of the 10 American 
muleteers, lodged no official protest. 
Consequently, the war at sea in 1914-1915 was indeed 
brutal, but the brutality was not limited to one 
belligerent. As a result, German U-boat commanders, keeping 
in mind the orders of the British admiralty and the 
existence of Q-ships, began to attack without warning. 
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Three major incidents involving Americans on the high 
seas occurred prior to the sinking of the Lusitania. The 
first involved the British cargo-passenger ship Falaba, 
4,800 tons, bound to West Africa from Liverpool. The 
encounter this ship would have with Baron von Forstner's U-
28 would parallel, in some ways, the sinking of the 
Lusitania. 
On March 28, 1915, one day out of Liverpool, the 
Falaba - flying no flag - encountered the U-28. The U-boat 
surfaced some three miles away, and signaled the Falaba to 
"stop and abandon ship." The British ship attempted to 
escape at full steam, but the U-boat caught up with her. 
Though lawfully able to sink a fleeing ship without further 
warning, the U-boat signaled again. This time the ship gave 
up and the 242 passengers and crew made for the lifeboats. 
Von Forstner gave the Falaba ten minutes, then extended this 
to 23 minutes (this both belligerents disputed). During the 
entire period, the Falaba's wireless operator was sending 
distress signals to the British coastal patrol - it also 
sent up distress rockets. A small flotilla of fishing 
trawlers approached, though they were well out of gun range. 
Whether conservative or ruthless, Von Forstner fired a 
torpedo into the stern of the ship. There was a great 
explosion of either ammunition or the boilers, and the ship 
went down in eight minutes. An American, Leon Thrasher, was 
among the 104 people killed. 
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The Falaba, like the Lusitania, carried ammunition, 
sank quickly; and carried Americans. Like the Lusitania it 
was disputed what caused the internal explosion: Britain 
said boilers; Germany said gunpowder. And finally, like the 
Lusitania, the British board of inquiry laid total blame for 
the sinking on the U-boat captain and the policies of the 
German government. The fact that the Falaba resisted was not 
publicly released until later, so that the incident appeared 
a wanton act of cruelty. 
Though a challenge to 
accountability," no official 
the 
protest 
policy of "strict 
over the Falaba was 
sent from Washington. Facts were in dispute: the ship had 
carried munitions, it had been warned, and only one American 
passenger had been killed. Added to this was the dispute 
between Bryan and Lansing over "contributory negligence"-
whether or not Americans took their chances when sailing on 
belligerents. Bryan wanted Americans warned to stay off such 
ships in the interest of neutrality. Lansing who authored 
"strict accountability," said they should be able to go 
where they pleased with U.S. protection. No protest was 
issued until May, when the Falaba was lumped in with the 
Lusitania protest. In Germany's eyes, however, the silence 
meant one of two things: "strict accountability" applied 
only to U.S. merchant ships, or it was a bluff. 
On April 29, an American oil tanker was bombed by a 




Cushing, bound for the Netherlands from New York, was hit by 
one of the three bombs dropped - causing slight damage and 
no injuries. The case of the Cushing also merged with the 
Lusitania, but it was subsequently seen by the Germans as a 
mistake in judgement. The ship flew the Stars and Stripes, 
but it had no other markings, and could not be seen from the 
air. The United States accepted this explanation. 
On May 1, 1915, the day the Lusitania left New York 
for the last time, the American tanker Gulflight was 
torpedoed off the south coast of Ireland. The ship was bound 
for Rouen, France, out of Port Arthur, Texas, with a cargo 
of oil. In an area close to where the Falaba was sunk, and 
where the Lusitania would meet her fate, the captain of the 
Gulflight had asked British patrol boats where a French 
harbor pilot might be obtained. The British patrol suspected 
the tanker of refueling U-boats in the area, and began to 
escort it to the nearest port. The U-30, commanded by 
Captain von Rosenberg-Gruszczynski, surfaced and attempted 
to halt the convoy. One of the patrol boats attempted to ram 
the U-boat, which then crash-dived. When the U-30 
resurfaced, the crew fired a torpedo at the tanker which it 
thought was part of a British convoy. The torpedo exploded, 
but with very little damage. However, two American crewmen 
panicked, jumped overboard, and drowned. When Von Rosenberg 
saw the Stars and Stripes on the Gulflight's stern, he 
abandoned his attack. Later that night, the Gulflight's 
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captain died of a heart attack. The three dead crewmen were 
the only Americans killed on an American ship from the 
outbreak of the war in Europe until Washington broke off 
diplomatic relations with Germany on March 16, 1917. 
The attack on the Gulflight, like that on the Cushing, 
was a mistake of war. The Germans apologized in both cases, 
and later paid damages in the case of the Gulflight. The 
Gulflight was also lumped in with the first U.S. protest 
after the sinking of the Lusitania. 
After looking at the 1915 foreign policies of Britain, 
Germany, and the United States, as well as the international 
maritime law of the period, it is easy to see why the debate 
over the Lusitania continues. Such a review is essential, 
however, to an understanding of the complex issues 
surrounding the sinking. The study will now build on this 
foundation, with a review of the systems of censorship and 
propaganda that affected the news of the Lusitania that 
reached the United States, and the seven newspapers of this 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE .AMERICAN PRESS 
Censorship and Propaganda 
The role of censorship and propaganda in World War I 
is one of the best researched aspects of the conflict. 
Though every belligerent in the struggle had some system 
controlling censorship and propaganda, the major ones that 
influenced America were Great Britain and Germany. A brief 
review is required in order to study American newspapers 
during the neutrality period. 
The battle for the hearts and minds of Americans began 
immediately after the outbreak of the war. Great Britain 
made the first move - a decisive one in propaganda terms. On 
August 5, 1914, England cut the trans-Atlantic cables 
between Germany and the United States. From that moment on, 
all war news - all European news of any kind - bound for the 
United States would have to pass through London and one of 
the most elaborate censorship apparatuses the world had ever 
seen. 
The cutting of the trans-Atlantic cable was the most 
visible aspect of an elaborate British plan for 
disinformation. The planning for this operation took place a 
year before the outbreak of the war. In 1913 the government 
formed a Joint Consultative Committee of Admiralty, War 
Office, and Press for the purpose of planning wartime 
.~ 
~,: f~ I, 
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censorship. This Press censorship committee, as it was also 
known, was replaced in 1916 with the Press Bureau - but the 
always the same: 
"supervise, largely on a 
mission was 
voluntary basis, issue of news to and by the press."1 This 
" voluntary" press 




intelligence and censorship bureaus 
agency. 
The Defense of the Realm Act was enacted by Parliament 
at the outbreak of the war in 1914. This law armed British 
censors with control over "all statements intended or likely 
to prejudice His Majesty's relations with foreign powers." 
Such general language gave British censors sweeping powers 
over the press. Phillip KnightleY in his book, The First 
f_asualty, discussed the results of this censorship power: 
rt was a routine designed with two 
ostensible ends in view: to enable the public to 
have a picture of its armY at the front, but at 
the same time to prevent the publication of any 
information that might be of use to the enemy. 
But, of course, these were not the real aims. 
The real aims were, first, to provide colourful 
stories of heroism and glory calculated to 
sustain enthusiasm for the war and ensure a 
supply of recruits for th~ front and, ~econd, to 
cover any mistakes the hig~ c?mmand might make, 
preserve it from criticism in its c?nduct of the 




. Dictionar of official war-Time Or anization 
~uoted in H.C. Peterson, gopaganda for War: The campai~~ 
~ainst American NeutralitY, 19 14- 1917 , (The University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1939; reprint ed., Port Washington, N.Y.: 
Kennikat Press, 1968), P· 1
3
. 
2. Phillip KnightleY, .'!'.!1e First casualty, 
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Such an accusation could be hurled at any one of the 
belligerents in the field, but it applied especially to the 
British, since London was the gatekeeper of all news to 
America. Once news dispatches reached London, the British 
government could re-censor items already censored by the 
French, Germans, Austrians, and Russians. Though there were 
some other ways to get news to America - mail, wireless 
radio, smuggling, and circuitous cable routes - the fastest, 
and most reliable route was via London. The rush for news 
beats often gave reporters no other choice. The British 
noose on news was extremely tight, however, as the Defense 
of the Realm Act allowed all means of communication - even 
mail- to be censored. 
Negative actions by the British government were 
coupled with "positive reinforcement" - censorship went hand 
in hand with propaganda and disinformation. In September, 
1914, the government authorized the British Foreign Office 
to form a War Propaganda Bureau. Installed in Wellington 
House, the office of an insurance firm, the group was 
responsible for all war propaganda - especially that aimed 
at the United States. The responsibilities of Wellington 
House were many and varied: 
Wellington house was ... concerned with the 
production, translation and distribution of 
books, pamphlets, government publications, 
speeches and so forth dealing with the war, its 
origin, its history and all the varied and 
difficult questions which arose during its 
development; the production and distribution of 
special pictorial papers; assisting in the 
placing of articles and interviews designed to 
influence opinion in the world's newspapers and 
magazines, especially in America; the wide 
distribution of pictorial matter, cartoons, 
pictures and drawings, photographs for insertion 
in newspapers and periodicals and for 
exhibition; the production and distribution of 
cinematograph films; personal correspondence 
with influential people abroad, especially in 
America; arrangements for the interchange of 
visits, of personal tours to neutral and allied 
countries and of visits of distinguished 
neutrals and of representatives of the Allies to 
this country; the production and distribution of 
maps, diagrams, posters, lantern slides and 
lectures, pictures, postcards, and all other 
possible means of miscellaneous propaganda. 3 
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Much of the propaganda handled by officials from 
Wellington House involved stories of German war atrocities. 
Germany did not help its own public relations effort when it 
invaded neutral Belgium at the war's outbreak, calling the 
neutrality accord it had signed "a scrap of paper." The 
British capitalized on this brutal invasion of a neutral 
country by inventing atrocity stories about the type of 
warfare conducted by the Germans. Wellington House arranged 
lectures, books and pamphlets by "experts" detailing such 
grotesque stories as: public gang rapes of Belgian women, 
the crucifixion of Allied troops, and German soldiers 
cutting off the hands of young children. Though the essence 
of war is violence, and the German advance across Belgium 
caused civilian casualties, various sources have estimated 
that 90 percent of these atrocity stories were false. All 
3 . "An Aspect of British Official War-Time Propaganda," 
quoted in Peterson, Propaganda for War, p . 17. 
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including the British and French-
inflicted their share of civilian casualties. 
Members of Wellington House made use of British 
friends of Theodore Roosevelt, J.P. Morgan, Colonel House, 
and other prominent Americans, in a letter writing campaign 
stressing Anglo-American ties. speaking tours were arranged 
for British "experts" to travel to the United States on 
lecture tours - usually giving the lurid accounts of German 
atrocities. Well-appointed chateaus near the war front were 
made available to British and American VIPs - especially 
writers - for tours of the front. The well-orchestrated 
tours, along with briefings, convinced such people as Arthur 
Conan Doyle, George Bernard Shaw, and H.G. Wells of the 
righteousness of the Allied cause. 
The all-encompassing British propaganda effort was 
strengthened by the fact that, at the war's outbreak, many 
journalists from American news organizations were pro-Allied 
anyway: 
For years the American public had received 
its day-by-day picture of Europe through a 
distinctly British perspective. Few American 
newspapers at that time maintained European 
staffs of their own; while those which did found 
few trained American foreign correspondents to 
man them. There were one or two capable American 
newspapermen in Berlin, but there were probably 
none at all in St. Petersburg, while even the 
Paris correspondents concentrated mainly upon 
social and artistic news rather than political 
reporting. Both our newspapers and press 
associations tended to cover European politics 
from London. Their London bureaus had general 
supervision over the correspondents on the 
Continent; the news was largely assembled in 
London bureaus and forwarded by them. It was 
often heavily filled out with information or 
'background' material derived from the British 
newspapers and magazines simply because they had 
so much better sources than the American staff 
... The New York Times, which perhaps gave more 
serious attention to European events than any 
other American newspaper, had an Englishman, Mr. 
Ernest Marshall, as the head of its London 
bureau, and his subordinates were largely 
Britishers. Its Berlin correspondent, Mr. 
Frederick William Wile, was an American, but the 
Times shared him with Northcliffe's [London] 
Daily Mail, a leader in the anti-German 
propaganda in England. The New York World's 
London correspondent was an Irishman who had 
never worked in the United States; his staff, 
like Mr. Marshall's, was largely composed of 
British newspapermen. So was that of the [New 
York] Sun. Those correspondents who were 
American citizens, moreover, had often lived so 
long abroad as to absorb the British viewpoint. 
The dean of the American correspondents in 
London, Mr. Edward Price Bell of the Chicago 
Daily News, had arrived fresh from college, to 
remain there for the rest of his active life, 
and it was naturally impossible for the others 
not to reflect the atmosphere by which they were 
daily surrounded.' The result was ' that the 
American view of Europe was normally and 
unavoidably colored very deeply by the British 
attitude. 4 
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The collar of British censorship was tight, their 
propaganda extremely effective, and American reporters 
inclined to favor the Allies 
initially able to deliver 
counterpunch. 
a 
but the Germans were 
strong disinformation 
The British controlled all European cable traffic and 
mail bound for the United States. Smuggling dispatches by 
boat - though often a way major stories were broken - was 
4 Road to War, America 1914-1917, quoted in Peterson, 
Propaganda for War, p. 6. 
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unreliable and slow. But the Marconi wireless radio used 
thin air to deliver its message - and not even the tight 
British noose could control the airwaves. The wireless was 
an important means of communication between Berlin and 
America. 
During the early days of the war Germany was winning-




along the war 
stories telling 
anxious to exploit this good news, and show 
and superior fighting spirit of the German 
it initially allowed correspondents free rein 
front. German censors, facing only news 
of victory in the field, cut only the bare 
amount of information - such as unit strengths and specific 
casualty figures. Wireless stations in Berlin broadcast 
these dispatches throughout the world. For awhile, Americans 
had in-depth news and feature stories of the war's early 
campaigns. This forced the British to somewhat ease their 
restrictions on the activities of combat journalists. It 
accredited five correspondents one carefully chosen 
American - to accompany units into the field (though under 
tight censorship requirements that allowed only upbeat 
feature stories). 
But the early German victories were soon supplanted by 
the attrition tactics of trench warfare as the armies bogged 
down in France - here success was measured in yards instead 
of miles. Without good news, the Germans became as strict as 
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the British - correspondents were no longer able to roam the 
front. 
German censorship was l ess s ubt le, and somewhat more 
harsh than the British. The Ber l i n government took direct 
control of all German newspapers . Where an enterprising 
British paper might be able to work a watered- down story 
past the military censor, the German papers could not. In 
effect, the government in Berlin made its own news. This 
policy would later boomerang on Berlin officials during the 
last days of the war when Germa n citi zens revolted against 
the government that covered up t he magnitude of its losses. 
Like the British, the Germans made an effort at 
positive propaganda aimed at America. Coordinated by the 
German Embassy in Washington, the prop aganda effort enlisted 
noted German leaders - such a s Dr . Be rnard Dernburg, former 
director of the German governme nt ' s Colonial Office - to 
arrange pro-German speakers, books and pamphlets, movies, 
and editorial columns. The effort e nl is ted the help of the 
many German-Americans in the Uni ted States - the powerful 
German-American Alliance was a prominent U.S. lobby group 
that helped promote the Ge rman cause . The German propaganda 
effort struck a responsive c o r d among Americans of German 
and Irish descent, and other c i t i zens with no love for 
England. 
But the German effort was c lumsy , lar gely because of 






The German military was often its own worst enemy. Not 
only did Germany try to stem the flow of American munitions 
to England by its U-boat campaign - it sent saboteurs to 
attack the sources. Several U.S. munitions factories and 
warehouses were destroyed during the neutrality period, and 
the Justice Department later uncovered many other German 
plots. This did nothing to help the German cause in America. 
In Belgium, many members of a violent underground 
movement against the German occupation were women. When such 
women were taken prisoner, they were legitimately - as spies 
and saboteurs shot by firing squad. The German army 
rightly defended its action, but had no conception of its 
public relations mistake which gave the British 
propagandists a field day. Though most of the German 
atrocity stories were untrue, 
did little to help their cause 
Prussian military efficiency 
on the world stage. The 
sinking of the Lusitania itself was 
propaganda blunder of the war. Though 
the biggest German 
technically within 
their rights under international law to sink a ship like the 
Lusitania, the German Admiralty had no conception of the 
wrath brought on by the spectacular act of sinking an ocean 
liner with women and children aboard. 
The weather even turned against the Germans. The 
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atmospheric conditions required for German wireless to reach 
the United States occurred only during the cool fall and 
winter months. Half the year spring and summer - the 
Germans were at the mercy of the British cable censors in 
London. The sinking of the Lusitania occurred in May when 
the long-distance wireless was practically useless. 
Reporting the war 
A flood of new war correspondents hit Europe after the 
outbreak of hostilities but all of them chafed under the 
wartime press restrictions. As the war bogged down in the 
trench warfare of the western and eastern f r ont s, all 
belligerents banned unescorted journalists from viewing the 
especially those journalists not 
scenes of 
officially accredited. unescorted correspondents wandering 
the front in search of news were subject to arrest and 
execution as spies. Though many were arrested, however, 
there is no record of anY war correspondents being executed. 




was hard to come by. France 
language fluency before 
required French citizenship a
nd 
correspondents were accredited (
th
is 




that their oath 
stories would remain unchanged while passing from the hands 
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of the censors in Berlin to the pages of their newspapers. 
British accreditation was based on a check of the 
correspondent's background, and required that no stories be 
written that mentioned regiments by name and places (except 
in vague terms), and any officers other than the commander-
in-chief. In almost all cases the correspondents were 
treated extremely well when they played by the rules. They 
lived and filed their stories in large group houses near the 
front where fine food and drink were provided. War 
information officers accompanied them at all time in the 
field, providing well-orchestrated tours of the front. 
Phillip Knightley described the correspondent's 
routine on the British front: 
The correspondents soon settled down into a 
routine. On the day that an attack was 
scheduled, they drew lots to see who would cover 
which area. Each then set out in his chauffeur-
driven car, accompanied by his conducting 
officer. They went as close to the front as 
possible, watched the preliminary bombardment, 
got into the backwash of prisoners and walking 
wounded, interviewed anyone they could, and 
tried to piece together a story. Back at their 
quarters, the correspondents held a meeting, and 
each man outlined the narrative part of his 
story, keeping any personal impressions for his 
own dispatch. They then retired to their own 
rooms, wrote their pieces, and submitted them to 
the waiting censors. What the censors left was 
given to a dispatch rider, who took the message 
to Signals at G.H.Q [General Headquarters], 
where they were telephoned to the War Office and 
sent from there by hand to the various 
newspapers' offices. 5 
daily 
Many reporters joked that the only accurate, unaltered 
5 . Knightley, The First Casualty, pp. 96-97. 
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fact they could get past the censors was the weather. Added 
to these news gathering conditions were the flood of 
"official communiques" provided by the belligerent 
governments. These communiques, the only battle reports 
allowed to be circulated, often had no basis in reality-
skewing casualty figures and calling retreats "strategic 
repositioning." Such government policies took their toll on 
the quality of the writing from the front. An American 
journalist said: 
In general the World War correspondents 
felt they were writing pretty fine stuff, stuff 
worthy of the romantic war correspondent of an 
earlier day ... Few of them stopped to think the 
matter through. The censorship irked them and 
they hated it at first, but gradually they grew 
used to it and wrote what they could, working up 
all the 'human interest stuff' available and 
learning quickly that the censors loved it and 
almost invariably passed it - provided it said 
nothing about the drinking, stealing and rugged 
amours ... Dragooned into thinking about and 
observing the war in terms of what would get 
printed he [the correspondent] went on exuding 
larger and larger gobs of slush, to the 
continual delight of the appreciative censor, 
the supreme satisfaction of his managing editor 
and the glory of the paper that had sent him. 6 
It has been said that had there been adequate press 
coverage of the American Civil War it would not have lasted 
as long as it did. The same can be said of World War I. 
Wartime restrictions meant that hundreds of important 
stories were missed. Supplies were so short that thousands 
6 "Front Page Stuff: 1918," quoted in Joseph J. 
Mathews, Reporting the Wars, (Minneapolis: The University of 
Minnesota Press, 1957), pp. 157-158. 
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of men marched into battle without rifles. Generals, 
fighting 20th Century weapons with 19th Century strategy, 
sent wave after wave of men "over the top" of the trenches 
in a cruel war of attrition. The French alone lost five 
million men by the end of the war. 
Some major war stories were broken in spite of the 
censor, such as British reporting of the disastrous 
Gallipoli campaign, but these were the exception rather than 
the rule. The British and French correspondents generally 
answered the call of patriotism, making their censors happy. 
It was usually the Americans who got into trouble - many 
were arrested and jailed for trying to circumvent wartime 
press restrictions. Some American journalists - volunteers 
at that point from a neutral country - left the wartime 
restrictions in Europe and returned home for more 
substantial work. This left the American people with less 
information - just when they needed it the most. Though many 
war correspondents wrote books after the war denouncing the 
censorship and propaganda, few organized protests occurred 
during the conflict. 
The American Press: The Seven Selected Newspapers 
With few correspondents overseas at the beginning of 
the war in August, 1914, Americans began arriving in Europe 





- n searc of romance 
others volunteered to cover the war i h 
and action. Almost all the Americans ran afoul of wartime 
press restrictions, and it was only after they returned home 
that they could freely publish in-depth stories. One group 
of Americans, who had traveled with the German 
army in 
Belgium, was strongly condemned in the British press for 
Publishing a story disputing the atrocity stories coming out 
of the invasion of that country. Until America entered the 
war, U.S. correspondents shuttled back and forth to Europe-
usually leaving the war theater when disillusioned with its 
Press restrictions. But the reporters with the major news 
services - among them the Associated 
Press, United Press ' 
International News service, and New York 
Times News Service 
- remained throughout the war. 
At home, a LiterarY Digest poll 
of leading American 
editors in the third month of the war showed 240 neutral, 
105 pro-Ally, and 20 pro-German. How scientific this 1914 
it is often cited by 
Poll was is open 
to question. However, 
journalism historians 
as a measure 
of the editorial 
neutrality period. 
After reviewing the 
Viewpoint of the 
literature, however, it appears to this writer that "pro-
German" was in the eye of the beholder - those editor s and 
newspapers who sought to balance their coverage between 








the method of 
chosen for this 
,111111 11111 
,,, .. :11 r.; ' 
I ,1111 • ~ 
I 1111 1111 
,, 111 1 ll ifl 
I I 
'I lilllf# 
• I >III' 
[ ; J!E~ 
1 .1 JI 1,fj 
1,,1 i, ,, 
116 
study based on their geographic locations and political 
prominence: the New York Times, Atlanta Constitution, 
Chicago Tribune, San Francisco Examiner, Washington Post, 
Kansas City Star, and Milwaukee Journal. The Times was 
chosen for its reputation as a paper of record, and because 
New York marked the Lusitania's last point of departure. The 
Constitution was chosen as one of the most prominent and 
respected dailies of the south. The Tribune was selected not 
only as prominent mid-western paper, but as one of the most 
notorious American dailies favoring the Republican Party - a 
paper opposing the policies of Woodrow Wilson. The Examiner 
was used as a representative from the west coast, and as a 
paper owned by William Randolph Hearst, a man with an 
enormous affect on the journalism of this period. The Post 
was selected because of the importance of Washington in the 
foreign policy process. The Star was selected because of its 
prominence in the western farm states "America's 
Heartland." The Journal was chosen because the majority of 
its city's population was made up of German immigrants. It 
was felt that these papers represented most political shades 
of opinion in the United States of 1915. Thus a firm 
foundation for a study of this type. 
Each paper was studied before, during, and after the 
crisis, in order to determine any change in editorial policy 
or outlook. The papers were examined six months prior to t he 










November 1914 (Nov. 1 - 7). The papers were examined during 
the crisis itself, from the sinking on May 7, 1914, through 
the exchange of three diplomatic notes ending February 4, 
1916. To cover this crisis period, every issue in May, June, 
July, and the first two weeks in August were examined. The 
final U.S. protest note was sent on July 21, 1915, and was 
not answered until February 4, 1916. Therefore, to cover the 
final German response, the first two weeks of February, 1916 
(Feb. 1 - 14), were also examined. The papers were studied 
six months after this final exchange of notes, during the 
week of August 1 - 7, 1916. A total of 134 issues per paper. 
This review of each newspaper included an examination 
of: the first seven pages of each paper, the unsigned 
editorials expressing the view of the editorial staff, and 
any letters to the editor, when published, that dealt with 
the sinking. This study used descriptive analysis to 
determine degrees of difference, or biases, in the news 
coverage of each paper. Therefore, a formal content analysis 
- the counting and categorizing of each story, picture, map, 
diagram, editorial, and letter - was unnecessary. 
The first seven pages were examined to see how the 
same story received coverage in 
included headline, placement, size, 
each newspaper. This 
and content - along with 
any graphics used. Six months before, and six months after 
the sinking, the news of the European war was analyzed in 
this way. During the crisis, news of the sinking itself was 
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the focus of study. 
As there was much comment on the many aspects of the 
war in Europe, only unsigned editorials and letters to the 
editor specifically mentioning the Lusitania were reviewed 
during the crisis period of May, 1915, through February, 
1916. Six months prior to the sinking (November, 1914), and 
six months after the final German note (August 1916), 
general war editorials and letters to the editor were 
reviewed to obtain the papers' views on foreign policy 
issues. 
The remainder of this chapter will provide a brief 
history of each newspaper studied, as well as the news 
coverage and editorial viewpoint of each paper six months 
prior to the sinking of the Lusitania. 
New York Times 
The New York Times was the most pro-Ally of the papers 
used in this study. Many journalism historians write of the 
Times as if Moses brought it down the Mountain with the Ten 
Commandments. Yet in World War I it was hardly "All the News 
That's Fit to Print." 
The Times was founded in 1851 as a paper following the 
tenets of the Whig Party. With the demise of the Whigs, it 
moved from the Free Soilers to the Republican party before 
the Civil War - all the while advocating the conservative 
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industrial and banking interests of the northeast. owner-
editor Henry J. Raymond wrote the first Republican party 
platform in 1856. But Raymond dabbled too much in party 
politics and the Times began to suffer. Without adequate 
leadership from Raymond, and leaderless after his death in 
1869, the Times - though providing copious amounts of news-
appeared dull compared to its rivals. It was also more 
expensive. The Times went into receivership in 1895. 
Editorial page editor Charles R. Miller, a stalwart 
leader during this period, then brought to the Times 
Tennessee newspaperman Adolph S. Ochs. A success in 
Tennessee, Ochs desired work in New York and had heard of 
the Times financial troubles - Miller urged stockholders to 
give Ochs a chance. In 1896, Ochs agreed to a deal allowing 
him controlling interest in the paper should he make it 
successful in three years. 
Much has been written of Ochs by journalism 
historians, again as if he had strolled down the Mountain 
with Moses. He was a solid editor - but above all he was a 
smart businessman. In 1896 he published his declaration of 
purpose: 
It will be my earnest aim that the New-York 
Times give the news, all the news, in concise 
and attractive form, in language that is 
parliamentary in good society, and give it as 
early, if not earlier, than it can be learned 
through any other reliable medium; to give the 
news impartially, without fear of favor, 
regardless of any party, sect or interest 
involved; to make the columns of the New-York 
Times a forum for the consideration of all 
questions of public importance, and to that end 
to invite intelligent discussion from all shades 
of opinion. 7 
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Historian Frank Luther Mott has said that the motto 
"All the News That's Fit to Print" was aimed at the tawdry 
"yellow" journals of Hearst and Pulitzer. But Ochs was smart 
enough to know what sold newspapers - and he copied some of 
their methods. Pictures were used more frequently, headlines 
stretched across pages, some crime stories were printed, and 
the Times financed its share of foreign expeditions-
including one to the Arctic. The paper's readership was the 
solid New York businessman, and it reported widely on news 
that affected business: foreign news, financial news, 
economic forecasts and government policy. It became a leader 
- and a paper of record - for printing important speeches 
and government documents in their entirety. At the outbreak 
of World War I, it printed "white papers" from each 
belligerent's foreign office, explaining their individual 
causes. The Times did it share of muckraking, but only when 
business was adversely affected - it vigorously opposed the 
Tweed Ring in Tammany Hall, but opposed anti - trust 
legislation just as strongly. Ochs modeled his paper after 
the Times of London, and shared much of its foreign news. 
This is evident in a review of the New York Times six 
months before the sinking of the Lusitania. A review of the 
7 . Meyer Berger, The Story of the New York Times: 1851-
1951, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1951), pp. 107 - 108. 
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contents of the first week of November, 1914, revealed much 
about the paper's editorial viewpoint. 
At least the first five pages of the Times contained 
war news from Europe - often stretching to pages six and 
seven. Most of the front page was devoted to war news, which 
usually made up the lead stories. Stories of national or 
local news appeared beyond pages five and six, including the 
jumps from page one. An exception to this was the late-
breaking election news of this first week in November. The 
Times war news included pictures, maps, and analysis - one 
standing feature, "The War Situation," was written "by a 
military expert of the New York Times, (An associate Editor 
of the Army and Navy Journal). 11 8 War news usually included 
its route to the Times "via Marconi wireless" or "via 
cable from London." Few reporters had by-lines. The Times 
relied on its own worldwide news service - few stories were 
credited to the Associated Press or United Press. The 
editorials were usually located on page ten. The editorials 
shared space with letters to the editor, columnists, and 
"Topics of the Times" (short, unsigned editorials). There 
were no editorial cartoons. 
The only balance to be found in the pro-British Times 
of November, 1914, was in its letters to the editor. 
Published letters always balanced British and German 
8 . This regular feature of the Times always appeared on 
page 3. 
interests 
- -- -- - - - - - -----
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with writers attacking the Times from both 
sides. The rest of the paper was shamelessly pro-British. 
War news compared the brutal efficiency of the Germans with 
the heart and courage of the Allies. Stories of the military 
movements of both sides - as far as the censors would allow 
- were given equal status on the front page. 
But most of the Times' war news was obtained via cable 
from London - even news from Berlin (few stories came by 
German wireless) - so the British angle was highlighted. The 
pages of the Times were filled with features highlighting 
German atrocities or the pluck of the Allied fighting man. 
Stories of Germany emphasized the brutal efficiency of her 
armies - burning and raping their way across Belgium. The 
few German features stories that were printed emphasized 
only German weakness such as the lack of adequate 
ambulance service at the fronts. 9 
Allied features stories were all over the first seven 
pages, highlighting courageous British nurses or brave 
French fliers: BOLD AIRMAN PLAYS HIS GAME WITH GLEE - SWOOPS 
DOWN ON GERMAN CAMP AND ESCAPES - FINDS FOE'S BATTERY AND 
WINS GENERAL'S PRAISE. 10 Editorials were just as biased. An 
editorial of November 5 praised the British Treasury for 
raising money for the war effort - and urged America to 
9 . New York Times, 5 November 1914, p. 2. 
lO. Ibid., p. 2. 
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grant loans to the Allies.11 A November 3 editorial 
discussed the effectiveness of Allied submarine nets: " ... a 
convenient and effective means of reducing these much-
dreaded little assassins to helplessness. 1112 
Washington Post 
The Washington Post was more balanced in its coverage 
of the war than the Times, but had a character all its own. 
The Post was founded as a Democratic paper in 1877 by 
Stilson Hutchins and it quickly became very popular in the 
city. In 1889, Hutchins sold the paper to Frank Hatton, 
former Postmaster General, and Beriah Wilkins, a member of 
Congress from Ohio. Hatton was a Republican and Wilkins a 
Democrat, so the paper took on a distinctive, independent 
approach to the news. The paper became a well respected 
daily noted for muckraking at the local level, and in-
depth political news. By 1905, however, both Hatton and 
Wilkins had died. The Post was sold to a publisher, 




McLean was a survivor of several political battles in 
a Democrat in an overwhelmingly Republican state who 
came close to winning he governor's race in 1899. McLean 
11. Ibid., p. 10. 




took over the reins of the Cincinnati Enquirer from his 
father in 1880. His father, Washington McLean, had owned the 
paper since 1857. John McLean was a Democrat, but from the 
conservative side of that party backing industrial and 
financial interests. He was also a wealthy man, and used to 
boast that he even made his father pay for his Enquirer 
subscription. 13 The Enquirer was a major Democratic daily of 
the midwest, a paper to be reckoned with in the politics of 
the Ohio valley. McLean moved to Washington in 1884, 
balancing his business interests between the two cities. At 
the time he bought the Post in 1905, McLean owned 
c ontrollin g i nteres t in the Washington Ga s Light Compa ny, 
American Security and Trust Company, Riggs National Bank, 
and a streetcar line - the Old Dominion Ra ilway.14 
McLean was a good friend of William Randolph Hearst, 
and like Hearst, knew how to sell newspapers. Both the Post 
and Enquirer published lurid crime stories, colorful comics , 
sports news, and Sunday magazines and used bold headlines. 
But the Post's reputation began t o decline under McLean. 
Foreign news came almost exclusively from t he wi re s ervices , 
and the conservative publisher put a stop to business 
muckraking. The Post was an eastern newspaper with many 
southern traditions. Therefore, like the Times, the Post 
13. Chalmers M. Roberts, The Washington Post: The First 
100 Years, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, Co., 1977), p. 85. 
14. Ibid., p. 85. 
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lauded American business and trade interests; and like the 
Atlanta Constitution, it espoused many rural ideals and 
protected agricultural interests particularly cotton. 
Though a Democrat, McLean was suspicious of Wilson's 
progressive "New Freedom" legislation 
distant critic of the administration. 
and remained a 
The Post of the first week of November, 1914, unlike 
the Times, provided balanced coverage of the war in Europe. 
Part of this due no doubt to McLean's Cincinnati background 
- a midwestern city, largely German and Irish. The Post 
openly criticized British war policies, but was no strong 
advocate for the German cause either. Some historians, such 
as Frank Luther Mott and Edwin Emery, have labeled the paper 
"anti-British." The Post was, more accurately, fiercely pro-
American 
preparedness. 
backing U.S. neutrality and calling for armed 
The front page of the Post was usually a mix of war, 
national and local news - with war news often getting half 
the space. War news dominated until page three or four, 
where national and local news began. War stories centered on 
military movements and analysis, yet there were few of the 
syrupy feature stories of sacrifice and heroism - the few 
that did appear highlighted both sides. Stories of Allied or 
German victories and defeats - though censored - were given 
equal placement in the paper. Like the Times, the Post 
published side-by-side communiques from the belligerent 
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governments. During the week of November 1 - 7, 1914, it was 
the German and French. The Post's local and national news 
was highlighted by several "man bites dog" stories-
oddities to attract reader's interest: a Wilmington, 
Delaware, man swallowed his false teeth 15 
' 
or a local 
burglar left his own book review in the library of a local 
house. 16 The Post contained more community news in its first 
seven pages than did the Times. Stories had few by-lines, 
and, like the Times, stories attributed their routes to the 
paper - such as, "Paris, via cable from London." 
The Post's editorial page was not as comprehensive as 
the Times. Letters to the editor were supplanted by daily 
short interviews with Washington visitors - giving their 
hometown views on major issues. The editorial page also 
contained daily humorous excerpts from newspapers and 
magazines across the country. The editorials themselves were 
comprehensive and generally balanced. A NovembeI 2 editorial 
urged caution and skepticism when reading atrocity stories 
from both sides - without a way to find out who's telling 
the truth, let history be the judge, it argued. 17 An 
editorial on November 4 criticized both Germany and Britain 
for restricting neutral trade though admitting Britain 
15. Washington Post, 2 November 1914, p. 1. 
16 . Washington Post, 6 November 1914, p. 5 . 







seemed "more reasonable" about it. 18 A theme 
running 
t hroughout the Post's editorials was d 
arme preparedness-
staying out of the war, but being strong enough to keep 
European powers from tangling with America. 
The Post -constantly urged Congress to build up the nation's coastal 
defenses. 
San Francisco Examiner 
Another preparedness advocate was McLean's friend 
William Randolph Hearst. By 1914, Hearst's San Francisco 
Examiner was part of a chain of morning and evening dailies 
that included papers in New York, Boston, and Chicago. The 
Examiner had been Hearst's springboard to journalistic fame. 
He had inherited the paper from his millionaire father in 
1891. While he was in San Francisco Hearst admired and 
imitated the new, sensational journalism of Joseph 
Pulitzer's New York World - some would say he perfected it. 
In 1895, Hearst bought the New York Journal and began to 
compete with Pulitzer on his home ground - New York - the 
nation's most influential newspaper city. Much has been 
written of the 19th Century journalistic escapades of 
Hearst: the circulation war with Pulitzer, the 
sensationalism of the "yellow" press, and the adventure of 
the Spanish-American War. 
18. Washington Post, 4 November 1914, p. 6. 
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By 1914, however, Hearst's brand of journalism had 
toned down a bit. Several factors contributed to his 
change. Hearst's papers delivered vicious, and personal, 
editorial attacks on William McKinley as a candidate, and as 
president. When McKinley was assassinated in 1901, there was 
a strong public backlash against Hearst. Many said his 
editorials created the climate for the murder. Hearst also 
entertained strong political ambition. Hearst, aligning 
himself with the Democratic machine of New York's Tammany 
Hall, was elected to Congress in 1902 and 1904. He sought 
the party's presidential nomination in 1904, but came up 
short of delegates in a tough convention fight. Hearst ran, 
and lost, for the job of mayor of New York in 1905. In 1906, 
he obtained the Democratic nomination for New York governor 
- but lost to Republican Charles Evans Hughes. In 1909 
Hearst ran again for mayor of New York and lost. In 1910 he 
tried unsuccessfully for the job of lieutenant governor. 
Such political activity, by means of which he sought the 
presidency, forced him to become a man of compromise. 
Finally, by 1914, Hearst had become a millionaire many times 
over. He was now a more mature businessman, and began 
looking out for his own interests. Hearst saw in the 
European war a chance to allow Britain to weaken 
economically and allow the U.S. to fill the void. The war 
could be a boon for American business, his interest, in 
gaining new markets abroad. All these factors combined to 
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temper Hearst's role in World War I - it would not be his 
"splendid little war" as had been the one in Cuba. 
This did not mean Hearst was a passive force during 
the period of U.S. neutrality. He was one of the first 
publishers to seize on the issue of American preparedness-
calling for better coastal defenses and a larger navy. He 
openly criticized British trade policies, especially wartime 
restrictions preventing U.S. growth and profits. Critics 
pointed to his German investments and labeled him "pro-
German." He was hung in effigy for his anti-Ally views, and 
the New York Tribune pictured him as a snake, coiled in the 
American flag hissing "Hears-ss-ss-t." By 1916, the British 
found an official reason to deny Hearst's International News 
Service use of the trans-Atlantic cable. 
The San Francisco Examiner of November 1 - 7, 1914, 
still used many of the sensational techniques made famous by 
its owner in 1896. The paper still used occasional banner 
headlines, and kept readers abreast of the lurid crimes and 
other news oddities of its region. The paper included many 
pictures, drawings and maps. War news made up most of the 
front page, and continued through page three - where local 
and national news took over. The Examiner published daily 
the "official statements" communiques - of the warring 
nations during this first week of November, all except 
Britain. War news concentrated on troop movements and 
battles. The story selection and placement was evenly 
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balanced between accounts of the Allies and Central Powers. 
An occasional column of "expert" analysis appeared on the 
editorial page. There were few war features in the daily 
Examiner; those that were published were evenly divided-
though Germany had a few more than Britain and France. Some 
stories were attributed to the Associated Press or Reuters, 
though most appeared to be from the International News 
Service. The Examiner also gave stories from Asia and the 
Far East more prominent page placement than the other 
newspapers studied. Local and national news highlighted the 
offbeat: KEG OF BEER ROLLS ON MAYOR IN DRY TOWN, or FAMILY 
TRAPS BURGLARS 
HEROINE.19 
LAD FIRES, CATCHES ONE - GRANDMOTHER 
The editorial page was 
lacked for controversy. The 
bright, readable, and never 
page contained unsigned 
editorials, columns, excerpts from other newspapers and 
magazines, a thought for the day, and a political cartoon. 
There were no letters to the editor. The Examiner seemed to 
relish the old game of "twisting the Lion's tail"-
criticizing Britain - in editorials. A November 5 editorial 
traced the royal lineage of King George, and said before 
Britain should question anyone's loyalty it should note that 
its king has "no English blood in his veins. 11 20 But the 
Germans were not always spared. A news story quoted German 
19 . San Francisco Examiner, 2 November 1914, p. 1. 
20 . San Francisco Examiner, 5 November 1914, p. 18. 
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Ambassador Count Bernstorff as saying the Monroe Doctrine 
would not protect Canada from German invasion and 
colonization. The Examiner replied on November 4 with 
Hearst-like defiance: "if there is to be any colonizing done 
in Canada, Count Bernstorff, we will do it ourselves. 11 21 
But preparedness was the Examiner's major issue during 
this week. A November 5 editorial strongly attacked critics 
of military preparedness, calling on congress to build eight 
battleships a year until it reached a total of fifty. The 
editorial exhorted the people: "will you not make these 
representatives do the people's will and spend the people's 
money to build the ships of battle which alone can protect 
us all? What say you? 1122 Another editorial on the same day 
praised the efforts of Belgian relief, but urged officials 









Chicago Tribune il; ir·l:: 
Like Hearst and the Examiner, the Chicago Tribune and 
its ruling family were controversial giants in the 
journalism of this period. The paper had been an outspoken 
21 "Count Bernstorff and 
Examiner, 4 November 1914, p. 18. 
Canada," San Francisco 
22 . "Battleships Cost Less Than Battles," San Francisco 
Examiner, 5 November 1914, p. 18. 
23 . "Wrong Folks Are Hungry," San Francisco Examiner, 5 
November 1914, p. 18. 
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advocate for the Republican party since Joseph Medill bought 
controlling interest in 1855. Medill, and his partner 
' 
Charles Ray, were a major force behind the political success 
of Abraham Lincoln and the paper had supported all 
Republican efforts ever since. Though initially liberal, the 
Tribune had turned conservative in line with the Republican 
party by the turn of the century. The paper opposed many 
progressive reforms - including the eight-hour day - and was 
strongly anti-labor, calling union leaders "scum." Like the 
New York Times, the Tribune appealed to the wealthy men of 
business and industry - but in a much more radical fashion. 
The paper was often criticized for slanting its news stories 
to fit its editorial views, but the Tribune remained an 
influential paper in the midwest of 1914, and was one of 
America's largest dailies. 
With Joseph Medill's death in 1899, control of the 
paper was passed to a series of his relatives. By 1914, 
Robert R. McCormick, Medill's grandson, had taken control. 
Though the paper opposed Wilson and U.S. entry in the war, 
McCormick eventually served on Pershing's staff in Europe, 
achieving the rank of colonel. By 1914, the Tribune had a 
large foreign and national news staff - one of the most 
efficient in the nation. The paper's editorial view 
reflected the attitudes of the large Irish and German 
populations in Chicago. 
The Tribune of November 1 7, 1914, used many of 
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Hearst's ideas to sell newspapers, including many pictures, 
maps, and drawings. It was particularly fond of bold black 
banner headlines. Like the Washington Post and the San 
Francisco Examiner, the Tribune printed oddities and stories 
of crime - particularly those featuring damsels in distress . 
War news was usually balanced with local and national news 
on page one, but dominated pages two, three, and often page 
four. War accounts, like those in the Post and Examiner, 
centered on battles and other military movements. There were 
fewer war features, and like those in the Examiner, these 
tended to highlight the Germans. The overall coverage was 
balanced between the belligerents, however. The Tribune used 
its own foreign staff, few stories were credited to the wire 
services. The news stories were listed as coming to Chicago 
"via cable" or "via wireless." Local political news received 
special treatment in the Tribune, and political editorials 
often appeared on the front page. On November 3, election 
day, a huge banner proclaimed: IT'S YOUR DAY, MR. AND MRS. 
VOTER, while underneath appeared a large ballot listing the 
Tribune's "absolutely non-partisan" recommendations - almost 
exclusively Republicans.24 When the national off-year 
elections went slightly against the Democrats - who still 
held control of both houses of congress - a Tribune banner 
proclaimed REPUBLICAN LANDSLIDE IN MANY STATES INCLUDING NEW 
24 . Chicago Tribune, 3 November 1914, p . 1. 
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Theodore Roosevelt, a former Republican President , 
received good story placement in the Tribune. 
The Tribune's editorial page was lively during the 
first week in November, 1914, using several regular 
features. Two citizen-help columns - "How to Keep Well" and 
"Legal Friend of the People" - appeared daily. The paper 
also printed, on a daily basis, letters to the editor and "A 
Line-0'-Type or Two" from around the country. Letters to the 
editor concentrated mainly on local issues during this 
period. Most of the week's editorials centered on 
preparedness, the backing of Republican political moves, and 
statements telling readers not to underestimate the pride 
and efficiency of the German military. A November 1 
editorial rebuked pacifists, particularly Secretary of State 
Bryan: 
The perversion of the peace propaganda by 
impracticables and sentimentalists, which shows 
in opposition to all measures for naval and 
military defense, ought to be challenged 
wherever it appears. It does not represent the 
main current of peace sentiment in America, 
which is sane, if rather ingenious in some 
respects. We are all pacifists in the United 
States, holding war in detestation and mere 
military glory in indifference or humorous 
contempt. This is so true that what we need is 
to be waked up to the fact that we cannot afford 
to neglect national defense on the comfortable 
theory that we are immune from aggression or 
free from the entanglements of world 
relations. 26 
25. Chicago Tribune, 4 November 1914, p. 1. 
26 "War and American Policy," Chicago Tribune, 1 
November 1914, p. 11. 
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The Tribune was fiercely pro-American. It leaned 
toward the German side in the war, but wanted no part of it. 
It even urged its readers to "buy American" so that the 
country would not need the powers of Europe. 27 The Tribune, 
reflecting the ethnic background of its city, condemned 
those who questioned the loyalty of "hyphenated Arnericans"-
those of European descent: 
Hyphenated Americanism is going to be more 
vexatious and injurious for awhile. Let us hope 
it will be followed by a reaction in favor of 
plain Americanism, and let us not merely hope 
but work for that reaction. 28 
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Like the Tribune, the Atlanta Constitution vigorously 
defended its editorial beliefs, but it differed from the 
Chicago daily in many significant ways. The Constitution was 
the leading newspaper of the "New South." Its tradition came 
from its progressive managing editor Henry W. Grady, who led 
the paper from 1880 until his untimely death of pneumonia in 
1889. In those nine short years, Grady made the Constitution 
one of the country's most influential southern newspapers. 
Grady is credited with the idea of the "New South," calling 
on the region to improve its strong agricultural base with 
27. Chicago Tribune, 6 November 1914, p. 6. 
28 "Politics and Hyphenated 
Tribune, 1 November 1914, p. 11. 
Americans," Chicago 
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new industry, making the way to bridge the cultural and 
economic rift between north and south. The Constitution held 
fast to this ideal in its editorial policies under Grady, 
and it was one of the south's more progressive papers on 
racial issues. 
Clark Howell, Sr., son of publisher Evan P. Howell , 
replaced Grady as managing editor after his death. Under 
Howell, the paper aligned itself more toward the Democratic 
Party. In 1896, it was one of the major "jingo" papers 
calling for U.S. entry in the Spanish-American War. Howell 
was also influenced by New York's sensational press, and 
tried to incorporate those ideas in the Constitution, using 
large headlines, pictures, Sunday supplements and fiery 
editorials. 
The Constitution of November 1 - 7, 1914, resembled 
the Washington Post in its layout - but the New York Times 
in its editorial policy and story selection. The 
Constitution was fiercely pro-British, and like the Times, 
emphasized the brutal efficiency of the German war machine 
as opposed to the heart and courage of the Allies. The issue 
of November 1 provided many examples of pro- Allied stories: 
REFUGEE SHIP STRUCK BY GERMANS; FRENCH AIRMEN RAIN BOMBS ON 
GERMANS; 29 MILITARY IS SUPREME IN THE GERMAN EMPIRE.30 On 
November 3, the Constitution printed a communique from the 
29. Atlanta Constitution, 1 November 1914, p. 3. 
3 O. Ibid. , p. 6. 
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British foreign office on page three under the headline: 
RIGHTS OF U.S. VESSELS RECOGNIZED BY BRITAIN.31 On November 
2 another published story came from the British foreign 
office: GOOD TREATMENT GIVEN TO GERMAN PRISONERs.32 On 
November 5, the Chicago Tribune had declared the opposite: 
BRITAIN AND FRANCE TREAT PRISONERS BADLY, IS CLAIM.33 The 
Constitution's war news came completely from the wire 
services - particularly the Associated Press. The week's 
front pages were dominated by European war news, which 
usually stretched back six pages into the daily paper. The 
paper contained national news, but was more comprehensive in 
its coverage of local and regional news. It also printed its 
share of the bizarre: BRIDE TRIES TO COMMIT SUICIDE.34 
Except for the editorials themselves, the 
Constitution's daily editorial page was light - hearted in 
tone. Regular features included: "The Life Line," "Just From 
Georgia," and "Issues of the Day" - all of which looked at 
the lighter side of the news. There were several daily 
editorials in the Constitution during the week studied, many 
dealt with southern agriculture - cotton, pecans, apples, 
and livestock. 
sympathetic to 
31 Atlanta . 
32 Atlanta . 
33 Chicago . 
34 Atlanta . 
On these issues the paper was less 
Britain, whose blockade had restricted 
Constitution, 3 November 1914, p . 3. 
Constitution, 2 November 1914, p . 2. 
Tribune, 5 November 1914, p . 2. 
Constitution, 3 November 1914, p . 1. 
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southern trade. The editorial viewpoint, on the whole , was 
pro-Allied but non-interventionist. The paper was disgusted 
by this modern war, and on November 1, ran an editorial 
declaring the mass slaughter might cause men to give up on 
armed conflict: 
Glory and grandeur, with their traditional 
appeal, cannot survive under these conditions. 
Diet of this harshness kills both. When men find 
they must go forth to combat machines, instead 
of other men; to pit their brain and their 
noblest impulses against cogs and gears - what 
then? Will there not be an accumulating 
hesitation to engage in this bloody and 
mechanical business? Will not men, denied the 
lure of romance as an appetite for battle, see 
the folly of battle and turn to peaceful ways of 
arbitrating their differences? 35 
The November Constitution supported Woodrow Wilson - a 
Democrat and a southerner. It was not happy with his trade 
policy, however, hoping for a more vigorous defense of 
trading rights with Britain, especially where cotton was 
concerned. But the Constitution, like Wilson, was strongly 
against the "jingoes" clamoring for armed preparedness 
(though Wilson took up their rallying cry by 1916). On 
November 3, the paper strongly attacked defense build-ups as 
a waste of tax money. The Constitution said it was not 
"soft" on the military, but: 
... we decidedly object to this country 
being lugged into the race toward bankruptcy 
that invariably is implied by ' armed 
preparedness.' What a horrible commentary it 
would be on common sense if, after the 
35 "Will Romance-Robbed War Lead Mankind to Peace?" 
Atlanta Constitution, 1 November 1914, p. 2F. 
expiration of the present war, none of the 
nations had learned one lesson, and went 
straight back at the old game of impoverishing 
themselves for standing armies and 
battleships. 36 
Kansas City Star 
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Like the Constitution, the Kansas City Star was a well 
respected regional paper. But unlike the Constitution, Post, 
Examiner, or Tribune, it achieved its prominence without the 
sensational. The Star's success was due in large part to the 
personality of its crusading editor William Rockhill 
Nelson. A construction contractor and newspaper publisher in 
Fort Wayne, Indiana, Nelson moved west to Kansas City-
buying the four-page Star in 1880. At that time, Kansas City 
had all the elements of an old frontier town - unpaved 
streets, rowdy gambling, ramshackle buildings, and a corrupt 
city government. But the town was a busy transportation hub. 
It was a major port on the Missouri River, had once been a 
gateway to the Santa Fe Trail, and by the 20th Century was a 
terminus for several railroad lines. Nelson based his 
crusading newspaper on community service. Not a writer 
himself, Nelson hired the best editors and writers he could 
find, giving them full rein to sniff out corruption. Nelson 
emphasized his news sections more than his editorial page, 
but he used his editorials effectively to attack machine 
3 6. Atlanta Constitution, 3 November 1914, p. 6. 
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government and call for city improvements. 




Party and a strong backer of Theodore Roosevelt. But the 
paper displayed a remarkable political independence_ 
giving 
the news and letting the people make up their own minds. 
Improvements came to Kansas City streets were paved, 
electricity installed, viaducts built, parks established-
in part because of Nelson's hometown boosterism. 
And yet, the Star of November 1 -7, 1914, was a 
progressive paper with a conservative style. It was small, 
used one-column headlines, few pictures, and no comics. The 
stories were short, with a heavy emphasis on local, upbeat 
stories and muckraking. The Star did print it share of crime 
stories, however. Nelson pictured the Star as a family 
paper, and it was wildly popular - with a morning, evening, 
and weekly edition. The popularity was also due to the 
price. A shrewd businessman, Nelson forced advertisers use 
his newspaper, its large circulation meant they could go 
nowhere else. Meanwhile, customers paid a weekly 
subscription rate of ten cents, covering 14 issues-
morning, evening, and Sunday. At less than a penny a copy, 
it was one of the best deals in journalism history. Nelson 
saw the outbreak of World War I, but he did not see its end. 
He died in April, 1915, at the age of 75. 
The Kansas City Star of the first week of November, 
1914, emphasized local news and the importance of the off-
• • 
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year elections. Small front page editorials urged voters to 
support the Progressive ticket and the temperance movement-
liquor was a big evil for the Star. The front page was 
usually dominated by local news. War news often took the 
form of short bulletins down the right hand column. on the 
inside pages of the paper, the war news was always mixed 
evenly with national and local through page seven. News of 
the war in Europe, as was all the news in the paper - short. 
Page for page, the Star printed less war news than all the 
other papers studied. The paper received its war and 
national news from the major news services - Associated 
Press, United Press, New York Times, New York Herald - all 
these sources were credited. But because the Star received 
so much of its war news from New York, the coverage closely 
resembled that of the Times. The Germans tended to be the 
brutally efficient "Huns," and the British and French the 
lovable heroes. One typographical drawback to Nelson's 
circulation strategy was evident on the first seven pages-
pages two through seven were mostly advertising. 
Unlike its war news, the Star's editorial viewpoint of 
the war was very balanced - both sides received criticism. 
The decadence of European aristocracy was a theme of several 
editorials during the week studied. A November 2 editorial 
wondered why people pay so much attention to war casualties 
among the royal families of both sides when many nameless 
folks had 
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died.37 A November 1 editorial called the 
aristocracy of Russia "medieval" and "backward. 11 38 A 
November 4 editorial criticized the English crown for 
sending its young men to die fighting the Russians in the 
Crimean War, only to find itself now helping the Russians to 
take the same territory: 
Almost it is enough to make an Englishman 
change his mind about dying for his country 
since his country changes her own with such 
facility. 39 





losses at Verdun on 
The Star prophetically 
bemoaned, on November 2, the fact that this war had a 
tendency to draw in "innocent bystander" nations. 41 The Star 
criticized the super-patriots of preparedness on November 4: 
"Some confuse patriotism with the nationalism that sets 
nations at one another's throats." The Star said "genial, 
charitable affection is patriotism. 1142 The majority of Star 
editorials, however, dealt with local issues and progressive 
37 Kansas City Star, 2 November 1914, p . 12. . 
38 Kansas City Star, 1 November 1914, p . 2D. . 
39 "Somebody Blundered," Kansas City Star, 4 November . 
1914, p. 6B. 
40 Kansas City Star, 1 November 1914, p . 2D. . 
41 Kansas City Star, 2 November 1914, p . 12. . 
42 "Patriotism," Kansas City Star, 4 November 1914, . p . 
6B. 
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reform. Letters to the editor were 
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published, but on a 
separate page under "Speaking the Public Mind." 
usually dealt with local issues. 
They 
Milwaukee Journal 
Like William R. Nelson and the Kansas City star, 
Lucius Nieman used his newspaper, the Milwaukee Journal, to 
boost his city's image. But while Nelson sought to improve 
the image of Kansas City with its residents, Nieman fought 
to improve Milwaukee's image with the rest of the country. 
Nieman bought the Journal in 1882 when the paper was 
then only 20 days old. From the 10 x 10 foot office Nieman 
initially shared with a German-language newspaper, he built 
the Journal into a crusading newspaper that influenced not 
only Milwaukee, but the state of Wisconsin as well. Nieman's 
philosophy was to be the champion of the people, providing 
them with both sides of every story. He said that his paper 
would "be sensational only when the facts are 
sensational. Every unfettered newspaper is the same. 11 43 
Nieman flirted early on with the Democratic party but left 
when it gave the presidential nomination to William Jennings 
Bryan in 1896. From that point on, the Journal was 
43. Berres, Jean L., "Local Aspects of the 'campaign 
for Americanism': The Milwaukee Journal in World War I," 
(Ph.D. dissertation, Southern Illinois University - School 
of Journalism, 1977), p. 33. 
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independent of party, 







Milwaukee's Socialist government, and its mayor Victor 
Berger, largely for their pacifist views. Also criticized in 
the Journal was Republican Senator Robert M. LaFollette. 
Nieman agreed with his goals, but found him ill-equipped to 
achieve them (LaFollette also was a pacifist). Nieman's idea 
of reform applied internationally. He felt the powers of 
free democracies should prevail and crush the autocracy of 
Germany. 
At the outbreak of war in 1914, the Milwaukee Journal 
served a city made up largely by European immigrants. The 
majority of city residents were of German descent; half of 
them spoke no English. The teaching of German was required 
in city schools, and there were a half-dozen German-language 
newspapers. Journalism historian Jean L. Berres sums up 
Nieman's view of his city in 1914: 
The nation's press combined these isolated 
attitudes with the Socialist's proclaimed 
pacifism and LaFollette's anti-Wilson position. 
Under this guilt-by-association reasoning this 
press gave all of Milwaukee the unwarranted 
appellations of a 'disloyal city,' a ' member of 
the German Empire' and one which had 
' repudiated' the rest of the nation. The result 
was a confused populace, misunderstood by many 
Americans. 
Nieman set about correcting this false 
impression. Through the use of his newspaper he 
expressed what he saw as the true, American 
viewpoint on the war. He exposed the 
disloyal, or at least the misguided, element of 
the population, and called upon all to proclaim 
the loyalty of Milwaukee and Milwaukeans. He 
urged such means as petitions of patriotism, 
11 Ill! II 
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all-out support of the government's position on 
war issues, and resolutions by clubs and 
organizations stating their unbounded 
Americanism. 
He did not wait until the United States 
entered the war in April 1917 to use his 
newspaper to achieve this end. 44 
In 1919, the Pulitzer Prize Committee called Nieman's 
witch-hunt the "Campaign for Americanism," and awarded him a 
gold medal for meritorious service. 
The Milwaukee Journal of November 1 7, 1914, 
resembled the Kansas City Star in many ways. Like the Star, 
the Journal received all of its war news from the east coast 
- the New York Times, New York Herald, New York World, and 
United Press. Both the Journal and Star emphasized local and 
regional news over the conflict in Europe. But the Journal 
differed in its story selection. Though receiving its news 
from pro-Allied sources, the Journal carefully balanced its 
war coverage. Stories concentrated on battles and troop 
movements. There were few features, and in both cases the 
coverage was balanced between Allied and Central Powers. 
Another similarity between the Journal and the Star was 
their fascination with upbeat local stories, as is evident 
from these headlines in the November 1 Journal: TRAVELING 
MAN'S STORY OF BEING LOST ON GRAND-AV MAKES TRAFFIC OFFICER 
SMILE, 45 and GIRAFFE IN HIS LONG NECK HAS ONE HALF AS MANY 
44 . Ibid., p. 6. 









BONES AS SPARROW HAS IN His.46 
Though carrying roughly the same amount of war news as 
the Star, the Journal included regular features to make its 
news much more comprehensive . A daily page two feature was 
"Today's War News Analyzed - European Military Officer Tells 
What Dispatches Mean." This was written anonymously by a 
"graduate of famous War School in Europe used by Journal for 
hour by hour updates." This column provided a balanced view 
of the official news from the front (an early "deep throat," 
the author was known to exist but Nieman never revealed his 
name). Two regular editorial features included "Light on the 
World War" and "Around the Edges." The "Light" column used 
articles by academics, diplomats, and journalists to explain 
the causes and movements of the war. The "Edges" feature was 
the one place the Journal printed its syrupy human interest 
stories provided by journalists "from the war zone." 
Another regular feature, related to the letters to the 
editor, was the "War Query Box" - letter s from readers 
stating their views on the war. The Journal also published, 
side-by-side, the official communiques from the various 
belligerent governments. 
November's editorial page, besides carrying the war 
features already mentioned, included a health column, 
quotable quotes, and articles on how to train your dog. The 
unsigned editorials dealt almost exclusive ly with 
46 . Ibid., p. 5. 
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Milwaukee's elections. One front-page editorial shouted: 
VOTE TO SAVE MILWAUKEE FROM THE DISASTER OF SOCIALISTIC 
TRIUMPH.47 The war in Europe was only indirectly mentioned. 
Thus, six months prior to the sinking of the 
Lusitania, each of the seven newspapers had their own 
editorial vantage point from which to view the events of May 
7, 1915. The Times was an outright advocate of the British 
cause, in news coverage as well as in editorials. In the 
same Allied camp, but less extreme, were the Constitution 
and the Star. Both papers news coverage, like the Times, 
portrayed the Germans as vicious beasts, while the Allies 
were valiant heroes. The Constitution and Star differed with 
the Times, however, in their editorial policy. Both were 
more moderate, not hesitating to criticize Britain as well 
as Germany. 
On the other editorial extreme were the Post, Tribune, 
and Examiner. Their news coverage, on the whole, was quite 
balanced portraying neither belligerent as hero or 
villain. Their editorial policy, however, was definitely 
anti-British. Never failing to criticize the actions of the 
British government. These papers did not praise Germany, 
however, but often pointed out that the German military was 
more potent and efficient than the Allies would have America 
believe. These papers were, perhaps, aggressively neutral. 
47 . Milwaukee Journal, 3 November 1914, p. 1. 
Attacking the British because, in reality, 
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they were 
violating more of America's trading rights than the Germans. 
When they described a strong German military they were 
calling the situation squarely - the war was a stalemate. 
The Post, Tribune, and Examiner, were also vigorously pro-
American. Calling for a tougher U.S. military to assure 
American isolation. 
The Journal was in between these two groups, with a 
perfectly balanced view of the warring sides in both its 
news coverage and editorials. This editorial balance was due 
in part to the large German population of Milwaukee. It was 
also due to the fact that publisher Lucius Nieman was a 
Wilson supporter and an advocate of the Allied cause. 
With an understanding of wartime press restrictions, 
and the political and historical backgrounds of the 
newspapers studied, we now turn our attention to the 








CHAPTER FIVE: REVIEWING THE SELECTED NEWSPAPERS 
The Sinking of the Lusitania 
The sinking of the Lusitania was the biggest public 
relations gaffe of the First World War. And the British 
government made sure that the entire world knew of Germany's 
miscalculation. American news bureaus in London began to 
hear rumors of the disaster during the late afternoon of 
Friday, May 7. Calls to the British Admiralty and to Cunard 
quickly confirmed that the sinking had occurred. The news 
was immediately cabled to America - FLASH. LUSITANIA SUNK-
along with the initial sketchy details. British censors 
cleared these messages with unusual speed. 
The race was then on to Queenstown, the small shipping 
port on the south coast of Ireland. United Press 
correspondent Wilbur Forrest made use of a friend in the 
Admiralty to obtain the most direct boat passage to the area 
- a steamship route otherwise restricted to aliens. As a 
result, Forrest arrived hours ahead of his competition, and 
the United Press initially had the most precise information 
of the disaster. Forrest even identified several of the dead 
- including Frohman - for Irish officials. Reporters from 
the other major news services soon arrived, and the bulk of 
information was soon on its way to America. Though the news 
of the disaster arrived in time for the deadlines of some 
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evening papers on May 7, the majority of Americans read of 
the disaster on the morning of May 8. 
The New York Times 
News Coverage: Pages 1 - 7 
The pro-British New York Times exploded with news of 
the Lusitania disaster. A large, factual, headline stretched 
in several lines across page one: LUSITANIA SUNK BY A 
SUBMARINE, PROBABLY 1,000 DEAD; TWICE TORPEDOED OFF IRISH 
COAST; SINKS IN 15 MINUTES; AMERICANS ABOARD INCLUDED 
VANDERBILT AND FROHMAN; WASHINGTON BELIEVES THAT A GRAVE 
CRISIS IS AT HAND. 
Though the facts were still a bit confused, the Times' 
coverage of the event stretched a full nine pages. A large 
photograph was printed of the Lusitania on page one, with 
"X's" showing the impact points of the "torpedoes;" pages 
two and three contained full diagrams of the lost liner, and 
a map of Ireland showing the location of the attack. Full 
passenger lists, and lists of the known survivors, were 
printed. The Times made use of news from the Associated 
Press, United Press, Reuters, and its own reporters in 
London and Queenstown. Survivor stories abounded. One such 
story was from Ernest Cowper, a Toronto journalist aboard 
the liner, who claimed to have seen the submarine surface 
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and fire the torpedoes. The torpedoes, he said, were filled 
with "poison gas. 111 Other stories expressed fear and 
uncertainty over the losses of Vanderbilt and Frohman, and 
gave accounts of other New York passengers on board. 
Theodore Roosevelt called the sinking "piracy" on page one. 
And Washington and Wilson waited for all the facts. 
The next day, Sunday, May 9, the Times again devoted 
over seven pages to the Lusitania tragedy. Survivor stories 
emphasized the recovery of the bodies of women and children. 
Germany declared justification the ship was armed and 
loaded with munitions. Cunard and the British government 
denied this allegation. In Washington, Wilson and his 
cabinet continued calm deliberation. In New York the Cunard 
offices were swamped with people seeking information - and 
war talk was reported to be high on Times Square. 
In the days following May 9, the Times continued to 
devote most of its front section to the Lusitania. The 
administration was still awaiting complete information about 
the disaster before making a statement. Press reaction from 
around the country said the nation stood behind Wilson. At 
the inquest, Captain Turner said he saw only one torpedo-
and an internal explosion followed. The lists of dead and 
survivors became more complete - Vanderbilt, Frohman, and 
Hubbard all perished. Stories were printed telling how the 
U-boat surfaced among the struggling passengers and its crew 
1 . New York Times, 8 May 1915, p. 1. 
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laughed at them. 
Editorials 
The Times' first editorial concerning the sinking, 
"War by Assassination," was published on May 8. Its author 
must have used a thesaurus to find new ways of describing 
"murder." The editorial condemned Germany and recalled 
Wilson's "strict accountability" warning regarding submarine 
warfare and neutrals given on February 10, 1915: 
From our Department of State there must go 
to the Imperial Government at Berlin a demand 
that the Germans shall no longer make war like 
savages drunk with blood, that they shall cease 
to seek the attainment of their ends by the 
assassination of non-combatants and neutrals. In 
the history of wars there is no single deed 
comparable in its inhumanity and its horror to 
the destruction, without warning, by German 
torpedoes of the great steamship Lusitania, with 
more than 1,800 souls on board, and among them 
more than 100 Americans. Our demand must be 
made, and it will be heeded unless Germany in 
her madness would have 
it understood that she is at war with the whole 
civilized world ... 
It [the sinking] will stir the American 
people as they have not been stirred since the 
destruction of the Maine in the harbor of 
Havana, and government and people will be united 
in the resolve that Germany must be called upon 
to bring her practices into conformity with the 
usages of civilized warfare.2 
The editorial went on to say that although the 
American people were passionate, they were also deliberate, 
2 . "War By Assassination," New York Times, 8 May 1915, 
p. 14. 
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and all citizens were urged to support the president in 
whatever he did. 
The editorials of May 9 continued the condemnation of 
Germany. Under "The Law of the Lusitania Case," the Times 
said that even if the ship contained munitions, Germany did 
not have the right to imperil the passengers: 
Germany snapped her fingers at the laws of 
war and at the law of morality when she did this 
deed of blood. She put herself outside the 
domain of law, and it is a frequent comment upon 
her behavior that by that act she confessed 
herself to be an outlaw nation. We know how she 
makes war, how she intends to make war - that 
discussion is ended. 
Should this lawlessness continue, the editorial said, 
the neutral nations should unite and act to bring about "the 
saving consummation" of the German spirit. 3 
After these strong (even hostile) words, the Times 
proceeded to excuse all the questionable actions of the 
British Admiralty regarding the Lusitania in a companion 
piece: 
There is only one possible explanation for 
the British Admiralty's neglect of its plain 
duty, which has resulted in such terrible 
fatalities. Perhaps the British government could 
not believe, in spite of the many recent 
revelations of the unutterable brutality of the 
Germans, that any nation would be guilty of a 
crime so shocking, so unnecessary, and in 
violation of all the rules of warfare. If that 
is the explanation, an unfortunate delusion has 
3 . "The Law of the Lusitania Case," New York Times, 9 










been dispelled forever.4 
Editorials cautioned faith in Wilson and the need for 
preparedness, should the nation be called on to suppress 
this outlaw German nation. 
On May 11, in an editorial entitled "Germany's 
Defenses," the Times refuted all of Germany's positions in 
the Lusitania matter, and defended Britain's starvation 
blockade. Responding to Germany's allegations as to the arms 
and cargo of the Lusitania, the Times said: 
Governments in their official 
communications are not supposed to enter 
falsehoods. Unless her spy system utterly failed 
her in this instance, Germany might have known 
the truth. 
The British side of the story was obviously the truth 
for the Times. Regarding the inhumanity of the British food 
blockade of Germany, the editorial continued: " a 
blockade which inhibits the food of an enemy country is a 
recognized method of warfare, neither cruel nor unusual." 
The submarine on the other hand, will never fit into 
international law. There is no defense for Germany. There is 
nothing to be said in her behalf that can diminish her 
"blood guiltiness. 115 
Another May 11 editorial again completely excused 
Cunard and the British Admiralty. 
4 "The 
1 915, p. 2C. 
Admira l ty's Neglect ," 
It claimed those 
Ne w Yor k Ti me s, 9 May 
5 . "Ger many's De f ens e s ," Ne w York Times, 11 May 1915 , 
p. 14. 
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passengers who submitted alle gations of the lack of safety 
and the crew's ineptness were victims of shock and the 
excitement of the moment. Such allegations could be given 
"no great weight as testimony." The criticism of Cunard and 
the Admiralty was "founded on misapprehension."6 Apparently 
the same did not hold true for the Times' stories of gas-
filled torpedoes, and laughing U-boat crews. 
Letters to the Editor 
Though an occasional letter advocating the German 
cause would be printed in the Times, the majority were 
strong condemnations of the sinking. Most called for 
decisive action against Germany: 
To the Times: Germany has not respected our 
neutrality; on the contrary, she has 
deliberate ly destroyed American lives and ships. 
Her evident purpose is to continue to destroy 
them whenever she thinks best to do so. Shall we 
submit, or shall we take steps to make our 
neutrality respected by her? There is no doubt 
that every American worthy of the name is now 
ready to declare that we shall not submit. The 
time has come to assert ourselves. 7 
To the Times: We read this morning that Germany 
is "sorry" and offers "sympathy" to the United 
States. Should a murderer, then, be allowed to 
go free by merely saying that he is sorry and 
sympathizes? Where has the spirit of '76, of 
1812, of 1896 gone? Where's the spirit that made 
6 . "Based on Misapprehension," New York Times, 11 May 
1915, p. 14. 
7 . "Does Germany Want Our Neutrality?" New York Times, 
12 May 1915, p. 12. 
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us strike after the sinking of the Maine?8 
The Chicago Tribune 
News Coverage: Pages 1 - 7 
The Chicago Tribune hit the streets that fateful 
morning of May 8 with a huge banner headline: 1,400 DEAD ON 
LUSITANIA. A subhead declared: HOLD FILLED WITH WAR 
MUNITIONS. Beneath this was added that the number of rescued 
had reached 658 and that Vanderbilt and Frohman were feared 
dead. The Tribune's front page also contained a cartoon by 
John Mccutcheon that epitomized the paper's attitude toward 
the crisis. In the cartoon, Wilson stood at the bridge of an 
ocean liner, while Uncle Sam sitting in a deck chair told a 
worried passenger: "Keep cool, hope for the best, trust the 
captain, and stand by the ship fair weather and foul." 
The May 8 edition of the Tribune carried six pages of 
articles relating to the sinking of the Lusitania. The pages 
contained survivor accounts, descriptions of the disaster, 
pictures and diagrams of the liner, maps, and stories of 
Washington's quiet 
concern. The list of survivors was printed with the original 
passenger list. The paper's news came from the major wi r e 




Associated Press, United Press - and its own 
reporters in London and Quee nstown. One story covered the 
national press reaction to the s inki ng, a nd the confus ion in 
New York - where many of the Ameri cans on board came from. 
Two s tor i es involve d first the prominent Chicagoans on board 
the liner, and then covered the "neutral" reaction of the 
citizens of Chicago. 
The Tribune differed form the New York Times in its 
coverage of the 
dead, included 
disaster. The vivid descriptions of the 
in the Times were toned down in the Tribune. 
There were no stories about the U- boat surfacing to laugh at 
survivors, although one story did deal with the possibility 
of gas in the torpedoes. Another clear difference in the 
two papers' coverage concerned the issue of whether the 
Lusitania carried munitions or was armed. A story on the 
Tribune's May 8 front page described the cargo of munitions; 
a story on the third page said "substantially all of the 
$750,000 cargo of the Lusitania consisted of contraband of 
war." The Times had downplayed the munitions issue, 
following the Cunard point of view. While stories in the 
Times proclaimed the Lusitania was unarmed, similar stories 




The Tribune's May 8 editorial concerning the disaster 
contemplated the issues involving "massacre" and contraband: 
"To the slaughter of innocents in Belgium and in Poland has 
been added the slaughter of the innocents on the Lusitania. 
This last massacre violates all previous laws of the seas 
"The editorial then mentioned the fact that the ship 
carried munitions, and that Germany would use this as 
justification: 
We do not propose to weigh the value (if 
any) of the defense as compared with the evil of 
the deed. That is a function that belongs to our 
official government, under the leadership of 
President Wilson, and which, in a crisis as 
grave as this one, should belong exclusively to 
our official government. 
It is not for any good American now to 
cloud its counsels with unsought advice, or to 
attempt to force its decision. We can only stand 
and wait, united in our determination to enforce 
the will of our government whatever that may be. 
'our Country! In her intercourse with 
foreign nations may she always be in the right; 
but our country, right or wrong. 19 
In short, the Tribune sought to be neither pro-German 
nor pro-British, but strongly pro-American. In fact, the 
editorial's closing quote of Stephen Decatur would be 
printed at the head of every editorial page for the 
remainder of the year. 
In the days that followed, as more news of the tragedy 
became available, the Tribune through its editorials-
began to ask more questions concerning the events 
surrounding it. Why was the Lusitania maintaining a straight 
9 . "Lusitania," Chicago Tribune, 8 May 1915, p. 8. 
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course at such a slow speed? Why was not escort provided? 
The issue of particular concern to the Tribune was the 
carrying of munitions on passenger ships. The paper felt 
that if the United States wished to remain neutral and avoid 
war it should not allow Americans to board steamers carrying 
contraband. Regardless of the question of international law, 
another incident like the Lusitania, could bring America 
into war with Germany. 
Two days after the sinking, on May 10, the Tribune 
addressed itself to this issue: 
Pending any determination of our course of 
action upon the loss of American lives on the 
Lusitania, immediate measures should be taken to 
discourage or prevent the transportation of 
American citizens on ships carrying arms and 
munitions of war. 
The fact that the Lusitania carried this 
form of contraband, which constitutes perhaps 
the most grievous danger to the German cause, 
considered with the notice given Americans not 
to embark, provides the principle grounds of 
moral justification for the attack. Without 
conceding the German right under international 
law, as it is or as it ought to be, to pursue 
the course adopted in the proclaimed war zone, 
it is proper for us to recognize the facts and 
try to avoid further loss of life and further 
serious complications.10 
Another editorial, more prophetic, discussed America's 
course of diplomacy regarding U.S. citizens on munitions 
carriers: 
... We cannot continue to say, to Germany, 
You must not do that,' and be engulfed in notes 
and representations while citizens who adhere to 
10 . "Non Combatants and Contraband," Chicago Tribune, 
10 May 1915. 
:1 1 11 1 







our interpretation of international justice and 
right are being killed. That sort of controversy 
cannot be continued We may accept this 
German reasoning or reject it. We cannot 
continue to maintain that our citizens have a 
right to enter that war zone, under certain 
defined conditions, and continue to assure them 
that they have a right to enter, and continue 




humiliate us. 11 
no further argument about it. 
merely abase, dishonor, and 
160 
The Tribune had hit the nail on the head as far as 
true neutrality was concerned. This was the position 
Secretary of State Bryan was calling for, without result, in 
discussions with Wilson, House and Lansing. Wilson publicly 
proclaimed his neutrality, but the Allied die had been cast. 
Still the Tribune proclaimed: "The United State government 
ought to prevent its citizens from embarking on a boat which 
carries war material, even as the police would prevent 
citizens from going into a burning building. 1112 
Letters to the Editor 
The majority of the Tribune' letters took an 
isolationist stand. Although and occasional pro-British 
letter appeared, most followed the Tribune's viewpoint, 
criticizing Britain for shipping munitions on passenger 
11 . "Lusitania and Consequences," Chicago Tribune, 9 
May 1915, p. 4B. 
12 . "Carrying Arms and Passengers," Chicago Tribune, 11 
May 1915, p. 6. 
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liners and the Wilson administration for not doing something 
about it: 
To the Tribune: Neutrals that willfully accept 
such risks should be no more entitled to the 
protection of our government than if they sailed 
on a dreadnought, a transport bearing troops or 
rode between the trenches in an ammunition 
wagon. Why don't they sail on American Steamers 
or those of any other neutral country which have 
been promised immunity by Germany? Furthermore, 
is the life of an American citizen held in very 
high esteem when he is placed over a $750,000 
cargo of explosives, and especially under 
present conditions? The Cunard company and the 
English government are due for severe censure. 13 
To the Tribune: an American sailing on a 
British ship is virtually under British 
protection as against the rest of the world, and 
it stands to reason that an American in such a 
position cannot claim more rights or more 
protection than that foreign nation under whose 
flag he is sailing is capable of giving to its 
own citizens.14 
To the Tribune: I am partly of German blood. 
Heretofore I have held that there are two sides 
to the European conflict. For me, since the 
Lusitania outrage, which Mr. Roosevelt rightly 
terms piratical murder, there is but one side. 
This has become a conflict of freedom and 
civilization against tyranny and savagery. I am 
against tyranny and savagery I am against 
Germany. 15 
San Francisco Examiner 
13 . "Should Sail on American Ships," Chicago Tribune, 
12 May 1915, p. 6. 
14 "British Ship, 
Tribune, 12 May 1915, p. 6. 
British Protection," Chicago 







News Coverage: Pages 1 - 7 
The news judgement and editorial positions of the San 
Francisco Examiner were similar to the Tribune's. The 
Examiner, however, though fiercely neutral like the Tribune, 
was more likely to implicate Great Britain in the situation. 
The May 8 edition of the Examiner was topped by the banner 
headline: LUSITANIA TORPEDOED: 1,409 DIE. A large photograph 
of the ship on the front page was followed by more pictures, 
diagrams, and maps on the inside pages. A total of six pages 
was devoted to the Lusitania, most topped by large 
headlines. The paper claimed that Hearst's International 
News Service had beaten all the other services with word of 
the disaster.1 6 The paper used some reports from the 
Associated Press and United Press, but relied mostly on the 
International News Service. A page one story, BLAME PUT ON 
ENGLAND, discussed the German accusations that the ship was 
armed and carried munitions. Another front page story, SHARP 
DROP FOR STOCKS, discussed how the disaster had affected the 
Wall Street stocks of the Allies' major munitions suppliers. 
Like the Times and the Tribune, the Examiner covered the 
prominent passengers, published survivor lists, and 
described the tense mood in Washington. A May 8 story on 
page five, SAFETY DEVICES FAILED TO SAVE THE LINER, 
discussed the Lusitania's construction, and pondered what 





caused the ship to sink so quickly after being struck. The 
Examiner's coverage was more like that of the Tribune, than 
the Times. The munitions issue was highlighted, while 
stories like the laughing U-boat crew failed to appear. 
Editorials 
Like the Tribune, the Examiner's editorial opinion was 
strongly in favor of neutrality, but it used the sinking as 
a lesson for preparedness. The editorial of May 8 said both 
the Germans and the British failed to respect international 
law: 
No the fact is only emphasized today - the 
fact that has long been apparent - that neither 
the allies nor the Germans give to international 
law or custom any more adherence than may suit 
their immediate end. They are both estopped from 
discussing this frightful catastrophe in the 
light of any international law or usage. 
The sinking of the Lusitania was not an act of war but 
an act of "wholesale murder:" 
It must however teach the people of the 
United States, who will today read with horror 
the list of their fellow countrymen sacrificed 
to the red rage of Europe, that a nation can 
rely upon nothing for its own protection, and 
for the safeguarding of its own citizens, except 
for the own physical power to protect them 
against all menace. 
The Examiner felt that it was useless to enter into 
any "hollow treaties" or reach agreements in international 
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the Lusitania, every editorial page of the paper 
was topped 
With the bold statement: OUR FIRST DUTY IS TO MAINTAIN 
PEACE; OUR NEXT DUTY IS TO PREPARE FOR WAR. 
Again on May 10, the Examiner graphically stated its 
Views regarding the Lusitania: 
How small a company, amid the millions of 
s?uls of men and women and children who have 
died in torment since this war began, are the 
sad ghosts of the Lusitania's slain! How few are 
they amid the enumerable hosts of Europe's dead! 
Nor is this warfare, this inhumanity, this 
desolation, this slaughter a new thing under the 
The normal enterprise of Europe's rulers is sun. 
war we have now this frightful evidence that 
the civilized peoples can degenerate into 
savages within the space of a few months. 
And we have the most conclusive evidence 
that now, as in the past, NEITHER ABSENCE OF 
PROVOCATION NOR ABSENCE OF ARMED PREPARATION 
EVER SECURES A NATION FROM THE DANGER OF ATTACK 
AND WAR.18 
In short, the fil'{amine.f. sailed a course of non-
intervention in the affairs of Europe, and called for 
Preparedness as a way to ward off anY potential challenges 
from the old world. unlike the Times and Tribune, the 
&,xaminer did not publish letters to the editor. 
M;lanta C t"t t· ons 1. u 1.0_,!! 
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' San Francisco Examine_.£, 8 MaY 1915. 
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Break Them," San D 18. "American people pare Not Trust 
Fefense Against Nations that Likely 





News Coverage: Pages 1 - 7 
In general the Atlanta Constitution's news coverage of 
the Lusitania sinking was quite similar to that of the Times 
- highlighting the German brutality. 
The May 8 edition of the Constitution was topped with 
the banner headline: OVER 1,000 LIVES LOST ON THE LUSITANIA 
WHEN SUNK BY A GERMAN SUBMARINE. Page one included a large 
picture of the liner at sea, a story detailing how two 
torpedoes struck the ship, and Teddy Roosevelt's charge of 
"pure piracy." Four pages of news were devoted to the 
disaster, one of the fewest of the papers studied. The news 
came exclusively from the wires mostly the Associated 
Press. Details of the sinking, tales of survivors, the loss 
of famous passengers, pictures, diagrams and maps were all 
part of the coverage. Great space was given to the few 
prominent citizens of Atlanta that were on the liner. 
Page three on May 8 contained a story unique to the 
Constitution: GERMAN ADMIRALTY FORMED THE PLANS TO SINK THE 
LUSITANIA. The story said that the Kaiser and his advisors 
believed the destruction of the ship would be a crushing 
blow to Great Britain's morale. Other papers had called it 
piracy, the Constitution set it up as premeditated murder. 
The front page of May 9 proclaimed: THERE IS JOY IN GERMANY 
OVER THE LUSITANIA TRAGEDY. 
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Editorials 
Though the Constitution, like the Times, highlighted 
German barbarity in its news coverage, its editorial 
position was more moderate. It was one of the strongest 
backers of Wilson in the group of newspapers studied. Much 
of this was due, no doubt, to the fact that Wilson was a 
southerner and a Democrat the first elected since the 
Civil War. The paper seemed to choose its words carefully, 
discussing the disaster only when necessary. The 
Constitution spent most of May addressing regional issues, 
as if heeding Wilson's call to be neutral in thought and 
deed. 
The Constitution was the only paper not to publish an 
editorial comment on the disaster on May 8. That day's 
editorials addressed local issues such as highway 
construction. The paper's first Lusitania comment appeared 
on May 9, following four pages of news coverage of the 
sinking. The editorial called for the nation to remain calm 
behind Wilson: 
Shocked as we are in common with the rest 
of the world over the appalling loss of life on 
the Lusitania - now, more than ever, our country 
should keep cool and be guided by judgement 
rather than by emotion ... 
Our protest made to the German government 
at the beginning of the undersea campaign was 
right; we should repeat it now following the 
Lusitania Horror, in language, if possible even 
more emphatic; we should give Germany to 
,J ,, 
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understand beyond all question that we will 
demand a reckoning and enforce that demand. 
But that does not necessarily mean war. The 
people of the United States do not want war. 
They have no desire to become embroiled in this 
European upheaval, and conservative America will 
congratulate herself that there is at the head 
of the government a man who has demonstrated his 
capacity in dealing coolly, calmly, and 
dispassionately with each individual incident 
that has brought it into contact with the 
quarrel across the Atlantic.19 
Two days later, on May 11, a Constitution editorial 
sharply criticized "some jingoes among newspapers as well 
among individual citizens" for advocating war with Germany 
over the loss of the Lusitania's Americans: 
Suppose we should declare war upon Germany 
now, what could we do? Nothing; less than 
nothing! It would amount to declaration, without 
action, at least without present action, and we 
would have on our hands a far more difficult 
situation than that which now confronts us . We 
could not send and army against Germany; that 
would be out of the question.There is nothing 
against which we could send our navy. 
The Constitution then outlined a course of action 
unique to the paper's studied: 
There is just one thing and one thing only 
that would be possible the seizure of the 
$70,000,000 worth of German ships now interned 
in American ports. They are here, anyhow - here 
to remain until the end of the war. They stand 
an absolute guarantee of German reparation; it 
will be time to act when diplomacy has exhaus ted 
itself and Germany has refused our right to 
exact it. Then, if hostilities must come, l e t 
them come as the result of Germany's 
declaration, not of ours. 
But we do not believe there will be 
19 . "Time to Keep Cool," Atlanta Constitution, 9 May 1915 . 
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occasion for it.20 
Letters to the Editor 
Most citizens, expressing their views in the 
Constitution's letters to the editor, said the loss of life 
on the Lusitania was appalling, but not enough to embroil 
the United States: 
To the Constitution: ... While I 
be best for the world at large 
to be defeated, I can't find any 
America being against her. 
think it would 
for the Germans 
real cause for 
As for the Americans on the Lusitania, they 
certainly regarded their personal interests, or 
inclinations, as superior to the neutrality of 
our country. 
This section of our country don't want to 
cross the ocean to fight.21 
To the Constitution: I am no German 
sympathizer but I have always understood that 
anything was fair in war, and this fact alone, 
without considering the ownership of the vessel 
and the repeated warnings sent out by the German 
government, ought to leave them without censure 
or condemnation in the matter.22 
Washington Post 
News Coverage: Pages 1 - 7 
20 "The 
May 1915, p.6. 
Only Sane Course," Atlanta Constitution, 11 
21 . "Holds Germany Blameless," Atlanta Constitution, 14 
May 1915, p. 8. 
22 "South Georgia Merchant's View," Atlanta 
Constitution, 15 May 1915, p. 8. 
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The Washington Post was as much anti-British as the 
Times was pro-Ally. But like the Examiner, the Post treated 
both the Germans and British with equal disdain. Eleven 
pages of the Post's May 8 edition were devoted to news of 
the Lusitania. The two-line headline ran: STEAMER LUSITANIA 
TORPEDOED AND SUNK OFF IRISH COAST; OF 2,000 ON BOARD, ONLY 
650 ARE KNOWN TO HAVE BEEN SAVED. The disaster news came 
mostly from the Associated Press and United Press. Front 
page stories detailed that two "terrific explosions" tore 
holes in the liner's hull - the result of two torpedoes. 
Another story pointed out that: "The Lusitania carried in 
her cargo a large store of ammunition for the allies. 1123 
Like the other papers, the Post's coverage included 
pictures, diagrams, eyewitness accounts, passenger and 
survivor lists, and the press reaction of Europe and the 
United States. News from Washington received comprehensive 
coverage; one story mentioned Bryan's opposition to American 
travellers on belligerent ships.24 Accounts of the sinking 
depicted its horror, but were more restrained than the 
stories in the Times. 
Editorials 
23 . "Salient Features of Catastrophe," Washington Post, 
8 May 1915, p.l. 
24 . "Fate of Lusitania Shock to Capital," Washington 
Post, 8 May 1915, p. 1. 
111 JI I 
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Editorially, the Post never hesitated to attack 
British policies. But in its first comment on the Lusitania, 
the paper left no doubt as to who was at fault: 
No warrant whatever, in law or morals can 
be found for the willful destruction of an 
unarmed vessel, neutral of enemy, carrying 
passengers, without giving them an opportunity 
to leave the vessel. Germany stands indicted on 
this charge, and if it is proved the world will 
not exonerate that nation for the awful 
destruction of innocent life. 
It may be that Germany will lay stress upon 
the fact that warning was given to Americans not 
to sail on the Lusitania. It is true that such 
warning was given, and it is true that Americans 
act unwisely when they travel in the war zone. 
But this does not excuse Germany for its failure 
to give the Lusitania's passengers time to take 
to the boats. 
Though the Lusitania was probably loaded with 
munitions, this did not exonerate the Germans, according to 
the Post. The paper echoed the Tribune: 
Probably, however, the Lusitania's fate 
will lead to the adoption of a new rule, 
providing that vessels carrying passengers shall 
not carry arms and ammunition. Such a rule 
should be adopted by all the belligerents ... 25 
The Post, like the Tribune, disagreed with America's 
policy of letting passengers sail on merchantmen carrying 
contraband. Still, the paper advised caution over emotion, 
and urged all to remain behind Wilson. 
On May 10 the Post attacked the British Admiralty over 
the loss of the liner. The failure to provide an escort was 
25 . "The Lusitania Case," Washington Post, 9 May 1915. 
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indefensible, it said. Great Britain could have used some 
her "hundreds of torpedoboats" to bring in the Lusitania: 
"The Failure of the British Admiralty to take this obvious 
precaution is one of the mysteries of the war. It must be 
explained. 1126 The Post, like the Tribune, began to probe the 
unanswered questions surrounding the sinking as more news 
became available. The Post pursued these issues with an 
anti-British slant. Like the Examiner, the Post advocated 
preparedness; and also did not publish letters to the 
editor. 
Kansas City Star 
News Coverage: Pages 1 - 7 
The Kansas City Star was one of the evening dailies 
able to provide details of the sinking on May 7. That day's 
front page of the Star, as usual, was mostly local news. But 
the early news of the sinking took up three columns, topped 
with a large headline: SANK THE LUSITANIA - A SUBMARINE 
STRUCK THE CUNARD GIANT AT 2 O'CLOCK THIS AFTERNOON AND IT 
WENT DOWN NEAR THE HARBOR OF CORK, IRELAND. The paper could 
not confirm the fate of the passengers. A small, hurried-
looking sketch of the liner accompanied the story in the 
26 . "Why Was the Lusitania Not Guarded," Washington 
Post, 10 May 1915. 
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lower right-hand corner of page one. The late breaking 
stories only occupied the first page. 
The Star's "Last Sporting Extra" of 6:00 P.M., May 7, 
sounded an optimistic note: SAVED ALL ABOARD - CUNARD LINE 
ANNOUNCES THAT NONE OF THE LUSITANIA'S PASSENGERS OR CREW 
WAS LOST - WEATHER WAS FAIR. Additional information included 
the fact that the submarine struck without warning, and that 
the ship foundered in 21 minutes. 
After initially reporting no fatalities in the loss of 
the Lusitania, the Star of May 8 devoted four pages to the 
disaster. Like that of the Times, the story selection tended 
to highlight German brutality and to praise the efforts of 
the Lusitania's crew. Official statements and counterclaims 
for both the Germans and the British were given equal 
emphasis, however. The Star's news came from the major wire 
services - Associated Press and United Press - and the New 
York Times, and New York Herald. The front page of May 8 was 
dominated by several, one-column width headlines: LOSS NOW 
IS 1,346 -TOTAL SAVED IS 703. The stories on page one said 
that the Lusitania had been hit without warning by four 
torpedoes from more than one submarine. The crew had acted 
bravely but "hysterical women interfered with the launching 
of the Lusitania's boats," increasing the loss of life, the 
story read.27 A story in the evening extra passed on to 
27. "Panic Was Fatal," Kansas City Star, 8 May 1915, p. 
1. 
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Kansas City the news that at least one submarine had 
surfaced to admire its deadly work. 28 In the same extra a 
story detailed the cargo of ammunition aboard the liner, 
estimating its value at $750,00o.2 9 A front page story on 
May 9 described the poison gas in the torpedoes. 30 
Like the other papers, the Star printed survivor 
lists, eyewitness accounts, and the reaction of other 
American newspapers. Unlike the others, it did not use 
graphics. The Star used small sketches of prominent victims, 
survivors, and the ship itself. There were no pictures, 
diagrams of the ship, or maps of the area. 
Editorials 
Like the Constitution, the Star was firmly behind 
President Wilson in the crisis. The Star, however, seemed to 
give to Wilson almost super-human qualities: 
' The melting pot' has got now to prove that 
it has fused a nation. It is up to this Nation 
to stand by its President, by its national 
leaders, with the same unity any kingly 
government commands from its people. 
Individuals not in official place cannot 
know all the facts. They are not in position to 
form completely intelligent or informed 
28. "Plunger Gave No Aid," Kansas City Star, Second 
Sports Extra, 8 May 1915, p. 1. 
29 "A Big Ammunition Cargo Too," Kansas City Star, 
Second Sporting Extra, 8 May 1915, p. 1. 
30 . "Dazed by Fumes," Kansas City Star, 9 May 1915, p. 
1. 
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judgement. They may, if they will, indulge in 
impulsive sentiments and possibly unjust 
expressions of opinion. The President may not do 
that. On him rests the responsibility for 100 
million people. He must speak with calmness and 
deliberation. On him Fate and the voice of the 
people have cast the burden of history. It is 
but just, it is only safe, that the voice of the 
people shall choose him as its oracle. 31 
Unlike the Post, Tribune, or Examiner, the Star voiced 
no concerns about the circumstances surrounding the loss of 
the Lusitania. There was no call to keep Americans off 
English passenger ships carrying munitions. The Star would 
wait for Wilson's lead: 
In this critical situation the attitude of 
President Wilson is commanding confidence. He is 
acting with deliberation, after taking counsel 
with his associates 
and with the Nation. His proposed plan of 
action, if the semi-official forecast is 
correct, is in accordance with that larger 
patriotism which takes into account the welfare 
of humanity, as well as the honor of the United 
States. 
In support of the President and that 
program, if the country understands it aright, 
all differences vanish, and we are all 
Americans. We all follow the flag1 32 
Letters to the Editor 
Few of the Star's letters to the editor dealt directly 
with the Lusitania crisis, most discussed local issues. 
31 . "Stand By the President," Kansas City Star, 8 May 
1915, p. 10. 
32 "Following 
1915, p. 10. 





Those that did appear, like the Star's own editorials, 
praised Wilson's neutral stand for peace: 
To the Star: We, as one of the millions of 
common families, wish to express, through the 
column of the Public Mind, our gratitude, 
admiration, and almost worship of President 
Wilson for his view in not declaring war. Our 
family is not one of men of high position, such 
as some who are trying to stir the nation to 
war, but of the common men who would be the 
sufferers if war was declared. 33 
To the Star: ... I am a mother and an American 
and, oh,Ipray our country will never go to 
arms. Oh, mothers wake up before it is too late 
and let us do what we can for peace.3 4 
Mi1waukee Journa1 
News Coverage: Pages 1 - 7 
The Milwaukee Journal was also an evening daily 
publishing news of the disaster on May 7. But unlike the 
Star, it was more cautious with the initial bulletins of 
that day. A banner headline stretched across page one: 
LUSITANIA TORPEDOED AND SUNK OFF THE COAST OF IRELAND-
GREAT LINER IS DESTROYED BY GERMANS. Two right-hand columns 
of news on page one were accompanied by small pictures of 
the prominent passengers - the stories jumped to page two. 
33 . "Almost Worship President Wilson," "Speaking the 
Public Mind," Kansas City Star, 15 May 1915, p. 4. 
34 . "A Mother's Plea for Peace," Kansas City Star, 16 
May 1915, p. 3B. 
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The Journal reported the sinking time as 30 minutes, but 
gave no details of the passengers:"Ambassador Page cables 
that nothing is known as to whether passengers were saved. 
But a late Queenstown message says lifeboats were launched 
before the gigantic ship took final plunge." The Journal 
mentioned on page one that the Lusitania had once flown the 
American flag as protection. Reports from Washington said 
there would be no complication in relations with Germany 
unless American lives were lost. A list of first-class 
passengers was printed on page two. 
Like the Star and the Constitution, the Milwaukee 
Journal was a paper that concentrated on local and regional 
news. Like those papers, the Journal devoted only four pages 
to news coverage of the Lusitania disaster, and was the 
first of the papers studied to drop off in the coverage of 
the event. By May 12, news of the Lusitania would go no 
further that page two. 
Half of the front page of the May 8 edition was 
devoted to the Lusitania, following the cautious news 
printed in the May 7 evening edition. A large portion of 
page one, however, detailed the visit to Milwaukee by former 
President William Howard Taft. Taft was pictured on page one 
instead of the Lusitania. News of the disaster was topped by 
the headline: 1,216 LOST LIVES ON LUSITANIA - FEW OF THE 
AMERICANS SAVED - MANY PICKED UP IN WATER SUCCUMB TO 
THEIR INJURIES. The Journal's news came from the services of 
,11 ., 
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the New York Times, New York Herald, New York World, and 
United Press. The Journal reported that several submarines 
fired at least three torpedoes into the liner. The paper 
reported bulletins that said the crew had acted bravely, and 
that forty children, less than a year old, had died during 
the attack. 35 But even as the Journal outlined the horror of 
the sinking, the paper gave equal emphasis to German 
justification. A page two story of May 8 discussed the 
contraband cargo of the Lusitania. And a front page story on 
May 9 discussed the British starvation blockade of 
Germany.3 6 The reaction of newspapers in Germany was also 
reviewed in several issues. 
Editorials 
Editorially, the Journal followed the Star and the 
Constitution in urging calm deliberation and faith in the 
president. A May 8 Journal editorial told Americans: "Sit 
tight. Don't rock the boat." The disaster called for calm, 
clear thinking: 
The sinking of the Lusitania,with 
consequent loss of American lives, comes as a 
great and almost unprecedented shock to the 
nation. It makes still more tense, still more 
menacing a situation that has caused alarm among 
all thoughtful men. 
35. Milwaukee Journal, 8 May 1915, p. 2. 
36 ''Sinking Due to Starving Plans Dernburg Puts 
Tragedy Up to British,'' Milwaukee Journal, 9 May 1915, p. 1. 
Because of this emotion, this shock and 
this danger, it is more necessary than ever for 
Americans to take a firm grip upon themselves 
and to win and retain self-mastery. It is 
imperative that they do this. It is no time for 
excited talk and reckless declarations. Clear 
heads, good sense, and calm thinking and 
reasoning are absolutely required in America 
today. 37 
178 
The Journal praised statesmen like former president 
Taft for urging calm faith in Wilson. The paper attacked the 
jingoes, most notably Theodore Roosevelt, for recklessly 
calling for military action: 
The thing Mr. Roosevelt ought to 
consider, and apparently does not consider, is 
that as a man who has occupied the post of 
president, he will be listened to more at home 
and in other lands than a man who has been only 
a private citizen. In his language, which is 
anything but the voice of calmness and 
judgement; in his violence, which is anything 
but representative of the American people, he 
does what one man can to hamper and embarrass 
the administration, which is charged with the 
responsibility of guarding the interests of the 
nation, and to misrepresent the American 
people. 38 
Letters to the Editor 
The Journal's letters to the editor, like its news 
coverage, reflected both sides of the issue. The letters 
covered both ends of the Lusitania spectrum: severe 
37 . "Let Reason Rule," Milwaukee Journal, 8 May 1915, 
p. 4. 
38 "Not Serving His Country," Milwaukee Journal, 13 
May 1915, p. 8. 
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condemnation of Germany, and criticism of British policies 
and Americans who traveled in the danger zone: 
To the Journal: The premeditated and cruel 
destruction of the Lusitania and the lives of 
innocent American citizens by Germany by means 
of submarines will go down in history as a most 
barbaric event. It is inconceivable at this 
stage of civilization that any nation would ever 
lend its aid and support to such wholesale 
destruction of innocent men, women and children 
39 
To the Journal: ... While all must regret the 
sinking of the Lusitania, particularly the loss 
of so many American lives, in war it is 
necessary to destroy as much property belonging 
to the enemy as is possible, and the fact that 
the ship was sunk by a German submarine is 
certainly no cause why we should go to war with 
Germany. All passengers had been repeatedly 
warned of the danger; there are American ships 
crossing the Atlantic in which they could have 
taken passage and been safe. 40 
"Too Proud to Fight" 
Meanwhile, Woodrow Wilson, the man the newspapers 
looked to in this hour of crisis, had issued no official 
word concerning the loss of American lives on the Lusitania. 
For three days after the tragedy - while front page stories 
of shock and concern from Washington quoted members of 
Congress, officials from the State Department, and members 
of the cabinet - Wilson remained stoically silent while the 
39 . "Sinking of the Lusitania," Milwaukee Journal, 13 
May 1915, p. 8. 
40 "Use American Ships," Milwaukee Journal, 14 May 
1915, p. 12. 
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facts filtered in from Ireland. He broke his silence on the 
night of May 10, when he traveled to Philadelphia to speak 
before a crowd of four thousand newly naturalized citizens. 
During his address he touched on the ideals of America: 
The example of America must be a special 
example. The example of America must be the 
example not merely of peace because it will not 
fight, but of peace because it is the healing 
and elevating influence of the world and strife 
is not. There is such a thing as a man being too 
proud to fight. There is such a thing as a 
nation being so right that it does not need to 
convince others by force that it is right. 41 
Wilson had intended his remarks as another statement 
of American neutrality and peace versus the warring nations 
of Europe. But coming on the heels of the Lusitania sinking, 
political foes seized the phrase, "too proud to fight," and 
began to use it against him. Again, Roosevelt led the 
charge, saying that "Professor Wilson," was a "Byzantine 
logothete," who was supported by all the "flubdubs," 
"mollycoddles," and "flapdoodle pacifists. 1142 
On May 11, all the newspapers reported Wilson's 
Philadelphia speech within the context of the Lusitania 
disaster. The speech was covered on the front page, and 
second page of all seven of the newspapers studied. The news 
in all the papers included the negative reaction of European 
leaders and newspapers. The Journal printed a story quoting 
41 . Patrick Devlin, Too Proud to Fight, p. 288. 
42 Bailey, 
People, p. 579. 
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White 
said Wilson's speech was not a 
House advisors that 
statement of his Lusitania policy.43 
Overall editorial opinion favored Wilson's 
speech. The 
Star --=- compared Wilson to Abraham Lincoln: 
In looking back now at the great figure of 
Abraham Lincoln the distinctive attribute of him 
was his patience the quality that gave him 
understanding of the passions and tribulations 
of others. The quality, also, that gave him 
strength to shape his course bY his own ideals 
despite those passions and tribulations others. 
It is not possible to measure a living 
actor on the world's stage with the accuracy 
that perspective gives. But it is possible to 
feel the stimulus of character and of moral 
greatness when exerted bY a living personage . 
Indeed, it is impossible not to respond to such 
qualities and to feel one's own moral energies 
are revived.44 
The Constitution also praised the speech, saying that 
Wilson's 
policies were anchOred on the "broad ground of 
nity," instead of the narr~ self-interest of the 
huma . 
jingoes· 
President Wilson could not have laid down a 
better rule of action than biS assertion, 'There 
is such a thing as being so right that it [a 
nation] doesn't need to convince others by force 
that it is right.' The president has made it 
clear that his remarks applied not alone to the 
Lusitania incident but to all of those which 
have tended to prod~ce friction with Germany or 
other countries; or, in other words, be put the 
reformations of a mistaken aerman_policY above 
the question of attempted chastisement for a 
43 f Jo • "Speech Not a Declaration ° 
~' 11 May 1915, P· 6. 
44 
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single untoward act.45 
The Post praised the speech for its directness, 
simplicity and patriotism. The Tribune lauded the speech's 
"sane statecraft," citing it as another reason to support 
the president: "If the cost of coming through safely be 
humiliation, we think the guide of our ways will have to be 
some other man than Woodrow Wilson. 46 
The reaction of the Times to the president's 
Philadelphia speech was unique to the papers studied. It 
praised the speech in a May 11 editorial, but indicated that 
Wilson was simply waiting for public opinion to jell before 
striking out against Germany. The American people, said the 
Ti mes, feel "there can be no peace on earth until the 
Hohenzollern curse is lifted from Germany, until her godless 
military arrogance is crushed." Wilson, the editorial 
continued, although knowing this feeling of the nation, 
could not say this in his speech in Philadelphia, but was 
waiting for the right moment. Wilson, according to the 
Times, would not let the people down. 47 
Hearst's Examiner was the only paper to criticize the 
speech. Although praising that aspect of Wilson's address 
45 . "The President's Address," Atlanta Constitution, 12 
May 1915, p. 8. 
46 . "In the Hands of the President," Chicago Tribune, 
12 May 1915, p. 6. 
47. "Not the Final Word," New York Times, 11 May 1915, 
p. 14. 
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that dealt with unity among Americans, the Examiner 
criticized the "too proud to fight" remark: 
The President's theory that a nation may be 
too proud to fight does more credit to his heart 
than to his head. 
The trouble with this theory is that the 
other nations may not be too proud to fight. 
Altruistic theories are one thing. The 
realities of life are another ... 
Let us always be too proud to make unjust 
war. But let us always be proud enough to fight 
valiantly any power which threatens us with 
unjust war. 48 
Thus ended the initial coverage of the tragedy. the 
splendid Lusitania was now a "smear of flotsam" on the Irish 
Sea. The Germans had apologized for the loss of American 
lives, but blamed the British for arming the vessel and 
filling it with contraband. Britain blamed the brutality of 
the "Huns." And Wilson had called for unity and neutrality 
in Philadelphia. The world awaited his official response to 
Germany. 
Each of the papers studied reviewed events from its 
own particular vantage point. The Times could have been a 
state-owned newspaper of the British government. Every 
account of the sinking, every accusation against the 
Germans, released by the British government or Cunard was 
publicized and editorially verified by the Times. The German 
side of the story was ignored, or viewed with suspicion. 




12 May 1915. 
But Won't Work," San Francisco 
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took a strictly neutral, pro-American stance. Charges from 
both sides were given coverage in these newspapers. German 
defenses and stories criticizing Cunard and the British 
Admiralty were placed as prominently as were the disaster 
stories themselves. Editorially, these papers wanted answers 
from both sides, and wanted the United States government to 
take action against a reoccurrence - by banning Americans 
from travel on belligerent ships. 
The Constitution and Star were similar in both news 
coverage and editorial opinion. Both used the major wire 
services and the services of the New York press to provide 
their readers with a news selection similar to the Times. 
German brutality was highlighted, while German defenses and 
counterclaims received little emphasis. Editorially, both 
backed President Wilson without question. The Journal was 
also an unquestioning advocate for the president's choice of 
strategy, but its news coverage was more balanced than the 
Constitution and the Star - even though it used the same 
news sources. 
During the initial coverage of the Lusitania crisis an 
editorial pattern began to appear. The large metropolitan 
dailies - Post, Times, Examiner, and Tribune - all rallied 
around the president, but were quick to point out policy 
options such as preparedness, or keeping Americans off 
British ships. The regional dailies of the smaller cities-
Constitution, Star, and Journal - urged calm deliberation 
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and faith in the president, but refused to second-guess the 
administration. 
As events drew on into the summer, the papers 
continued to probe, speculate, and comment - based on their 
unique political and editorial positions. 
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CHAPTER SIX: AFTERWARD - THE DIPLOMATIC DEBATE 
The Lusitania Notes 
President Wilson's first formal protest against the 
Lusitania's sinking was cabled to Berlin on May 13, 1915, 
six days after the disaster. Though still receiving front 
page coverage in all the papers studied, the Lusitania news 
was becoming more a story of diplomatic debate, and less a 
tale of tragedy at sea. Only the communication between 
Berlin and Washington was front page news. Remaining 
survivor and salvage stories began to share space with other 
war news on the inside pages or to disappear completely. 
Other than the mass funerals for the dead in Queenstown, no 
other breaking news came from the sinking. Not surprisingly, 
the British Admiralty and Cunard were vindicated at an 
inquest in Kinsale, Ireland. Germany was indicted for 
murder. An investigation by Parliament reached the same 
verdict on July 17. 
The first American Lusitania note upheld the 
"indisputable" right of Americans to sail on the high seas. 
It demanded a disavowal of the act and reparation for 
damages. It called for an end to U-boat warfare, because the 
submarine could never be used in accordance with 
international law. The note itself was drafted by Wilson, 
Bryan was forced to sign it although he personally had been 
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fighting to keep Americans off belligerent ships. 
The Examiner attacked this first note, largely on the 
same grounds as Bryan. The Examiner said it was unrealistic 
to expect that Germany would give up her only effective 
weapon against Britain, the submarine. It said Wilson's 
insistence on this could lead to war. 1 
All the other papers however, fell into line behind 
the president. The Times praised the president's note as 
temperate but firm: 
It may be said that 
point of the controversy 
nothing as to which it is 
conclusive. 
the note leaves no 
untouched and touches 
not convincing and 
The editorial continued that the choice Wilson gave to 
Germany 
was between "abandonment of a method of warfare in which 
she may feel that she has been singly successful and 
conformity to the dictates of justice and humanity." This 
should not be a hard choice for Germany, for if she refused, 
she would be considered an outlaw nation and all of 
civilization would rise against her. 2 
The Tribune called the note "at once an assertion of 
right an eloquent and friendly appeal." It said the note, 
although uncompromising on submarine warfare, was considered 
1 . "The President's Note to Germany," San Francisco 
Examiner, 14 May 1915, p. 20. 
2 . "The President's Note," New York Times, 14 May 1915, 
p. 12. 
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friendly enough to encourage negotiations over the matter. 
Such a note held out the possibility of renewing normally 
friendly relations between the two countries. 3 The Tribune 
did not push for Americans to be banned from belligerent 
ships. 
The Constitution said that the president's note proved 
there were other ways to solve a crisis than war. The paper 
simply stated: "The President's attitude is in full accord 
with the editorial expression of the Constitution." In 
short, "Well done, Mr. President."4 
The Post continued to back the president. Its comment 
was that the note: 
is framed in moderate language and 
leaves abundant opportunity for the German 
government to reply in a way that will restore 
good feeling between the countries. At the same 
time the note conveys an unmistakable warning 
that the practices complained of must cease, or 
the United States will take steps in its own way 
to protects the lives of its citizens and their 
exercise of their unquestioned rights. 5 
The Star said that: "The German government will 
strengthen itself before world public opinion if it accepts 
the note in the spirit in which it was sent, and changes its 
3. "The American Note," Chicago Tribune, 14 May 1915, 
p. 8. 
4 . "Well Done Mr. President," Atlanta Constitution, 14 
May 1915, p. 8. 
5 . "Up to Germany," Washington Post, 19 May 1915. 
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mode of warfare to meet the conditions laid down. 11 6 
The Journal backed the President, and seemingly called 
its city's large German-born population to do the same: 
His firmness and his desire for friendship 
are certain of the confidence and support of all 
Americans. It is our part not alone to approve, 
but to refrain from excitement or that kind of 
discussion which provokes unfriendly feeling. It 
is a time when we must hold every other thing 
second to our duty as Americans ... 7 
It took about two weeks for the Germans to deliberate 
and send back their reply from Berlin. This delay had a 
purpose, for Berlin hoped to give the United States time to 
cool off. In the meantime, the American press returned to 
business as usual. 
The Constitution, Star, and Journal went back to local 
and regional issues. After May 13, stories from Washington 
about the negotiations with Berlin began to share the inside 
pages with other news of the war. The attitude of these 
three newspapers was best summed up by a page one editorial 
in the Star: "The tragedy in Europe must not be permitted to 
absorb attention to the exclusion of obligations at home. 118 
The Star turned its editorial attention toward a bond 
referendum for civic improvements; but the few editorials 
6 . "The Note to Germany," Kansas City Star, 14 May 
1915, p. 1. 
7 "The Note to Germany," Milwaukee Journal, 14 May 
1915, p. 12. 
8 . "Boost Kansas City," Kansas City Star, 16 May 1915, 
p. 1. 
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dealing with foreign policy backed the preparedness policies 
of Theodore Roosevelt. The Constitution emphasized highway 
construction and the city schools in its editorials. The 
Journal continued to push for American unity in the face of 
conflict abroad. 
The Times continued its emphasis on international and 
national news. Preparedness was a growing theme in the 
paper's editorials. It reaffirmed Wilson's note, saying the 
U.S. position was non-negotiable. The Germans continued to 
receive the condemnation of the paper, while the British 
were upheld as champions of democracy. 
The Examiner continued to brood over Wilson's note and 
to urge the nation to beef up her defenses so that she could 
enforce her neutral rights against any nation. All the 
belligerents in the war were savage, self-interested, and 
not to be trusted with international agreements, it claimed. 
In Chicago, the Tribune also stepped up its preparedness 
campaign. All Americans of foreign descent were praised for 
their loyalty. Citing the difficulty for a democracy to 
formulate consistent foreign policy, it cautioned Americans 
to be patient and stand behind the president. 
The Post was also a member of the preparedness team. 
It held neutral rights had to be protected from abuse by any 
belligerent. The interruption of American commerce by the 
British blockade continued to be an issue for the paper. And 
President Wilson was urged to address Great Britain on the 
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same issues as he had Germany. The Post also continued to 
comment on the circumstances surrounding the sinking of the 
Lusitania, and it questioned the British silence in the 
matter. 
The German reply was cabled to Washington on May 18. 
The question concerning the validity of submarine warfare, 
raised by the United States in the first note was avoided. 
Germany said that it had already offered apologies to all 
the neutral nations involved in the sinking of the 
Lusitania; she would go no farther because the liner was an 
armed auxiliary cruiser - a justified target. The British 
government had been using neutral passengers as a shield for 
its munitions. 
The Times reacted sharply to this rather defiant 
reply. Germany was temporizing over the issues - clearly she 
misunderstood the resolve of the people of America. The 
Lusitania was not an armed cruiser and its deliberate 
sinking was an act of murder. The Times said of the German 
reply: 
we should find it difficult to refrain 
from calling into question Germany's good faith. 
That we shall not do, but she will be plainly 
told that her reply to our note is 
unsatisfactory and she will again be told that 
we expect to be clearly and definitely informed 
of her intentions.9 
The Tribune called the German reply "less a response 
9 . "Germany's Disappointing Reply," New York Times, 31 
May 1915, p. 6. 
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than an invitation to debate." And it called on all trans-
Atlantic passengers to refrain from traveling on steamers 
carrying munitions until the questions concerning submarine 
warfare could be settled.lo 
To the Examiner, the vague and defiant reply was 
invited by the contents of the first American note. It 
claimed Wilson had no right to prohibit Germany's use of her 
submarines against enemy commerce and said America could not 
tell a country how to fight its wars. Contending the 
submarine would eventually have to be covered by the rules 
of international law, it held Wilson's position was 
outdated. It called on the United States to join with other 
neutrals to draw up a clear cut list of rights - and then 
stand to defend them.11 
The Constitution speculated over the reason for 
Berlin's vague and resistent reply. The paper said that 
Wilson should stick to his guns, to demand answers to the 
two critical questions he posed - "Will Germany cease to 
make war upon innocent American citizens, and will she make 
amends for the wanton slaughter she has already committed?" 
Although it called for "direct answers," it also said, "we 
cannot afford to let hysteria supplant reason. The breaking 
10. "The German Reply," Chicago Tribune, 31 May 1915, 
p. 6. 
11 . "Define 
Nations to Defend 
1915, p. 24. 
Neutral Rights, and Then Unite All Neutral 
Them," San Francisco Examiner, 1 June 
) ---~ 
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point is still a long way off. 11 12 
The Post joined the Constitution in calling for calm 
deliberation in this "critical situation" involving the 
German reply. According to the Post, the German reply was 
based on faulty reasoning. How could the victims of the 
sinking themselves be blamed for their tragedy?13 
The Star was not satisfied wit the German reply, and 
said the U.S. must insist on the protection of her citizens, 
no matter where they travel: "This government would fail in 
its duty to its citizens, and to the cause of humanity, if 
it did not stand by the terms of its great protest. 14 
The Journal continued its theme of American unity. Its 
editorial gave no opinion on the German reply except that it 
"will meet a variety of opinion in the minds of the American 
people." The Journal said that no matter what individual 
feelings were about the German response, it was every 
citizen's duty to maintain "self control" and "trust" the 
actions of the president. 15 
Official Washington was quite disappointed with the 
German reply to the first Lusitania note . Wilson, and his 
1 2. "The German Answer," Atlanta Constitution, 1 June 
1915, p. 8. 
13. "A Critical Situation," Washington Post, 31 May 
1915, p. 6. 
14 . "The Protest Still Stands," Kansas City Star, 31 
May 1915, p. 1. 
15 . "The American Duty," Milwaukee Journal, 31 May 
1915, p. 6. 
r 
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advisors, set out almost immediately to formulate an answer. 
Again following the legal advice of Lansing, Wilson drafted 
the second Lusitania note. In blunt language it refuted 
Germany's claims that the ship was armed and said the fact 
it carried a small amount of munitions did not justify an 
attack without warning. He again urged, on humanitarian 
grounds, that Germany give up its use of the submarine as a 
commerce raider. Wilson defended the right of Americans to 
travel freely on the high seas. 
This second note was too much for Bryan, who was now 
convinced that Wilson's pro-Ally policy would eventually 
lead to a showdown with Germany. Frustrated after months of 
watching true American neutrality slip away, Bryan resigned 
on June 8. Lansing became Secretary of State. 
Americans were unaware of the deep rift that had 
opened between Bryan and Wilson. As a loyal party man, Bryan 
steadfastly refused to criticize his chief in public. So his 
resignation at this point in the negotiations made it appear 
the administration's foreign policy was in disarray. Six of 
the newspapers studied saw Bryan's resignation as an act of 
disloyalty, and he received sharp criticism. In the ensuing 
weeks, the Star and Times viciously attacked the former 
secretary of state. Only the Examiner praised Bryan's 
resignation as an act of conscience: 
Perhaps in thus following his conscience 
Mr. Bryan has done his country a real service by 
emphasizing the far divergence of the 
Administration, of which he now ceases to be a 
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member, from that strict and impartial 
neutrality which should characterize this nation 
and by the observance of which alone it can 
escape entanglement in the world war.16 
With the Bryan resignation, the press expected the 
second note to be close to a declaration of war. When it 
repeated the terms of the first note, they were relieved. 
The Constitution praised the president's second note as 
being "consistent with American dignity and honor." It said 
Wilson stood on firm ground with international law; Berlin 
would be mistaken to doubt America's resolve. 17 
The Tribune saw the second note as more neutral than 
the first. Its tone seemed to invite mediation over the use 
of the submarine in warfare. To blindly insist on a total 
ban on the use of the submarines against merchant ships 
would favor Great Britain. This second note expressed a 
balanced approach, according to the Tribune, and it lacked 
the wording of an ultimatum. 18 
The Times called the note "firm and courteous." It had 
an appeal to justice and humanity that no nation could 
refuse. Wilson was offering Germany the opportunity to enter 
16 . "Mr. Bryan's Resignation And Its Significance," San 
Francisco Examiner, 9 June 1915, p. 24. 
17 . "Second Note to Germany," Atlanta Constitution, 12 
June 1915, p. 6. 
18 . "The Second Note," Chicago Tribune, 11 June 1915, 
p. 6. 
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once again the "roles of civilization. 1119 
The Post said of the second note: 
While the United States yields nothing in 
asking for an assurance that the destruction of 
American lives shall not occur again, there is 
nothing in the note at which Germany can take 
offense, and much that points the way toward a 
friendly adjustment of all differences. 20 
The Examiner was pleased with the second note, noting 
especially that the use of the submarine was now an item for 
negotiation: 
The American people ought now to be able to 
look forward to the proper assertion of the 
rightful demands of the nation instead of the 
extreme unreasonable demands of the original 
note now delicately set over if not entirely 
eliminated. 
With the submarine issue now negotiable, the Examiner 
wondered by Bryan had resigned. 21 
The Star was still directly behind Wilson on the 
second note: 
The United States would be lacking in self 
respect, it would be false to its obligation as 
the leading neutral power, it would be inviting 
the contempt of the world, if it did not insist 
on those rights that were disregarded when the 
Lusitania was sunk.22 
19 . "Germany's Opportunity," New York Times, 11 June 
1915, p. 14. 
20 "The 
1915, p. 6. 
Note to Germany," Washington Post, 11 June 
21 . "Our Rights, All Our Rights, And Nothing But our 
Rights," San Francisco Examiner, 11 June 1915, p. 24. 
1. 
22 . "America's Duty," Kansas City Star, 9 June 1915, p. 
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The Journal praised the "friendly" tone of the second 
note, and said that if an agreement could not be reached it 
would be through no fault of President Wilson. 23 
The German response of July 8 again sidestepped 
Wilson's demands. Berlin said it did indeed respect the laws 
of humanity, but was obliged to continue submarine warfare 
due to the unlawful acts of her enemies. It argued Great 
Britain had first broken international law by its food 
blockade of Germany and by arming many of her merchant ships 
had forced Germany to sink vessels without warning. 
Therefore, it said submarine warfare was a justifiable 
response to the British blockade, and in the case of the 
Lusitania, there would be no disavowal. 
The Times reacted angrily: 
The purpose of Germany in this latest note 
is quite unconcealed. It could hardly be more 
frankly avowed. She asks us to suspend the law 
of nations, the laws of war and humanity for her 
benefit. 
The editorial asserted that Germany was an outlaw 
nation, and Americans must be firm in asserting their rights 
abroad. 24 
The Constitution took a more optimistic view of the 
situation: 
Although the german note, just received, 
23 . "The Note to Germany," Milwaukee Journal, 11 June 
1915, p. 12. 
24 . "What are Germany's Intentions?" New York Times, 11 
July 1915, p. 14. 
making reply to the demands of he United State 
regarding rights upon the high seas, fails in 
some important particulars to meet American 
views, there is evidence enough that Germany and 
this country through diplomatic negotiation, are 
gradually finding a way out of the entanglement 
that came about as the result of the torpedoing 
of the Lusitania. 
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The Constitution pointed out that since the sending of 
the first American note, Germany had been complying with the 
legal principles recognized by America regarding neutral 
shipping. Germany had not attacked an American or other 
neutral ship without warning. Surely a compromise could be 
reached from this situation, it said. 25 
The Post held the same view as the Constitution: 
If this avoidance of injury to Americans is 
continued as policy, it matters little what the 
two governments may declare in their exchange of 
notes. Actual danger of conflict will have been 
removed. 26 
The Tribune suggested that since this second German 
reply was as equally unbending as the first, the nation 
might be asking too much of Berlin. It was time to seek 
compromise, it said, Germany could not be expected to give 
up her only worthwhile naval weapon: 
The question is 
stands ready to stand 
its rights to the 
consistent with its 
interests to forego 
rights in favor of 
whether the United States 
upon the full measure of 
uttermost, or finds it 
honor, its duty, and it 
full enjoyment of its legal 
an agreement which will in 
25 "Our Foreign 
July 1915, p. 2F. 
Problems," Atlanta Constitution, 11 
26 "Germany's Note and Her Policy in Fact," Washington 
Post, 11 July 1915, p. 4. 
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fact protect its citizens and avoid the danger 
or certainty of a resort to extreme measures.27 
The Examiner continued to comment that the reason for 
the unsatisfactory German reply was the unrealistic demands 
of Wilson. Like the Tribune, the Examiner called for 
compromise and negotiation on the subject of submarines and 
international law, so the right of neutrals might be clearly 
established.28 
The Journal again addressed its citizens as if they 
were about to riot over the issue: 
The reply of Germany to the recent note of 
the state department refuses to grant the 
demands made by this government. We must now 
look for a flare of indignation throughout this 
country. There will be much excited comment, and 
we enter on the gravest situation since the 
sinking of the Lusitania. We must still remember 
that the president has a better view of this 
matter than any one else can have. 29 
The Star said that Wilson was following the only 
diplomatic path 
available: 
... The Lusitania tragedy remains as it was 
the day it occurred. The sinking of an unarmed 
merchantman without warning and with great loss 
of life is not disavowed. There is no assurances 
that other similar tragedies may not be enacted. 
There is nothing in the note to cause the 
United State to alter the position which it has 
assumed, and which it must maintain. This 
government is standing for the rights of neutral 
27. "The German Note," 
p. 4 II. 
Chicago Tribune, 11 July 1915, 
28 . "Insist Upon All Rights, And Only Upon Rights," San 
Francisco Examiner, 12 July 1915, p 16. 
29 . "Germany's Reply," Milwaukee Journal, 10 July 1915, 
p. 4. 
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nations, which in this particular case are the 
rights of humanity as wel1. 30 
200 
By July the sinking of the Lusitania was found nowhere 
on the pages of the newspapers studied. More exciting war 
news the loss of battleships and the struggle in the 
trenches had taken its place. Only the diplomatic 
wrestling over the Lusitania remained news on the front 
page. And this was only when a note was anticipated from 
either Berlin or Washington. Otherwise, speculation on the 
outcome of the debate was buried on the inside pages. 
Ironically, this is what both Berlin and Washington had 
wanted, hoping the passage of time 
unyielding positions. 
would change two 
With the pro-Ally Lansing now firmly in charge at the 
State Department, he set about providing Wilson with a fi r m 
answer to this second defiant German reply. Lansing was 
hoping to get the Germans to admit the sinking was illegal, 
as a reprisal to an already illegal starvation blockade. 
What neither Lansing nor Wilson knew, but both the 
Constitution and the Post had observed in their editorials 
(already mentioned), was that the German Admiralty was now 
under standing orders to spare all passenger liners-
regardless of nationality. No passenger ships had been sunk 
since the loss of the Lusitania. 
Wilson drafted his third, and final Lusitania note for 




Lansing's signature on July 21. The note was still blunt, 
but it admitted that the submarine might be used legally if 
deployed using the Cruiser Rules of visit and search. The 
note sought an acknowledgement from Berlin that the sinking 
was illegal, and that American rights to sail on belligerent 
ships would not be threatened. After the note was cabled, 
little mention was made of it in the front pages within a 
few days. 
On July 22, the Tribune continued its call for the ban 
of passengers on ships carrying munitions of war. But with 
the release of the third note, the paper saw its duty as one 
of backing the president - right or wrong. The Tribune said 
the third note was: "If not an ultimatum in form, it is an 
ultimatum in fact. The door of discussion is closed. 11 31 
The Examiner felt the third note an unjustifiable 
ultimatum from Wilson and Lansing: 
Naturally, Germany will no more admit that 
the President of the United States can formulate 
international law and apply it without Germany's 
assent than would we Americans admit that the 
Kaiser can formulate new international law and 
apply it to us without our assent. 32 
The Times said the third note stated the U.S. position 
with "courage and firmness." Now that our nation had spoken: 
"It rests with Germany to say whether she desires the 
continuance of friendly relations between the two 
31. "Our Country!" Chicago Tribune, 24 July 1915, p. 6. 
32 "Arbitration, Not Ultimatums, Best For European 
Issues," San Francisco Examiner, 26 July 1915, p. 16. 
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Governments and the two peoples. 11 33 
The Post was not impressed with the note. Like the 
Examiner, the paper felt it was now time to pursue England's 
violations of American rights. 34 
The Journal again praised Wilson's statesmanship: 
"Beyond the shadow of a doubt, were there mutual relations 
reversed, the position that Washington takes is the position 
that Germany would take. 1135 
The Star echoed the Tribune: "My country right or wrong., 
Mr. Wilson, in his latest note to Germany, has placed his 
country unquestionably right." 36 The Constitution though 
reporting the news of the third note on page one, had no 
editorial comment. 
The end to the diplomatic duel came on February 4, 
1916, when Germany - after much discussion with Washington-
sent its final response. Berlin said the sinking was an act 
against the starvation blockade of Germany, but the great 
loss of life was unintentional. Germany said she would limit 
her submarine attacks - an act she had already ordered. And 
the German government expressed "regret" for the loss of 
p. 6. 
33. "The Last Word," New York Times, 24 July 1915, p.8 
34. "American Rights," Washington Post, 23 July 1915, 
35. "The Note to Berlin," Milwaukee Journal, 24 July 
1915, p. 4. 
36. "The President's Note," Kansas City Star, 24 July 
1915, p. 1. 
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American lives, agreeing to pay damages. Due reparations 
were made in the 1920s. Germany was never forced to admit 
the sinking was illegal. 
Though all seven newspapers studied ran news stories 
of this diplomatic settlement on pages one and two, only 
three closed the proceedings with editorials. Both the Post 
and the Examiner called for the same effort against Great 
Britain. The Times hoped the fight against Germany would 
continue, though Washington now dropped the matter: 
It was unlawful, and the admission of 
illegality is the essence of our demand. No 
money indemnity can take its place, no fine-spun 
phrases will be accepted as satisfactory. There 
must be an admission of the wrong, of the 
unlawfulness of the act. Without that the 
diplomatic interchanges will be discontinued. 
Responsibility for the conseguence must rest 
with the unrepentant wrongdoer. 3 7 
Six months later, during the first week of August, 
1916, the fate of the Lusitania was all but forgotten. The 
newspapers studied continued to cover the war in Europe, but 
were much more interested in the political conflict about to 
take place in America the election of 1916. The 
Republicans, that first week in August, had nominated 
Supreme Court Justice Charles Evans Hughes. The Democrats 
were ready to renominate Woodrow Wilson for a second term, 
using the slogan "He kept us out of war." 
Though the coming election was beginning to creep into 
37. "Freedom of the Seas," New York Times, 6 February 
1916, p. 14. 
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editorials concerning the policies of the Wilson 
administration, all seven papers remained against American 
intervention in the European conflict. Their views of 
Germany had not changed. 
On August 3, the Times attacked a recent speech by 
Kaiser Wilhelm in which he praised the determination of the 
German people in the righteous cause of their nation. The 
Times said the Kaiser would be defeated in his quest for 
world domination: 
When the pride of the German rulers is 
humbled, the fangs drawn from their hatred, the 
Germany they have deceived and led into a 
devil's dance will 'live free, secure, and 
strong among the nations of the world' [the 
Kaiser's words]; but there will be small 
recompense for those men and women, old and 
young, all quietly and bravely wearing 
mourning,' whose loved ones died for a will-o-
the-wisp, for a cause not their own, for the 
gratification of a mad ambition and the 
glorification of a false god.38 
While the Times railed against Germany, the Post 
maintained its independent course during the first week in 
August, 1916. It continued to attack British trade 
restrictions against American ships, but was not about to 
take sides in the European war. On August 4 the paper vented 
its disgust: 
Americans are sick of having one side or 
the other in the European war trying to work up 
prejudice and hatred while committing acts just 
a offensive as those charged against the enemy. 
- A plague of both your houses!' cries the 
38 . "Wilhelm Speaks Again," New York Times, 3 August 
1916, p. 10. 
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disgusted neutral; 'clean the blood off your own 
hands before you raise them in holy horror at 
the acts perpetrated by your enemy. Do not try 
to justify your murders by calling your enemy a 
murderer. Do not pose to us as an injured party 
when you are making reprisals that shock 
mankind. ' 3 9 
Like the Post, the Examiner was disgusted with the 
bloodshed in Europe. The paper's political cartoons attacked 
the British trade restrictions, but the editorials were 
strongly isolationist. On August 6, the Examiner said the 
nations of Europe had been caught like rats in the trap of 
war: 
But every nation, if it said today what it 
felt, would say, ' rt was not worth it.' The 
nation that says it fought to defend its 
commerce knows that it has spent ten times more 
blood and money than its commerce was worth. 
So of every other ' good reason.' 
If the nations had thought and taken time 
for good REASONING, instead of seizing upon the 
first good reason for war, millions of men dead 
or wounded would now be well and working 
usefully; thousands upon thousands of millions 
squandered would be saved for useful spending.40 
Though isolationist in line with the Post and 
Examiner, the Republican Tribune had already decided that 
Charles Evans Hughes was the best man in the coming 
presidential election. During the first week of August, 
1916, it praised Hughes acceptance speech and criticized 
Wilson's slogan "He kept us out of war:" 
39 . "Both Sides Guilty," Washington Post, 4 August 
1916, p. 4. 
40 "The Cheese Was Not Worth It," San Francis co 
Examiner, 6 August 1916, Editorial Section, p . 1. 
"f, lffllMWJWTM:tiftD'SWWSti&G&ilZ%JUU H ,.__"'==============----'--..=....:. 
From this review of four years of unhappy 
ineptitude we realize that we have been kept 
perpetually on the rim of war, where courageous 
firmness would have thrust us safely back from 
the abyss; we realize that after four years of 
dizzy balancing we are still in the midst of 
intolerable complications, still threatened and 
still unprepared.41 
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The isolationist Tribune said that Wilson's foreign 
policy favored Britain. The paper wanted Americans to make 
up their own minds. On August 3, the paper criticized 
British censorship because it clouded the judgement of the 
American people: 
The British censorship aims to prevent this 
play of opinion in America. It strikes at our 
sources of criticism and interpretation. It 
wishes to deny us the judgments of Americans who 
are professionally engaged in Germany 
[reporters]. Cable messages have to pass through 
British hands. They come to us if the British 
censor allows them to come and as he allows them 
to come. 
The attempt is one in limitation of 
American intelligence. It is a restriction of 
American judgement. It is designed to produce 
bias. Great Britain may not be starving Germans 
physically, but it is trying to starve the 
Americans mentally. 42 
The Constitution of the first week in August, 1916, 
was primarily concerned with local issues before the state 
legislature. on August 3, the paper criticized Hughes for 
attacking Wilson's foreign policy. The Constitution said it 
was easy for Hughes to criticize Wilson, but much harder to 
41 "Mr. Hughes' Speech 
Tribune, 2 August 1916, p. 6. 
of Acceptance," Chicago 
42 . "Will the British Allow Us to Think?" Chicago 
Tribune, 3 August 1916, p. 6. 
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stand in his shoes.43 Firmly behind Wilson, the paper 
continued its isolationist stand. Like the Post and 
Examiner, the Constitution was disgusted with the war that 
was destroying so many lives: 
And the men fighting on to the end share 
the people's wish for peace; for the home folks 
are their people; they took home with them when 
they went to war. In the trenches and in the 
hospitals, it is said, the literature of home 
and simple things is that which appeals most to 
them: They do not read of wars; t he y ha ve had 
enough of battlesi44 
Like the Constitution, the Journal continued to stand 
behind the policies of the Wilson administration. On August 
2 it criticized Hughes for trying to be "all things to all 
men" on the war issue: 
Evidently Mr. Hughes has succeeded in his 
initial effort in pleasing those who will be for 
him at all events because they have made up 
their minds to be against Mr. Wilson. But 
whether the American people will accept a 
candidate who thus obviously attempts to be on 
both sides of the principal question in the 
campaign is another and far different thing. 45 
The Journal praised Wilson for his peaceful policy 
toward the belligerents in Europe. Throughout the week, the 
paper also continued to highlight the loyalty of the 
citizens of Milwaukee. 
43 "Where Hughes 
August 1916, p. 8. 
Stands," Atlanta Constitution, 3 
44 . "In The Don't-Know Class," Atlanta Constitution, 5 
August 1916, p. 8. 
45 . "All Things to All Men," Milwaukee Journal, 2 
August 1916, p. 8. 
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The Star, like the other papers, wanted no part of the 
war in Europe. The paper was pleased that Wilson's policies 
had kept America out of the conflict, but echoing Theodore 
Roosevelt, began to call for more comprehensive preparedness 
efforts. On August 1 the Star said that many of Wilson's 
preparedness plans were part of an "eleventh hour pre-
election rush."46 
The opinions reviewed six months after the sinking of 
the Lusitania closely resembled those of six months before 
in all seven newspapers studied. All the papers debated the 
issues involved in the war, but wanted America to stay out 
of it. 
Conclusion 
This study agrees with the public opinion assumptions 
made by previous scholars about the sinking of the 
Lusitania, especially those of Bailey and Ryan. There was no 
great clamor for war among the newspapers studied. Each 
paper had its own editorial vantage point. Each had its own 
ax to grind, but none of them called for a 
military strike against Germany for the loss of American 
lives. 
The New York Times was clearly the most warlike 
46 . "The Hughes Speech," Kansas City Star, 1 August 
1916, p. 14. 
the group 
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though its ultimate goals were 
newspaper in 
unclear. It sought a defeat of 
the German military state 
, 
but it was not 
Using 
the American military. More likely, it sought an open-
embrace of the Allies bY America - providing them 
clear about whether this ultimately meant 
hearted 
With 
all the tools necessary to defeat the Germans. 
The Chicago Tribun~, §_an Francisco Examiner, and the 
most even-handed editorial 
~shington Post all held the 
Though often criticized 
for their sensational, or 
Policy. 
reporting, these papers 
were willing to outline 
biased 
strict neutralitY 
that even the Wilson 
Policies of 
inistration avoided. seeking to 
keep America out of an 
actm· 
unpo 
pular war, these pro-American papers outlined policy 
ices to keep the u.s. out of the quagmire. Each wanted 
Cho' 
Ame · 
ricans off belligerent shiPS carrying munitions of war, 




guard;an t d the administration to 
.,_ angels." TheY also wan e 
Protest British violations of American neutral rights as 
v· igorously as it pursued the Germans· Cit St 
The Atlanta constitution, ~K~a~n~s~a~S:.-_.c==-;;.J,.--~~a=r, and 
papers most 
loyal to the 
M' -U__waukee -___:;:~~J~o~u::!.:r:..:n~a _±:,1 Presid each trusted Wilson 
ent. Though wanting to avoid war, 
to make the right choice• Much of thiS trust in Wilson was 
were 
due no doubt to the fact that all three papers shared his 
Polit' ·t t'on was firmlY behind 
ical affiliations- The~ first 
to be 
w· llson , a Democrat and a 
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electe d p r esident since t he Civil Wa r . The s ta r wa s an 
unfa i ling a dvocate of the progr essive cause , a nd Wi l son ' s 
domestic program by 1915 was progr essive beyond the 





a Democratic paper against the socialists 
Republicans of Wisconsin. The Journal's 
publisher, Lucius Nieman, also shared Wilson's dislike for 
German militarism. The Journal's position was unique, 
however, representing a city whose majority was of German 
birth - half of them unable to speak English. The paper 
backed Wilson, at the same time urging its population to 
remain behind the American cause. 
The key finding to this study is that all seven 
newspapers maintained 
before the crisis. All 
the editorial viewpoints they held 
were angered by the sinking of the 
Lusitania and the loss of American lives, but none of them 
radically changed their opinion of Germany because of it. 
The Times despised all things German before the sinking, and 
continued to do so afterward. 
Six months before the sinking, the Post, Examiner, and 
Tribune, all thought Germany an underrated power in the war, 
capable of striking with devastating military force. The 
papers also felt the United States was not doing enough to 
stay out of the conflict either through military 
preparedness, or more vigorous action against British 
violations of neutral rights. The sinking did not change 
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these basic opinions of the three papers. They stressed that 
the Germans had struck with the brutal force they were 
capable of, and that by not keeping Americans off ships like 
the Lusitania, the United States government had shirked it 
neutral duty. 
The Constitution, Journal, and Star were loyal to 
Wilson both before and after the crisis. They held that the 
sinking of the Lusitania was just one (though a large one) 
of the many policy decisions he would face as president. 
All seven papers felt the loss of American lives on 
the Lusitania was not the casus belli for an American plunge 
into war against Germany. The papers did not seek peace at 
any price, but they found the circumstances of the sinking 
too murky to martial a justified, and united effort, on the 
part of the nation. 
The sinking of the Lusitania brought the war home to 
many Americans, but this study of seven newspapers shows 
they failed to embrace it. The tragedy would eventually 
become a link in a chain of events that would draw the 
United States into the war. Certainly it did nothing to 
improve U.S. relations with Germany. But in this case, it 
appears the Lusitania was not the driving force, or key 
event, behind sending Americans to fight in Europe. 
Other observations can be made from this study. 
Probably the most interesting relates to the news coverage 
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same information regarding the disaster. They shared 
many of the same news sources. Yet each paper made 
independent news judgments, and the coverage varied from 
each paper. 
Most of the newspapers studied took their news of the 
disaster from a limited number of sources. Only three of the 
newspapers had overseas correspondents - the Times, Tribune 
----'=' 
and Examiner. All three were subject to the same British 
censorship policy. All seven newspapers shared access to the 
Associated Press and United Press. Three of the papers - the 
Constitution, Star, and Journal - received news from the New 
York news services of the Times, Herald, and World. Like the 
Queenstown reporters of the Times, Tribune, and Examiner, 
the reporters of the Associated Press, United Press, Herald, 
and World news services on the scene were also subject to 
the same British censorship policy. So the news sources 
available to the seven papers were limited, and those 
sources were affected by the British censor. 
The information about the disaster was also limited in 
scope. All seven papers had much of the same information 
regarding the sinking itself, were it happened, and 
approximately how long it took. They all knew that the 
disaster was the result of a U-boat attack - though the 
number of U-boats and torpedoes was in doubt. All seven 
papers had access to the same lists of dead and missing. The 
manifest, and other maritime documents were readily 
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available in New York and Liverpool. Reporters in Queenstown 
all had the same access to survivors - passengers and crew-
and wired their stories to America in the same way. Germany 
did not deny the sinking, and both Berlin and London 
released official statements to the press. Aside from 
classified information 
British censors anyway 
which would not be cleared by 
essentially the same facts were 
available to all seven newspapers. The only difference came 
in the selection of "experts" for analysis, or reports of 
the reaction of officials in London, Berlin, and Washington. 
With all these facts largely the same, it is amazing 
to see the wide differences in news coverage. The Times _;_;::=~' 
Constitution, and Star, all emphasized the brutality of 
Germany in the sinking of the Lusitania. The stories of 
death at sea were told more vividly in these newspapers. 
Readers learned that the German U-boat (or U-boats) had 
surfaced to allow its crew to laugh at the survivors 
struggling for their lives. The fact that the ship carried 
munitions, was possibly armed, or moving too slowly for 
evasive action, was downplayed. 
The coverage was reversed in the Tribune, Pos t , and 
Examiner. The failures of the British Admiralty and Cunard, 
and the accusations that the ship was a r med and loaded wi th 
munitions were all highlighted, while the horrific stories 
of death at sea, heroic crew members, or laughing U-boat 
crews were downplayed. Only the Journal seemed t o cull the 
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facts to achieve a balanced news product. Anyone perceiving 
the American press in monolithic terms would be surprised by 
this study. 
Another interesting observation involves those papers 
that published letters to the editor. Rather than providing 
a lively dialogue or spirited debate between the paper and 
its readers, the letters column was used as an extension of 
the views of the editorial staff. The majority of letters 
published usually agreed with the editorial opinion of the 
paper. The Times's letters registered the most rebuke 
against Germany. Most of the Tribune's questioned the wisdom 
of U.S. policies regarding travel on belligerent ships. 
Letters from the Constitution and Star displayed 
isolationism and support of the president. Only the 
Journal's letters appeared balanced. Like the paper's news 
coverage, its letters reflected both sides of opinion. After 
study of the letters in these newspapers, it appears their 
selection had more to do with editorial bias, than with the 
true sentiments of their cities' population. 
In sum, the reaction of these seven newspapers to the 
sinking of the Lusitania was far from black and white. The 
opinions contained shades of gray, and were marked by a 
distinct isolationist hue. 
The sinking of the Lusitania did not bring calls for 
military retaliation from the newspapers studied. Each paper 
was angered by the loss of life, but reacted in a way 
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consistent with its political beliefs before the crisis. The 
sinking did not change the editorial views toward Germany in 
any of the papers studied. These editorial viewpoints guided 
the papers in their story selection and news coverage of the 
crisis, even in the selection of letters to the editor. 
Though the papers held differing views over the sinking 




.. - _: ., ... 
- .,.~ 7 ....-::. :-:.~~ :-~-~ - .!.; ;_: 







The gunless Lusitania leaves New York on her final voyage. National Archives 
From Ba i ley and Ryan, The Lusitania Disaster, p. 147. 
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12_0 750 765 
'------' 
(Note rhe approximate position hclow the water line of the torpedo explosion; the damage to the two boiler rooms; the distance of the 
ammunition from the explosion labour 150 feclb. and the three steel bulkheads between the poinl of impact and the ammunition.) 
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